Arthur v. Lutheran General Hosp., Inc., 1-97-0859

Decision Date19 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. 1-97-0859,1-97-0859
Parties, 230 Ill.Dec. 72 Alexander J. ARTHUR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., an Illinois Not-For-Profit Organization, and Dr. Ann Walczynski, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

James W. Fessler, Michael Resis of O'Hagan, Smith & Amundsen, Chicago, for Lutheran General Hospital.

Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago (David A. Kanter, Martha D. Owens, Dara J. Keidan, of counsel), for Dr. Ann Walczynski.

Justice WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

The Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code sets out a statutory plan for involuntary admission of mentally ill persons. This case raises the question of whether a false imprisonment cause of action exists for a person who is committed in violation of a time limit in the Code. We conclude that it does.

FACTS

Some time in 1990, Alexander J. Arthur (Arthur), a 52-year-old former construction worker, began to develop breathing trouble, purportedly from years of working with chemicals. He contacted the Social Security Administration to apply for disability benefits, but his effort proved fruitless and frustrating.

On June 12, 1992, Arthur was admitted to Resurrection Medical Center (Resurrection) with recurrent chest pain and shortness of breath. The emergency room staff requested a psychological consultation as part of Arthur's treatment.

Dr. Ann Walczynski (Walczynski) spoke with Arthur. According to her written consultation summary, Arthur displayed anxiety over his health and financial situation. Arthur also voiced aggravation at the Social Security Administration and its handling of his application for disability benefits. As Walczynski noted in her consultation summary:

" * * * He has become increasingly extremely angry to the point that he has been thinking about going to Springfield[, Illinois] and throwing one of the [Social Security Administration] officers out of the window and all the papers destroyed [sic]. He also has been having thoughts of killing another staff member in that office in Springfield. His behavior has been progressively escalating; and on the day of this examination, he did throw a telephone set against the wall after one of the conversations with officers from Springfield. The patient says that he will not get satisfaction unless he 'hurts' these people.

* * *

* * * [The patient] says that he actually never had any problems with depression prior to nine months ago. 'But I think I will have problems once I go to Springfield and punch these guys and kick him [sic]. They never tell me anything right, but I will get my satisfaction.' * * * The patient admits to feeling hopeless and helpless but denies suicidal ideation. He says that he would rather have the other people to die and he is about to do it once he leaves the hospital.

* * *

* * * The patient does admit even on repeated questioning that he intends to hurt the staff members of these offices once he leaves the hospital."

Walczynski recommended Arthur's transfer to the mental health facility at Lutheran General Hospital (Lutheran General), once his physical condition stabilized. Although Arthur agreed to voluntary admission, Walczynski drafted a physician's certificate for involuntary admission pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code). See 405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1993 & Supp.1997). Walczynski's certificate cited Arthur's potential "to inflict serious physical harm" on Social Security Administration staff members. The certificate, dated June 12, 1992, at 9 p.m., also said:

"[Patient] has been extremely angry with soc. security offices staff (Chicago + Springfield) and has been threatening to harm some staff members--once he leaves the hospital. Homicidal potential."

On June 14, 1992, at 9 p.m., although his physical condition had stabilized sufficiently to allow his transfer to Lutheran General, Arthur chose to remain at Resurrection to complete his physical treatment with his own physician. Walczynski again spoke with Arthur. Although the record does not contain any notes from this meeting, Walczynski read her notes of it during her discovery deposition. Walczynski observed Arthur's "affect is still angry when the issue of Social Security office staff is discussed." Walczynski concluded: "Continue present treatment * * *." However, Walczynski did not draft a second physician's certificate to memorialize this meeting.

On June 16, 1992, Arthur was transferred to Lutheran General as Walczynski's patient. When Arthur refused voluntary admission, Martana Ghera, a Lutheran General staff nurse, completed a petition for involuntary admission based on Walczynski's certificate, as well as her personal observations of Arthur's demeanor. The petition, dated June 16, 1992, at 7 p.m., said: "Person identified as Alexander Arthur is intensely angry and making aggressive and threatening statements directed at Social Security staff." Arthur was involuntarily admitted on Ghera's petition and Walczynski's certificate, executed 94 hours earlier.

When Arthur complained about his involuntary admission and refused any treatment, Ghera telephoned Walczynski. Shortly thereafter, Walczynski arrived at Lutheran General and initially observed Arthur remained "potentially homicidal." Later that evening, as Walczynski spoke with Arthur and his daughter, Arthur said his threats against the Social Security Administration were not serious. In an astonishingly quick recovery from his psychosis, Arthur agreed to outpatient treatment to control his rage and was discharged the next day.

On June 15, 1994, Arthur filed a one count complaint against Walczynski and Lutheran General. According to his complaint:

" * * * [I]mmediately thereafter entering said hospital, the plaintiff, ALEXANDER J. ARTHUR, demanded of the said LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, operating by and through their duly authorized agents, servants and employees, and the said DR. ANN WALCZYNSKI, and each of them, that he be released from the said hospital; that notwithstanding said demand, the said defendants, kept the plaintiff in a confined area and refused to release him from that confined area; further, that the defendant, operating as afore [sic] said, did then and there refuse plaintiff's demand to be released from said hospital and the defendant, and each of them, wrongfully detained and imprisoned the plaintiff against his will."

Arthur alleged this false imprisonment proximately caused "great mental anguish, humiliation and shock."

After some preliminary motion practice and discovery, Lutheran General and Walczynski filed motions for summary judgment. In his response brief, Arthur also asked for summary judgment.

On January 27, 1997, the trial court granted summary judgment to Lutheran General and Walczynski and denied Arthur's cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court said:

"I'm not able to tell you that I'm altogether satisfied that the law can be used in this manner to effectuate the taking of a person's liberty and then cloaking it in the concept that, well, it was done in accordance with the judicial procedure without making some examination as to what, if any were the motives, whether there was a good faith belief in the certifier that the individual involved was the appropriate subject of a commitment or not, but I don't make policy, and I don't make law and my duty is to follow the law as best that I understand it, and I think Olsen v. Karw[o]ski is controlling in this case. Like it, don't like it, it's irrelevant. Nobody has appointed me as a court of review, and I don't have the opportunity to be a judicial anarchist. I have to follow the law."

This appeal followed.

DECISION

Appellate review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Kotarba v. Jamrozik, 283 Ill.App.3d 595, 218 Ill.Dec 659, 669 N.E.2d 1185 (1996). This court must consider anew the facts and the law related to a case in determining whether the trial court correctly decided no genuine issues of material fact were present and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill.2d 107, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995); Deloney v. Board of Education of Thornton Township, 281 Ill.App.3d 775, 217 Ill.Dec. 123, 666 N.E.2d 792 (1996). If the plaintiff fails to establish any element of the cause of action, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is proper. Flint v. Court Appointed Special Advocates of DuPage County, Inc., 285 Ill.App.3d 152, 221 Ill.Dec. 38, 674 N.E.2d 831 (1996). We may affirm summary judgment for any grounds which properly appear in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on those same grounds. Leavitt v. Farwell Tower Ltd. Partnership, 252 Ill.App.3d 260, 192 Ill.Dec. 88, 625 N.E.2d 48 (1993).

The Code provides for involuntary commitment in a mental health facility. To begin the process of involuntary commitment, any person 18 years of age or older may present a petition to the director of a mental health facility, naming a respondent whose "immediate hospitalization is necessary for the protection of such person or others from physical harm." 405 ILCS 5/3-601(a) (West 1997). This petition must include the following: (1) a detailed statement of the reasons for the respondent's involuntary commitment, "including a description of any acts or significant threats supporting [involuntary commitment] and the time and place of their occurrence;" (2) the name and address of the respondent's closest relatives; (3) the person's relationship with the respondent; and (4) any witnesses who may help prove these facts. 405 ILCS 5/3-601(b) (West 1997).

Additionally, the Code provides:

"The petition shall be...

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