Williams v. Richardson, 72-1534.

Decision Date29 June 1973
Docket NumberNo. 72-1534.,72-1534.
PartiesHaywood WILLIAMS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Elliot L. RICHARDSON, etc., et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

David K. Hardy, Kansas City, Mo., for appellants.

Mary A. Senner, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellees.

Before MEHAFFY, BRIGHT, and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, Haywood Williams, Jr., and six other individuals brought this class action for a writ of habeas corpus and for declaratory and injunctive relief against Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; Richard Kleindienst, Attorney General; Dr. P. J. Ciccone, Director of the United States Medical Center; Norman Carlson, Director of United States Bureau of Prisons; and Wayne Colburn, Director of United States Marshal Services. Petitioners allege infringement of their constitutional rights and the constitutional rights of others of the class. The class encompassed by this action consists of all inmates and patients of the United States Medical Center (the Center) who have been committed to the Center under the provisions of §§ 4244 through 4248 of Title 18, United States Code. The district court held the case inappropriate for class action and dismissed it. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioners contend that respondents have failed to provide "constitutionally adequate medical and psychiatric care and treatment for petitioners and to provide that petitioners be free from cruel and unusual punishment and conditions of confinement and transportation while in respondents' custody."1

In rejecting the complaint, the district court approved the memorandum proposed by the United States Magistrate which stated in part:

The practice of joining a number of petitioners in one habeas corpus case is not believed by this Court to be practical or desirable. Individual inmates having complaints about the conditions of their confinement can bring habeas corpus actions on forms provided for them free of charge and the Federal Public Defender will be appointed to represent them. If individual cases indeed present common questions of law and fact they can be joined for purposes of trial.

The precise question presented by this appeal is whether inmates of the Center may as a group attack their conditions of confinement and treatment while they are committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-4248.

By way of background, it should be noted that challenges to conditions of confinement are cognizable in habeas corpus. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972); Armstrong v. Cardwell, 457 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1972). We have repeatedly expressed our view that the Center is a penal institution and one who is confined there suffers incarceration, e. g., Henry v. Ciccone, 440 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1971); Guy v. Ciccone, 439 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion), and such holdings are particularly relevant in light of allegations in the complaint that "unsentenced, untried, mentally ill patients" are being confined at the Center without proper medical treatment. Additionally, we note the increasing tendency of federal courts to insist upon adequate medical treatment as a constitutional prerequisite to detention of the mentally ill. United States v. Pardue, 354 F.Supp. 1377 (D.Conn.1973), 13 Cr.L.Rep. 2008 (April 4, 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387 (M.D.Ala.1972); United States v. Walker, 335 F.Supp. 705 (N. D.Cal.1971); United States v. Jackson, 306 F.Supp. 4 (N.D.Cal.1969). See Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451 (1966); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F.Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo.1970).

In regard to the class action issue, as we read the district court's adopted opinion, a class action is never appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding. Contrary to the district court's holding that a class action would not be "practical or desirable," we think that under certain circumstances a class action provides an appropriate procedure to resolve the claims of a group of petitioners and avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial efforts in considering multiple petitions, holding multiple hearings, and writing multiple opinions. See Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1169-73 (1970). Considering the caseload burden of the federal courts, a considerable proportion of which is attributable to criminal appeals, we think that a method by which the common claims of a large group of petitioners may be properly litigated without endangering the individual rights of the class should not be summarily foreclosed unless clearly inappropriate under the circumstances. Even the government's counsel conceded on oral argument that a habeas corpus class action is not always improper.

The Ninth Circuit has recently held in Mead v. Parker, supra, 464 F.2d 1108, that a habeas corpus petition may seek relief for an appropriate class:

Nor can we agree that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can never be treated as a class action. Certainly the usual habeas corpus case relates only to the individual petitioner and to his unique problem. But there can be cases, and this is one of them, where the relief sought can be of immediate benefit to a large and amorphous group. In such cases, it has been held that a class action may be appropriate. Id. at 1112-1113.

The Mead court, while not deciding the class action issue, held that it was error for the district court to decide the question without a hearing. At least one district court has permitted six prisoners to bring a habeas corpus class action on behalf of all similarly situated prisoners in Florida. Adderly v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D.Fla.1968).

The class action procedure may very well represent the most appropriate manner of litigating the general claims alleged in the complaint. Thus we hold as error the dismissal of the complaint in the instant action.

In remanding this case to the district court, we adopt the following additional comment from Mead, supra, 464 F.2d at 1112.

It may be that the district court will ultimately decide that it is unnecessary to treat this as a class action, perhaps on the theory that, if the petitioners are entitled to relief, the relief will benefit all inmates, whether made parties or not. Or, the court might decide to treat the case as a class action on one or more of the grounds stated in Rule 23(b). A court has considerable latitude in deciding how best to proceed.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MEHAFFY, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

As I understand it, the narrow holding of the majority's opinion is that a petition in federal court for habeas corpus may, under appropriate circumstances, be pursued as a class action. I have no significant disagreement with this holding as an abstract principle. I do not believe, however, that the principle stated above supports the result reached by the majority; nor do I feel that the majority's opinion discusses the question of class action habeas petitions in sufficient detail to afford the district court a reasonable indication of its duty on remand. For these reasons I must respectfully dissent.

I.

The majority's decision to reverse in this case is based on their conclusion that the district court held a class action never to be appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding. Majority opinion at . . . . This interpretation of the district court's opinion apparently stems from the majority's reading of the following language:

"The practice of joining a number of petitioners in one habeas corpus case is not believed by this Court to be practical or desirable. Individual inmates having complaints about the conditions of their confinement can bring habeas corpus actions on forms provided for them free of charge and the Federal Public Defender will be appointed to represent them. If individual cases indeed present common questions of law and fact they can be joined for purposes of trial." Williams v. Richardson, supra, at 1.

Although I feel the language is ambiguous, I can easily understand how the majority might give this passage standing alone the meaning they ascribe to it. I am firmly convinced, however, that the original records in this case and the related case of Williams v. Ciccone, Civil Action No. 2918-2 (W.D.Mo. June 8, 1972) (unreported) clearly demonstrate the majority's interpretation to be in error.

Williams v. Ciccone involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by two of the named appellants in this case and some seven other inmates of the Springfield Medical Center. The petitioners in Williams v. Ciccone sought to attack the adequacy of their medical treatment and the conditions of their confinement as representatives of a class. Although the district court ordered the Federal Public Defender to assist the petitioners in presenting their case, the petition ultimately filed in Williams v. Ciccone failed to conform to the local rules of the district court for habeas proceedings. More specifically the single joint petition that was filed was not in compliance with the requirement of local rule 22(1) that each habeas petitioner must file his petition on the forms supplied by the court.1 Apparently recognizing the noncompliance of the single joint petition, counsel for the petitioners moved the district court to waive the requirements of local rule 22(1). The district court did not waive the provisions of the local rules, however, and Judge Collinson dismissed the petition for failure to conform to the requirements of local rule 22(1).2 In explaining the dismissal Judge Collinson stated:

"This court has prescribed by rule the forms to be
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Marshall v. Kort
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • October 22, 1984
    ...or statutory right to treatment to those committed through the criminal process is cognizable in habeas proceedings. Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358 (8th Cir.1973) (lack of treatment for criminally committed cognizable in habeas proceedings); Rouse, 373 F.2d 451 (denial of statutory ri......
  • Wang v. Reno
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • September 6, 1994
    ...Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir.1975) (class certification appropriate in "unique" circumstances); Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358 (8th Cir.1973); United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F.Supp. 311, 315-16 (W.D.N.Y.1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972) (habea......
  • U.S. ex rel. Sero v. Preiser
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • April 14, 1975
    ...and energy in hearing and deciding numerous individual petitions presenting the identical issue is thereby avoided, Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 631 (8th Cir. 1973), as is the expense which would be incurred in appointing counsel for each individual who proceeded on his own. Althou......
  • Fernandez-Roque v. Smith
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • April 28, 1982
    ...Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125-27 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. den. 421 U.S. 921, 95 S.Ct. 1587, 43 L.Ed.2d 789 (1975); Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1972); and Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1975). These case......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT