Arthur v. Schoonfield, Civ. No. 70-834.

• Decision Date: 23 July 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 70-834.
• Citation: 315 F. Supp. 548
• Parties: Marie B. ARTHUR et al. v. Hiram SCHOONFIELD, Warden.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

315 F. Supp. 548

Marie B. ARTHUR et al. v. Hiram SCHOONFIELD, Warden.

Civ. No. 70-834.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

July 23, 1970.

Michael Millemann, Elsbeth L. Bothe, and Robert G. Fisher, Baltimore, Md., for petitioners.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Alfred J. O'Ferrall, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before THOMSEN and HARVEY, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This proceeding has been filed by 43 inmates of the Baltimore City Jail, who are serving sentences imposed by various judges of the Municipal Court of Baltimore City.

All have joined in a single petition seeking the issuance by this Court of a writ of habeas corpus. They allege that each petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court and sentenced to a flat jail sentence, to be "suspended" upon the payment of a specified fine and court costs, and that they are now confined in the Baltimore City Jail because of their inability to pay the fine and costs imposed. They claim that such a sentence is unconstitutional and deprives them of the benefits of Chapter 147 of the Laws of Maryland, 1970.¹

Commitments attached to the petition vary in that (a) in some instances the form was filled out to show a jail sentence, e.g. 30 days, without a fine, but a stamp on the Commitment was filled out to read "30 days in Baltimore City Jail; SUSPENDED upon payment of $100.00 fine $10.00 costs and $ * * * restitution within * * * days"; and (b) in other instances the form itself was adapted to read in the same way as the stamp in example (a). In none of the Commitments supplied has the blank space before the word "days" been filled in so as to give the defendant involved time to pay the fine and costs imposed.

It appears that in none of the cases of these petitioners was both a fine and a prison sentence imposed, with the service of the prison sentence being suspended and the petitioner placed on probation on condition that he pay the fine in a lump sum or in instalments within a specified time. It does not appear from the Commitments attached to the petition that any of the petitioners received a hearing concerning his ability to pay the fine forthwith, or that there was any determination that the defendant was unwilling, rather than unable because of indigency, to pay the fine specified as the condition for the suspension of the jail sentence.

None of the petitioners is receiving credit for time being served at the minimum rate of ten dollars a day;² instead, all are being required to serve the full period of time to which they were sentenced. The jail sentence is, in every case, longer than the period of time the petitioner would have had to serve if he had received credit for time served at the rate of ten dollars a day. In all but four of the cases, petitioners would have been released by the date of the filing of the petition (July 16) if they had received credit for time served at the rate of ten dollars a day. Under the Commitments petitioners may be released short of serving the full sentence imposed only if they pay the full amount of the fine and (in many cases) court costs that have been made a condition of suspension of the prison sentence.

On behalf of respondent, the Attorney General of Maryland has filed an answer to the show cause order entered herein by this Court, admitting the essential facts alleged. Respondent urges that this petition should be dismissed because petitioners have failed to exhaust available state remedies. Respondent further denies that the sentences imposed are unconstitutional or violative of any provision of state law.

On April 15, 1970, Chapter 147 of the Laws of Maryland, 1970, became effective. That Act repealed and reenacted with amendments Article 38, §§ 1 and 4; Art. 26, §§ 113(b) and 113(c); Art. 5, § 39, and Art. 66½, § 1340 of the Maryland Code, "eliminating imprisonment for non-payment of costs of criminal prosecutions and eliminating such costs as part of any penalty, amending the law generally with regard to the payment of fines and commitment for non-payment thereof, providing for the limitation, or elimination of, fines in certain circumstances and for the resentencing in certain circumstances of defendants sentenced to pay fines, making the provisions of Section 4 of Article 38 as hereby amended applicable uniformly throughout the State and repealing all acts inconsistent therewith to the extent of such inconsistency."

Article 38, § 4, as so amended, provides as follows:

"4.

(a) When a court (including the Circuit Court for any County, the Criminal Court of Baltimore, the Municipal Court of Baltimore City, a People's Court or Trial Magistrate) imposes a fine upon an individual, the court may direct as follows:

(1) that the defendant pay the entire amount of the fine at the time sentence is imposed; or

(2) that the defendant pay the fine in specified portions or installments at designated periodic intervals, and in such case may direct that the fine be remitted to a probation agency or officer, who shall report to the court in the event of any failure to comply with the order; or

(3) where the defendant is sentenced to a period of probation as well as a fine, that payment of the fine be a condition of the sentence.

(b) If the defendant fails to pay the fine as directed (and costs shall not constitute a part of any fine), or if he is unable to pay the fine and so represents upon application to the court, the court, after inquiring into or making such further investigation, if any, which it may deem necessary with regard to the defendant's financial and family situation and the reasons for non-payment of the fine, including whether such non-payment was contumacious or was due to indigency, may enter any order which it could have entered under subsection (a) of this section, or may reduce the fine to an amount which the defendant is able to pay, or may direct that the defendant be imprisoned until the fine (or any portion of it remaining unpaid or remaining undischarged after a pro rata credit for any time which may already have been served in lieu of payment) is paid; and the court shall determine and specify, in the light of the defendant's situation and means and of his conduct with regard to the nonpayment of the fine, the period of any imprisonment in default of payment of the fine, subject to the following limitations:

(1) In no event shall such period of imprisonment exceed one day for each ten dollars ($10.00) of the fine.

(2) Where the fine was imposed for an offense subject to punishment by imprisonment or fine, or both, such period shall not exceed one-third of the maximum term authorized by statute or ordinance for such offense or ninety (90) days, whichever may be less.

(3) Where the fine is imposed for an offense for which imprisonment is not an authorized penalty (whether by statute or ordinance or by common law) in the absence of default in payment of a fine, such period shall not exceed fifteen days.

(4) Where a sentence of imprisonment as well as a fine was imposed, the aggregate of such term and of the original sentence of imprisonment shall not exceed the maximum authorized term of imprisonment.

(c) Unless discharged by payment or service of imprisonment in default of a fine, a fine may be collected in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action. Costs may be collected in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action, but shall not be deemed part of the penalty, and no person shall be imprisoned under this section in default of payment of costs.

(d) All periods of confinement imposed under the provisions of this section because of nonpayment of two or more fines shall run concurrently unless it shall be specified by the court that said periods shall run consecutively."

It is clear that the new statute was carefully drawn to meet the constitutional standards set out in the opinions of this Court in Kelly v. Schoonfield, 285 F. Supp. 732 (1968), in Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F.Supp. 158 (1969), and in the various cases cited therein, particularly United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F.Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.1965), aff'd 345 F.2d 533 (2 Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 911, 86 S.Ct. 254, 15 L.Ed.2d 163 (1965). The judgment of this Court in Morris v. Schoonfield was vacated and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of the aforementioned Chapter 147 of the 1970 Laws of Maryland and the decision of the Supreme Court in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970). Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 26 L.Ed.2d 773 (June 29, 1970).³

The new statute provides a variety of possible sentences and procedures to achieve the objective approved by this Court in the Kelly and Morris cases and not disapproved by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Illinois, supra, which was stated by this Court as follows:

"* * * The commitment of convicted defendants who default in the payment of their fines, whether from inability or unwillingness to pay, imposes a burden upon a defined class to achieve a permissible end in which the State has a vital interest; i.e., that persons who are found guilty of breaking the laws shall receive some appropriate punishment, to impress on the offender the importance of observing the law, in the hope of reforming him, and to deter the offender and other potential offenders from committing such offenses in the future. * * *" 285 F.Supp. at 737; 301 F. Supp. at 162.

However, the new statute places certain clear limitations on sentencing courts in Maryland, in order to avoid serious constitutional problems and to meet present-day standards.⁴ One such limitation prevents imprisonment for non-payment of costs. Art. 38, § 4(b). Another requires the sentencing court, by inquiry or such further investigation as may be deemed necessary, to determine the reasons for the non-payment of a fine before committing a defendant for such non-payment and gives such court considerable leeway in...