Arroyo-Delgado v. Dep't of Educ. of PR.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No. 15-2001 (FAB)
• Citation: 199 F.Supp.3d 548
• Parties: Lucynette ARROYO-DELGADO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

199 F.Supp.3d 548

Lucynette ARROYO-DELGADO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 15-2001 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed August 10, 2016

Francisco J. Vizcarrondo-Torres, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Lymaris Perez-Rodriguez, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

BESOSA, District Judge.

Lucynette Arroyo-Delgado ("Arroyo-Delgado"), personally and on behalf of her minor son "AGA", filed suit against the Department of Education of Puerto Rico ("PR-DOE") and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico seeking relief pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Docket No. 1.)

Before the Court is defendants' motion to remand or for summary judgment.² (Docket No. 24.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion, (Docket No. 45), defendants replied, (Docket No. 54), and plaintiffs filed a surreply, (Docket No. 66). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' motion to remand, REVERSES the decision of the administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and REMANDS the issue of the 2014-2015 IEP's adequacy to the PR-DOE for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Lucynette Arroyo-Delgado is the mother of AGA, an eleven-year-old child with disabilities registered in the PR-DOE's special education program. (Docket Nos. 1 at pp. 2-3; 45 at p. 9.) Due to concerns regarding the adequacy of AGA's education, plaintiffs filed due process complaint 2014-095-038 with the PR-DOE in July 2014. (Docket No. 27–1.) Among other items, the due process complaint alleged that the PR-DOE had not provided AGA an adequate individualized education program ("IEP") or educational placement for the 2014-2015 school year, as required by IDEA. Id. at pp. 5–6. The due process complaint also requested professional evaluations and assistive technology devices. Id. at pp. 4–5.

A hearing was held on October 14, 2014, in which plaintiffs presented witnesses. (Docket No. 69–1 at pp. 89-250.) A witness for the defendants also testified, but the hearing ended for the day before defendants concluded their case. Id. at pp. 256-301. Because of the PR-DOE attorney's busy schedule, the next hearing could not be scheduled until December 2014. See id. at pp. 304, 311.

After the October 14 hearing, the case veered off course. The ALJ presiding over the October 14th hearing, Judge Juan Palerm-Nevares, recused himself from the case. (Docket No. 27–2.) That order resulted in the cancellation of the December hearing. Id. at p. 7. The case was then assigned to Judge Luis Tomassini who held a hearing on January 12, 2015, to determine whether the case should continue using the transcript from the October 14 hearing or whether the entire process must begin anew. (Docket No. 97–1.) Unable to decide that issue at the January 12 hearing, Judge Tomassini requested memoranda of law from the parties and scheduled the next hearing for February 26, 2015. Id. at pp. 5–8. On February 20, 2015, Judge Tomassini issued an order stating that the case would continue using the transcript from the October 14 hearing, but that the hearing scheduled for February 26 must be cancelled because the PR-DOE clerical unit could not locate the case file. (Docket No. 27–3.) After Judge Tomassini's five-day deadline for the PR-DOE clerical unit to produce the case file had passed, id. at p. 2, plaintiffs twice requested continuation of the proceedings and scheduling of the next hearing. (Docket Nos. 100–1 (March 19, 2015); 64-6 (April 22, 2015).) On May 1, 2015, Judge Tomassini scheduled the next hearing for May 22, 2015. (Docket No. 27–4.) On May 15, 2015, plaintiffs moved to amend the due process complaint to include a claim for compensatory education for the 2014-2015 school year and claims relating to the upcoming 2015-2016 school year. (Docket No. 27–5.)

The parties next heard from Judge Tomassini on May 21, 2015, in the form of a final order. (Docket No. 27–7.) Not only did Judge Tomassini deny plaintiffs' motion to amend the due process complaint, he dismissed the entire complaint as moot because the 2014-2015 school year had ended. See id. at p. 8. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Tomassini made three factual determinations:

1. The student registered in Special Education and is eligible for educational and related services under the category of autism

. Petitioner was placed in [the Ines Maria Mendoza Elementary] School [in] the District of Bayamon at the age of five.

2. Petitioner, a minor, has been receiving educational services in the [Ines Maria Mendoza Elementary] School in autism classrooms. At the start of the 2014-2015 school year, the minor's parents requested payment for services in the proposed private institution[, Centro Explora].

3. The student remained placed in the [Ines Maria Mendoza Elementary] School for all of the 2014-2015 school year that ended in the month of May 2015.

Id. at p. 3. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of Judge Tomassini's decision to dismiss the complaint as moot. (Docket No. 50–1.) Without explanation, Judge Tomassini denied reconsideration on June 8, 2015. (Docket No. 15–1.)

On July 23, 2015, Arroyo–Delgado filed a complaint in this Court. (Docket No. 1.) Defendants now move to remand the case to the ALJ. (Docket No. 24.) AGA remains enrolled at the Ines Maria Mendoza Elementary School. (Docket No. 1 at p. 7.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to remand the case to the ALJ, arguing that the case is unripe for judicial review because the ALJ made no decision based on the merits of the case. See Docket No. 24. Although the Court finds the case ripe for judicial review, it remands the complaint to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion because the ALJ erred in dismissing the due process complaint as moot and because substantive determinations regarding the adequacy of AGA's education require the PR-DOE's specialized expertise.

A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The purposes of IDEA, inter alia , are "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs," 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), and to "assess, and ensure the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities," id.§ 1400(d)(4). Free appropriate public education ("FAPE") is delivered to the disabled child through an IEP. See D.B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2012) ("The ‘primary vehicle’ for delivery of a FAPE is an IEP." (quoting Lessard v. Wilton – Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2008) )). An IEP is a written statement detailing the child's current achievement levels and future goals in both academic and functional performance areas. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(III) (defining IEP). A team, which includes the parent of the disabled child, representatives of the local educational agency, and others, develops the IEP, see id.§ 1414(d)(1)(B), and reevaluates the IEP on an annual, or more frequent, basis, id.§ 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). "[T]o comply with the IDEA, an IEP must be reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit." D.B., 675 F.3d at 34.

If a child's parent considers the IEP to be inadequate, the parent has a right to an impartial due process hearing to review the adequacy of the IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). The "IDEA's policies favor[ ] prompt resolution of disputes in order to expedite the provision of FAPE to children who may be at a formative stage of their intellectual development." Nieves – Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir.2003) ; see 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (requiring a final decision resolving the matters in the due process hearing no later than forty-five days after an initial mediation period). The hearing officer is directed to make a decision "on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a [FAPE]." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). "[A]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision ... shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint ... in a district court of the United States ...." Id.§ 1415(i)(2)(A).

B. Review of Administrative Decisions Pursuant to IDEA

In any civil action brought pursuant to IDEA, a court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). Despite the independence granted to federal courts by IDEA, courts must avoid "substitut[ing] their own notions of educational policy for that of the state agency, which has greater expertise in the educational arena." Lt. T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 83–84 (1st Cir.2004). "Judges are not trained pedagogues, and they must accord deference to the state agency's application of its specialized knowledge." Lessard, 518 F.3d at 24. Thus, "judicial review falls somewhere between the highly deferential clear-error standard and the non-deferential de novo standard." Id.

C. Ripeness

Defendants challenge plaintiffs' federal complaint as unripe for judicial review. See Docket No. 24.

"In evaluating a claim to determine whether it is ripe for judicial review, [courts] consider both ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and ‘the hardship of withholding court consideration.’ " Stolt – Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n. 2, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010) (quoting Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) ).

In the administrative context, ripeness protects "agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way...