Arroyo-Ruiz v. Triple-S Mgmt. Grp.

• Decision Date: 10 July 2017
• Docket Number: Civil No. 15-1741 (FAB).
• Parties: Luis ARROYO–RUIZ, Plaintiff, v. TRIPLE–S MANAGEMENT GROUP, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

258 F.Supp.3d 240

Luis ARROYO–RUIZ, Plaintiff,

v.TRIPLE–S MANAGEMENT GROUP, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 15-1741 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed July 10, 2017

Nicolas Nogueras–Cartagena, Nicolas Nogueras Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Alberto Jose Bayouth–Montes, Luis A. Nunez–Salgado, O'Neill & Borges LLC, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendants Triple–S Vida Inc. ("Triple–S Vida"), Triple–S Insurance Agency ("Triple–S Insurance") and Triple–S Management Corporations ("Triple–S Management") (collectively "defendants")'s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (" Rule 56"). (Docket No. 56.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Luis Arroyo–Ruiz ("Arroyo") commenced this action against defendants alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Arroyo also invoked the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate his claims pursuant to Puerto Rico law, including Article II of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Article II"), Puerto Rico Law 100 ("Law 100"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq. ; Puerto Rico Law No. 115 ("Law 115"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194 et seq. , Puerto Rico Law 80 ("Law 80"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 185a – 185m, and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico ("Articles 1802 & 1803"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142. (Docket No. 32.) Defendants previously moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by law. (Docket Nos. 20 at p. 2; 33.)

The Court granted in part defendants' motion to dismiss, striking the causes of action pursuant to Title VII, Law 115, Law 100, Articles 1802 and 1803, and Arroyo's retaliation claim pursuant to the ADA. (Docket Nos. 49, 50.) Subsequently, the Court dismissed with prejudice the Article II cause of action. (Docket Nos. 53, 54.) Consequently, three causes of action remain before the Court: hostile work environment and discrimination claims pursuant to the ADA, and a claim for wrongful dismissal pursuant to Puerto Rico Law 80.

The parties have received ample time to conduct discovery and to engage in motion practice. The Court granted several motions prolonging the conclusion of discovery from March 18, 2016 to August 31, 2016, providing Arroyo with adequate opportunity to depose witnesses. (Docket Nos. 22, 36, 39 & 42.) On the final day of discovery, however, Arroyo moved for a protective order regarding the pending depositions of defense witness Juan Iglesias ("Iglesias") and Arroyo's own witness, Dr. Victor Llado. (Docket No. 46.) Subsequently, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 56.) More than two-weeks after defendants moved for summary judgment and well after the close of discovery, Arroyo requested an extension of time to oppose the Rule 56 motion. (Docket No. 59.) Arroyo claimed that Iglesias remained unavailable for deposition and that defendants refused to produce discovery.¹ Id. Defendants opposed. (Docket No. 60.) The Court denied the motion for an extension of time and deemed the motion for summary judgment unopposed. (Docket Nos. 31, 63.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment serves to assess the evidence and determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "At summary judgment, the judge's function is not himself or herself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ).

A fact is "material" if it "has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law ...." Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). A dispute is "genuine" when it "could be resolved in favor of either party." Id."Put another way, a ‘genuine’ issue exists if there is ‘sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute’ to require a choice between ‘the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (quoting Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 1975) ). "Issues are not suitable for summary judgment if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Martinez–Burgos v. Guayama Corp., 656 F.3d 7, 11 (2011) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of "demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" with definite and competent evidence. Campos v. Van Ness, 711 F.3d 243, 247–48 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). It must identify sections of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any" which support its motion. Id. Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the burden shifts to the nonmovant "to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in its favor." Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal marks and citation omitted).

"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant]'s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Murray v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). A party opposing summary judgment is required to "present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Martinez–Rodriguez v. Guevara, 597 F.3d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In making this assessment, the court must "review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." Escribano–Reyes v. Prof'l Hepa Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 2016).

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Because Arroyo failed to file a timely opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the "Court may consider the summary judgment motion unopposed, and take as uncontested all evidence presented with that motion." Nieto–Vincenty v. Valledor, 22 F.Supp.3d 153, 161 (D.P.R. 2014) (Besosa, J.) (citation omitted). Generally, the moving party prevails on an unopposed motion for summary judgment. See Perez–Cordero v. Wal–Mart P.R., 440 F.3d 531, 534 (1st Cir. 2006) ("While an unopposed summary judgment still must be scrutinized in accordance with Rule 56 [...], a party's failure to oppose summary judgment is [usually] fatal to its case.") (citation omitted).

The Court is mindful that "the entry of a summary judgment motion as unopposed does not automatically give rise to a grant of summary judgment." Aguiar–Carrasquillo v. Agosto–Alicea, 445 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). Despite Arroyo's failure to submit a timely opposition, the Court must nevertheless "entertain the motion on the merits and may not grant the same as a sanction even for failure to file a [timely] opposition." See De la Vega v. San Juan Star, 377 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2004). Ultimately, however, "a party that fails to oppose a motion for summary judgment does so at its own risk and peril." Quiñones Rodriguez v. Andoxx Corp., 440 F.Supp.2d 77, 78 (D.P.R. 2006) (Dominguez, J.). In the absence of an opposition, the Court accepts all evidence presented in the motion for summary judgment as uncontested.²

Significantly, the assertions contained in defendants' statement of uncontested facts in support of summary judgment, Docket No. 56–1, are DEEMED ADMITTED because of Arroyo's failure to oppose them timely. Moreover, defendants' statement of uncontested facts, in conjunction with their supporting exhibits, will form the SOLE BASIS for the factual background of this Opinion and Order. (Docket No. 56.)

A. Arroyo's Tenure at Triple–S Vida

Arroyo worked exclusively for Triple–S Vida for thirty-five years until his termination on May 1, 2014.³ (Docket No. 56–1 at p. 5.) At the time of his termination, Arroyo worked as a supervisor on a full time basis at the Arecibo district office. Id. The essential physical and mental requirements of Arroyo's position mandated that he stand and walk for long periods of time. Id. Arroyo was responsible for recruiting agents and maintaining a low attrition rate among personnel. Id. at p. 6.

In 2005, Arroyo suffered a cardiac arrest, requiring that he take leave from work. Id. at p. 8. After returning to work, Triple–S Vida transferred Arroyo to the Orocovis district office. Id. Arroyo exhibited low productivity at the Orocovis district office, which continued for three years without improvement. Id. The Orocovis district office closed due to low sales, the only office to do so in many years. Id. Arroyo was the manager of this office when it closed. Id. These circumstances resulted in Arroyo's demotion from manager to supervisor at the Arecibo district office. Id. at p. 9. Agency director Francisco Rivera ("Rivera") and Pedro Torres ("Torres") oversaw the office in Arecibo. Id. Carlos Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") was the manager of the Arecibo district office and Arroyo's immediate supervisor. Id.

Triple–S Vida rewarded "good producers" with commissions and other incentives. Id. Conversely, "low producers" were a "drain on...