De La Vega v. San Juan Star, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1637.,03-1637.
• Citation: 377 F.3d 111
• Parties: Sara DE LA VEGA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The SAN JUAN STAR, INC., a/k/a The San Juan Star, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 111

377 F.3d 111

Sara DE LA VEGA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The SAN JUAN STAR, INC., a/k/a The San Juan Star, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 03-1637.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard March 4, 2004.

Decided August 3, 2004.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Hector M. Laffitte, J Anibal Lugo Miranda for appellant.

Roberto O. Maldonado Nieves for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, SELYA, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Sara de la Vega filed an age discrimination claim against her employer, The San Juan Star (the Star), pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621-634, and Puerto Rico's anti-discrimination law, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146-151, also known as "Law 100." After discovery was completed, the Star filed a motion for summary judgment. De la Vega failed to respond within the time allowed under the local rules. On that basis alone, the district court entered summary judgment for the Star. Although de la Vega twice requested reconsideration of the judgment, the district court denied each motion.

We hold that the district court erred when it entered summary judgment as a sanction. Nevertheless, on the basis of our own analysis of the summary judgment record, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the Star because de la Vega failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

I.

We glean the following facts from the summary judgment record. We recount additional facts in the course of our discussion where appropriate.

The Star is a newspaper with circulation throughout Puerto Rico. In May of 1994, the Star hired Sara de la Vega as its Personnel Director. She was 54 years old at the time of her hiring. In 1996, de la Vega was promoted to the position of Executive Assistant to the President. In this new position, her duties included oversight of the personnel department, administration of vacation and sick leave policies, administration of the health plan, compliance with the collective bargaining agreement, negotiation with union representatives, and any additional responsibilities allocated to her by the President of the Star, Gerardo Angulo. During the period from 1994 to 1998, de la Vega's compensation package gradually increased from approximately $40,000 per year to $100,000 per year.

In 1997, the Star hired Salvador Hasbun as a Marketing Director. On April 28, 1998, the Star promoted Hasbun to the newly created position of General Manager, which required him to oversee the production and sales departments of the Star. Prior to creating this position, Angulo had been overseeing those departments in addition to his duties as President and CEO. Hasbun was 41 years old at the time of this promotion.

In her complaint, de la Vega claimed that her duties were effectively transferred to Hasbun after his promotion, and that she was "stripped of essentially all authority and/or decision making power." She alleged that Hasbun was "less qualified" to perform these duties and that he was entrusted with them because he was a "much younger person." She further claimed, without citing any specific instance, that members of the Star staff attempted to "get rid" of her by submitting her to "humiliating and discriminatory treatment." Despite these claims, de la Vega retained the title of Executive Assistant to the President and received the same pay and benefits package that she had received prior to Hasbun's promotion.

On September 2, 2000, de la Vega submitted a letter of resignation to Angulo. The letter did not state a reason for her departure, and it made no reference to perceived discrimination or to dissatisfaction with her working conditions. Angulo asked de la Vega to withdraw her resignation and to continue working for the Star. At first she agreed to continue her employment, but on November 13, 2000, she submitted a second letter of resignation. It stated:

The environment and supervision style you have shown in our work interaction, more or less during the last months, do not permit me to continue [working for the Star]. On multiple occasions I have sat down with you and we have spoken about this matter. Nevertheless[,] during the last months it has intensified and it reached its optimum level on Thursday, November 9.¹

Again, Angulo asked de la Vega to withdraw her resignation, and again de la Vega agreed to continue working for the Star.

Finally, on February 5, 2001, de la Vega submitted her third and final letter of resignation. In that letter she related an incident occurring on February 2, 2001, in which Angulo had reprimanded her in front of several senior members of the Star's staff after she interrupted a meeting. She referred to past instances in which she had asked Angulo to address such matters in private to avoid embarrassment. She further referred to the "constant hostile confrontation level that you had been showing toward me during the last two years." For a third time, Angulo asked de la Vega to return to her duties at the Star. This time, however, de la Vega refused. In a letter dated April 1, 2001, Angulo reluctantly accepted de la Vega's resignation as Executive Assistant to the President and suggested that she might continue to work for the Star as a consultant.²

On or about May 4, 2001, de la Vega filed an age discrimination charge with the Anti-Discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After receiving "right to sue" letters, she brought this action in district court.

II.

De la Vega filed her complaint on February 26, 2002, alleging that the Star had constructively discharged her from her employment in violation of the ADEA and Puerto Rico's Law 100. The Star filed its response on May 22, 2002. The district court scheduled a trial date of May 28, 2003, and the parties undertook discovery. On February 11, 2003, the Star filed a motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to local rule 7.1(b) of the District of Puerto Rico, de la Vega's response to this motion was due by February 21, 2003.³ She did not file a timely response, and the Star filed a motion requesting entry of judgment on February 27, 2003.⁴

On March 4, 2003, the district court granted the Star's unopposed motion for summary judgment. On March 5, 2003, de la Vega filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the judgment; on March 14 2003, she filed an opposition to the Star's motion for summary judgment. On March 18, 2003, the district court denied de la Vega's motion for reconsideration, admonishing plaintiff's counsel for failing to meet the filing deadline and failing to request an extension of time. On March 21, 2003, de la Vega filed a second motion requesting reconsideration of the judgment; on April 3, 2003, the district court denied that motion without comment.

De la Vega now appeals from the district court's order of March 4, 2003, entering summary judgment in favor of the Star. She argues on appeal that, even when unopposed, the district court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if it concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, she contends that the district court never undertook this required analysis and instead granted the Star's motion as a sanction against de la Vega for failing to meet the filing deadline for a response to the Star's summary judgment motion. Further, she contends that the Star's motion did not establish its entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. We take each of these arguments in turn.⁵

III.

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law." One Nat'l Bank v. Antonellis, 80 F.3d 606, 608 (1st Cir.1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Id.

Rule 56(e) governs the obligations of adverse parties to respond to a summary judgment motion. It provides in relevant part:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). We have previously emphasized the import of the last quoted sentence:

It is well-settled, however, that [the language of Rule 56(e)] does not mean that a moving party is automatically entitled to summary judgment if the opposing party does not respond.... [T]he district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment merely for lack of any response by the opposing party, since the district court must review the motion and the supporting papers to determine whether they establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact....

... The court must first inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir.1989) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir.2002) ("[A] district court may not automatically grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the opposing party failed to comply with a local rule requiring a response within a certain number of days.").

In this case, the district court issued three rulings, none...