Ashe v. McNamara, Civ. A. No. 64-911.
Decision Date | 28 June 1965 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 64-911. |
Citation | 243 F. Supp. 243 |
Parties | Hubert ASHE, Plaintiff, v. Robert S. McNAMARA, Secretary of Defense, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Timothy J. Murphy, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., John Paul Sullivan, Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant.
The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that his conviction and sentence by a general court-martial are invalid and prays for a mandatory injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, requiring the defendant to remove the plaintiff's dishonorable discharge. The defendant has moved for summary judgment.
The complaint and the affidavits and documents filed in connection with the motion indicate the following, essentially undisputed, facts. The plaintiff, then a Steward 3d Class in the Navy, and two codefendants were, on May 5, 1945, tried by a general court-martial for the offense of striking another person in the Navy. In the course of the trial defense counsel for the three accused perceived a conflict in his representation of all three, as the testimony of one of them was inconsistent with the statement of the plaintiff here. The court, nonetheless, directed defense counsel to proceed and the plaintiff now claims that this action on the part of the court violated his right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The plaintiff was, as noted above, convicted and he appealed the conviction. In the complaint he alleges that "he has exhausted all his remedies under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and all other administrative remedies and that his case is now ripe for review in the civil courts."
The motion for summary judgment challenges this court's jurisdiction.
Article 76 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 876, provides:
Even before enactment of this provision, court-martial proceedings were not directly reviewable in civil courts. They could only be attacked collaterally by petitions for habeas corpus, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 340, 90 L.Ed. 499 (1946), Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953), and in suits for back pay, Brown v. United States, 206 U.S. 240, 243, 27 S.Ct. 620, 51 L.Ed. 1046 (1907), Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 17 S.Ct. 448, 41 L. Ed. 823 (1897), Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982 (Ct. of Cl. 1964), Begalke v. United States, 286 F.2d 606 (Ct. of Cl. 1960), Krivoski v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 451, 145 F.Supp. 239 (1956) cert. den. 352 U.S. 954, 77 S.Ct. 326, 1 L.Ed.2d 243 (1956), Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct.Cl. 650, 69 F.Supp. 205 (1947). Neither course, the plaintiff has followed and, certainly, habeas corpus is no longer available to him.
The means of review chosen by this plaintiff has the support of at least one precedent, ...
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