Ashabraner v. Bowers

• Decision Date: 30 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 49S02-0010-CV-00603.,49S02-0010-CV-00603.
• Citation: 753 N.E.2d 662
• Parties: Madonna ASHABRANER, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Gary W. BOWERS and Rumpke of Indiana-Shelbyville, Inc., Appellees (Defendants below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

753 N.E.2d 662

Madonna ASHABRANER, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Gary W. BOWERS and Rumpke of Indiana-Shelbyville, Inc., Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 49S02-0010-CV-00603.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

August 30, 2001.

Nathaniel Lee, Robert A. Burns, Lee, Burns, & Cossell, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Edward R. Hannon, Hannon Centers Roop & Hutton, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellees.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Plaintiff Madonna Ashabraner sued defendant Gary Bowers and his employer, Rumpke of Indiana-Shelbyville, Inc., after a collision between her car and their garbage truck. Ashabraner appeals a jury verdict in favor of Bowers and Rumpke on grounds that the trial court violated Batson v. Kentucky by allowing Bowers and Rumpke to remove an African-American woman from the jury pool without requiring any race neutral justification in the face of a prima facie case of discrimination. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Background

This case arises out of a collision between a garbage truck and a small automobile. On November 19, 1992, Plaintiff Madonna Ashabraner was driving north on Arlington Avenue in Indianapolis. Her compact car trailed a garbage truck driven by defendant Gary Bowers and owned by defendant Rumpke of Indiana-Shelbyville (collectively referred to as "Bowers"). Both vehicles were in the far right lane of the four-lane road. Bowers slowed the truck because he knew that he had to make a right turn into a narrow driveway owned by a customer. Before Bowers attempted the turn, he pulled the truck into the left lane. The parties contest exactly how far left the truck strayed. Ashabraner testified that she believed Bowers was changing lanes and continued in the right lane in order to pass the truck. Bowers testified that he turned on his right turn signal and then straddled the lanes in order to make the right turn. He said that he did so in order to avoid lumbering the truck over the curb of the driveway. As Bowers turned into the driveway, the truck collided with Ashabraner's car.

Ashabraner sued Bowers for negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Bowers. Ashabraner appealed, claiming that Bowers used a racially-based peremptory challenge, an expert witness was not qualified, and the trial court erred in regard to two instructions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion. See Ashabraner v. Bowers, No. 49A02-9905-CV-330, 725 N.E.2d 167 (Ind.Ct.App. March 15, 2000). We granted transfer.

Discussion

Ashabraner seeks a new trial because she contends that Bowers used a racially-based peremptory challenge in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits racial discrimination in the exercise of such challenges. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). See also Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1104-05 (Ind.1997),

reh'g denied. While that proposition sounds simple on its face, Batson recognized that parties would have difficulty proving discriminatory intent because of the discretionary (and often opaque) nature of such challenges.¹ In response, the Court established a two-step burden-shifting procedure. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. First, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must set out a prima facie case of discrimination. To meet this requirement, the party contesting the challenge must show that:

(1) the juror is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) [the challenging party] has exercised peremptory challenges to remove that group's members from the jury; and (3) the facts and circumstances of this case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.

Wright, 690 N.E.2d at 1104-05 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712). If the moving party makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the challenging party to "come forward with a neutral explanation for [the challenge]." See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712.² The party's "explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." Id. Instead, "[i]f the explanation, on its face, is based on something other than race, the explanation will be deemed race neutral." McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997).³

Our experience is that the typical Batson claim turns on the sufficiency of a proffered race neutral explanation for exclusion of the juror.⁴ Here, however, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not reach that step because they resolved the issue by finding no prima facie case. During jury selection, Ashabraner objected to Bowers's peremptory challenge of a juror.⁵ To make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, Ashabraner told the trial court that:

[The juror] was an African American. [D]uring the course of the voir dire, [she] gave what appeared to be the most neutral possible answers.[⁶] She appeared to be intelligent. She appeared to be attentive and she answered all the questions that were posed to her by [ ] counsel. The only reason that he could have used the peremptory challenge is basically because of this person's race.

(R. at 180.) In her motion to correct errors and on appeal, Ashabraner noted that the juror was the only member of the venire who was black.⁷ Bowers's counsel argued in reply that I did not strike [the juror] because of race. I struck [the juror] because of the way I saw the jury panel being made up. And ... this is a situation where [the juror] may be African American.... I don't [see] race as being an issue one way or another in this case. And ... it didn't play into the decision in ... any way. There wasn't a single panel member, Your Honor, who didn't give positive responses to both sides on all questions.... [R]ace didn't enter into it and... how do you defend this. How do you defend this argument? ... [A]ll I can say is ... there was nothing inappropriate with using that peremptory strike in this case.

(R. at 180-81.) The trial court overruled Ashabraner's objection by stating: "I think the case puts the Court in an untenable position and peremptory challenges can be utilized for any reason." (R. at 182.)

This colloquy demonstrates that the trial court did not adhere fully to the principles enunciated in Batson and subsequent cases. Specifically, the trial court refused to analyze Ashabraner's objection to the peremptory challenge, indicating that the court did not follow Batson even though it applies to civil cases. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991)

. Edmonson held that a trial court is so intertwined with jury selection that its imprimatur is placed on any peremptory challenges that it allows. See id. at 624, 111 S.Ct. 2077. This interconnection makes racially-based peremptory challenges a form of state action susceptible to federal constitutional analysis even if the state is not a party to the litigation. See, e.g., id. ("As we have outlined here, a private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the court."). Because Batson applies to civil cases, the trial court was clearly wrong to conclude that "peremptory challenges can be utilized for any reason." (R. at 182.)

We also note that Bowers argued in the trial court that the peremptory challenge was permissible because the juror was not the same race as Ashabraner. This argument misapplies Batson. Trial courts must employ the Batson methodology regardless of the race of the parties. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991),

Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1104 (Ind.1997),

Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570, 578 (Ind.1996). This result obtains because under Batson a race-based peremptory challenge violates not only the equal protection rights of the adverse party, but those of the juror as well. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 415,

111 S.Ct. 1364.⁸

Batson therefore prevents parties from using racially-based peremptory challenges regardless of the race of the opposing party. See Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1377 (Ind.1996),

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1232, 117 S.Ct. 1828, 137 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1997) ("While Batson itself appeared to be based upon the right of the criminal defendant to a trial free of racial taint, the doctrine has evolved into one designed to protect the right of the prospective juror to serve.")

The Court of Appeals did not rely on the misunderstandings of the trial court, but applied Batson and concluded that the circumstances surrounding the peremptory challenge did not demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. We hold that this conclusion was error.

Three factors must be established before a party makes out a prima facie case under Batson. The first two—that the juror was a member of a cognizable group and that the party removed jurors of this group—are not at issue. The heart of Ashabraner's Batson claim is the third factor—whether "the facts and any other relevant circumstances of the defendant's case raise an inference that [a party] used [challenges] to exclude venirepersons from the jury due to their race." Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ind.1995) reh'g denied. The record shows that Bowers removed the only black member of the venire. We have held that this fact alone establishes a prima facie case, see McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997),

and, at a minimum, it is evidence of discrimination that must weigh in the balance.

Ashabraner also asserts that the juror gave "neutral" answers that were similar to answers given by other panel members who were not removed. Appellant's Br. at 8, 14.⁹ Bowers does not contest Ashabraner's assertion that the juror gave neutral answers to questions during voir dire and in the jury questionnaire, although the record does not reflect what those answers were. Appellee's Br. at 6-12. This evidence, coupled with the juror's status as the only black member of the panel, suffices to...