Arvia v. Madigan
| Decision Date | 15 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 95590.,95590. |
| Citation | 809 N.E.2d 88,283 Ill.Dec. 895,209 Ill.2d 520 |
| Parties | Patrick C. ARVIA, Appellee, v. Lisa MADIGAN, Attorney General, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
Terry Sullivan and Nancy J. Nicol, Rolling Meadows, for appellee.
At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of section 11-501.8 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.8 (West 2000)), commonly referred to as the "zero tolerance law." Generally, the zero tolerance law provides that any driver under the age of 21 who tests positive for the presence of alcohol or refuses testing upon a police officer's proper request is subject to summary suspension of his or her driving privileges. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(a), (d) (West 2000). The zero tolerance law also provides that a driver may contest such a suspension at an administrative hearing before the Secretary of State, whose decision is subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)). 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e), (h) (West 2000).
The circuit court of Cook County held section 11-501.8 unconstitutional on its face, finding the administrative proceedings contemplated in the statute violate the equal protection and due process rights of drivers under the age of 21. The State appealed directly to this court. See 134 Ill.2d R. 302(a). We reverse.
On July 29, 2000, a Winnetka police officer issued a traffic citation to plaintiff Patrick Arvia for failing to obey a stop sign. The police officer also issued plaintiff a "Zero Tolerance Warning to Motorist Under 21," and requested plaintiff take a Breathalyzer test. The warning advised plaintiff, who was under the age of 21, that refusal to complete requested chemical tests would result in suspension of his license for a minimum of six months. The warning also advised plaintiff that if he submitted to the requested test and the test disclosed an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00,1 his driving privileges would be suspended for a minimum of three months. Plaintiff refused to take the Breathalyzer test. The officer prepared a sworn report, certifying that plaintiff had refused the test, and submitted the report to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, in turn, notified plaintiff that his driving privileges would be suspended for six months, beginning September 13, 2000.
Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Secretary of State, seeking rescission of the suspension of his driving privileges. The hearing proceeded on September 18, 2000. Plaintiff offered various grounds for rescission: the officer had no reason to believe that he had violated the Illinois Vehicle Code; the officer lacked probable cause to believe that he had consumed any amount of alcohol; and the officer failed to advise him of the consequences prior to asking him to submit to a Breathalyzer test. Plaintiff also claimed that he had not, in fact, refused to take a Breathalyzer test, and that he had ingested a prescribed or recommended dosage of medicine that contained alcohol. After hearing testimony and considering the evidence, the hearing officer rejected plaintiff's arguments and recommended denial of plaintiff's petition for rescission. The Secretary of State, in an order entered November 2, 2000, accepted the hearing officer's recommendation and upheld the suspension. The order stated that it was "subject to appeal within 35 days under the Administrative Review Law [735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)]."
Plaintiff did not seek review of the Secretary's final decision under the Administrative Review Law. Rather, on November 28, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, naming then Attorney General James Ryan and Secretary of State Jesse White as defendants.2 Plaintiff sought a declaration that section 11-501.8 of the Illinois Vehicle Code—the zero tolerance law—violates the equal protection rights of drivers under the age of 21. In his complaint, plaintiff did not mention the administrative hearing which he had requested, and in which he had already participated, or the Secretary of State's final decision upholding the suspension of his driving privileges. Plaintiff did allege that on August 21, 2000, he had filed a "Petition to Rescind the Statutory Summary Suspension" in the circuit court, but that he had been unable to obtain a hearing on that petition; he then filed his complaint for declaratory judgment.
The State moved to dismiss plaintiff's declaratory judgment action, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). The circuit court denied that motion. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2000)). Plaintiff posited that drivers 21 years of age or older who refuse to submit to a chemical test for alcohol and are subject to summary suspension of their driving privileges (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2000)) are entitled to a judicial hearing to contest the suspension (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2000)), but that under the zero tolerance law, drivers under the age of 21 who refuse to submit to such a test and are subject to summary suspension of their driving privileges may only challenge the suspension at an administrative hearing before the Secretary of State (625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e) (West 2000)). Plaintiff argued that no rational reason exists to deny him the right to appear before a "neutral judge" to challenge his license suspension, and that the statutory classification, based on age, was unreasonable and arbitrary, violating his right to the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). In response, the State argued that plaintiff misread the statutory scheme and that any difference in available forums is rationally related to the legislature's goal of preventing underage drinking and driving. The circuit court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding section 11-501.8 of the Illinois Vehicle Code unconstitutional.
After the circuit court's ruling, attorneys for the State learned that plaintiff had already challenged his license suspension before the Secretary of State, resulting in a final administrative decision upholding the suspension. The State subsequently filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment order. The State argued that plaintiff should have filed a complaint for administrative review, and that plaintiff's declaratory judgment action was an improper collateral attack on the Secretary of State's adverse decision. The State further argued that principles of waiver and res judicata barred plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. The circuit court denied the motion to vacate. This appeal followed. See 134 Ill.2d R. 302(a).
The State first argues that plaintiff's constitutional claim was not properly before the circuit court based on principles of waiver, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and res judicata. Because this argument presents only issues of law, our review proceeds de novo. See In re A.H., 207 Ill.2d 590, 593, 280 Ill.Dec. 290, 802 N.E.2d 215 (2003).
The State contends that plaintiff's failure to raise his constitutional challenge in the administrative hearing before the Secretary of State waived review of the matter on administrative review and, in the context of this case, in plaintiff's separate complaint for declaratory judgment.
As a general rule, issues or defenses not raised before the administrative agency are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on administrative review. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill.2d 262, 278, 230 Ill.Dec. 991, 695 N.E.2d 481 (1998). This rule has been applied to constitutional issues, even though the administrative agency lacks the authority to decide such issues. E.g., Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill.2d at 278, 230 Ill.Dec. 991, 695 N.E.2d 481. Assuming, without deciding, that the same waiver rules apply where, as here, the litigant files a separate declaratory judgment action, rather than a complaint for administrative review, we find no waiver under the facts of this case.
We note first that the scope of a license suspension hearing before the Secretary of State is expressly circumscribed by statute. The zero tolerance law states:
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