Ashikian v. State ex rel. Ohrc

• Decision Date: 01 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 103,386.,103,386.
• Citation: 188 P.3d 148,2008 OK 64
• Parties: Cynthia ASHIKIAN, Plaintiff/Appellee v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMMISSION ex rel. Blue Ribbon Downs Board of Stewards, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

188 P.3d 148

2008 OK 64

Cynthia ASHIKIAN, Plaintiff/Appellee v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMMISSION ex rel. Blue Ribbon Downs Board of Stewards, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 103,386.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 1, 2008.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. NO. 4

¶ 0 The State of Oklahoma seeks certiorari review of a Court of Civil Appeals' decision that affirms a district court's summary judgment for the plaintiff. John C. Garrett, trial judge, Sequoyah County District Court, held an order of the Blue Ribbons Downs Race Track Board of Stewards to be void for lack of jurisdiction.

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' DECISION IS VACATED AND THE TRIAL JUDGE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

Neal Leader, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant.

Albert R. Matthews, Bonds & Matthews Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Appellee.¹

OPALA, J.

¶ 1 The issue presented on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) erred in affirming a trial judge's summary judgment for plaintiff/appellee, whose terms declare an order of the Blue Ribbon Downs Board of Stewards to be void for want of jurisdiction. We answer in the negative.

I. THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

¶ 2 Cynthia Ashikian (Ashikian or trainer) trains and races horses for a living throughout the United States and Canada. In October, 2000 she was issued a license by the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission (OHRC or Commission) and raced her horses at the Blue Ribbon Downs Race Track from 25 November through 10 December 2000. Her license expired by its own terms on 31 December of that year.

¶ 3 At the end of the season the race track claimed Ashikian owed $462.00 for stall rental. On 5 January 2001 the Board of Stewards (Stewards) for Blue Ribbon Downs sent her a letter apprising her of this unpaid liability.² The debt was not paid, and on 18 March the Stewards sent Ashikian notice to appear at a hearing to determine if she was in violation of the track's financial responsibility rules. The notice was sent by certified mail to the Houston, Texas address she provided the OHRC in her license application. It was not forwarded to her.³ She failed to appear at the 18 April 2001 hearing. The Stewards' order, issued on her default, provides that she was "suspended/ineligible for licensing pending settlement of her financial obligation."⁴

¶ 4 In April, 2001 Ashikian was granted a racing license by the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission (IRGC). She raced her horses there from April through June that year. Several of her horses earned prize money. In early July she learned of the action taken against her in Oklahoma. She tendered the amount due and was restored to good standing with the OHRC. Pending settlement of this obligation, the Iowa Board of Stewards learned of the action taken against her in Oklahoma and ordered her to disgorge all monies won by her horses in Iowa.⁵ The Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals affirmed this order.

¶ 5 In May, 2002 Ashikian sought an order from the District Court, Sequoyah County, declaring the Stewards' order to be void and awarding her an attorney's fee and costs. She urged (1) she did not receive notice of the hearing⁶ and (2) the Stewards' order was void for want of jurisdiction because (a) their jurisdiction over her matter had terminated and had not been timely extended and (b) they lacked authority to declare her to be "suspended/ineligible." The appellants (OHRC and the Stewards, represented by the Attorney General will be collectively referred to as appellants or state) responded by a motion to dismiss, urging Ashikian's claim was an impermissible collateral attack on an unappealed final order.⁷ The trial court denied this motion, and its ruling is not tendered for our review. Ashikian then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the Stewards' order is void for want of jurisdiction. The trial judge granted trainer's motion and awarded her costs and an attorney's fee.⁸ COCA affirmed the decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 Summary process is a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes.⁹ It is a search for undisputed material facts which, sans forensic combat, may be utilized in the judicial decision-making process.¹⁰ Summary relief is permissible where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense.¹¹ Only those evidentiary materials which eliminate from trial some or all fact issues on the merits of the claim or defense may afford legitimate support for nisi prius resort to summary process for a claim's total or partial adjudication.¹²

¶ 7 Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo review.¹³ All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.¹⁴ Just as nisi prius courts are called upon to do in deciding whether summary relief is warranted in the first instance, so also do appellate tribunals bear an affirmative duty to test for its legal sufficiency all evidentiary material received in summary process as support for the relief to be granted.¹⁵ Only if the court should conclude there is no material fact (or inference) in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense is the moving party entitled to the summary relief that is sought.

III. COCA'S RULING AND THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED ON CERTIORARI

¶ 8 COCA affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for Ashikian and ruled the Stewards' order was void for want of jurisdiction. This was so because although the Stewards had the authority to prohibit the trainer from obtaining a new license, its jurisdiction had expired for want of a timely extension by the Commission. COCA's decision was bottomed on the provisions of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7¹⁶ whose terms deal with the Stewards' jurisdiction to suspend or fine. The pertinent terms of the rule provide "[i]n the event a dispute or controversy arises during a race meeting which is not settled within the Stewards' thirty-day jurisdiction, then the authority of the Stewards may be extended by authority of the Commission for the period necessary to resolve the matter, . . ." [emphasis ours] COCA agreed with the trial judge that the OHRC executive director's letter of 15 February 2001 that is relied upon as having extended the Stewards' jurisdiction was ineffective. The Stewards' jurisdiction to deal with the matter before them ceased on 9 January 2001 (30 days after the race meeting) and could not be "revived" in accordance with the provision's terms.¹⁷ The order hence was devoid of legal effect.

¶ 9 The state disagrees with this interpretation of OHRC Rule 325:1-1-7. It also continues to urge that Ashikian's district-court challenge is an impermissible collateral attack on the Stewards' order. This is so because (1) she lodged neither a timely appeal nor a review proceeding for relief from the order¹⁸ and (2) the order is not tainted by facial invalidity.

IV.

A. THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE FOR OUR REVIEW UPON A CHALLENGE TO THE AGENCY'S JURISDICTION

¶ 10 Absent a timely judicial review in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Procedures Act, 75 O.S.2001 § 318,¹⁹ an OHRC final order is impervious to attack. This finality bar presupposes the existence of a prior decision that is facially valid. It is not applicable to an order that is facially void for want of jurisdiction.²⁰ Deemed void is only that decision which on the face of the record reveals that at least one of the three requisite elements of jurisdiction was absent, i.e., the trial tribunal's power (a) over the parties, (b) over the subject matter or (c) to pronounce the contested decision that was rendered.²¹ When a jurisdictional infirmity is apparent from a facial inspection of the trial tribunal's proceedings,²² its decision may be collaterally attacked and set aside upon request of either party at any time.²³ The district court's inquiry into the validity of an administrative agency's order (that escaped review on direct appeal) stands confined to determining, from an inspection of the face of that agency's proceedings (i.e., the application, the process by which the parties were notified, and the agency's order) if the agency met the jurisdictional prerequisites.²⁴ Where extrinsic evidence is needed to show the jurisdiction's absence, the decision is not facially invalid although it may be declared voidable.²⁵

¶ 11 According to the state, nothing in the administrative record (the administrative equivalent of a district court's judgment roll) reveals a want of subject-matter jurisdiction by the Stewards.²⁶ For a showing that an administrative order lacks facial validity, the entire agency judgment roll must be included in the materials presented for review.²⁷ The burden is cast on the party challenging the validity of a judgment or administrative order to provide the record revealing a total absence of at least one of the three jurisdictional components.²⁸ A reviewing court may take notice only of that record which stands before it.²⁹

¶ 12 Ashikian's petition before the district court asserts the Stewards' jurisdiction had not been extended prior to 10 January 2001. The exhibits submitted with her petition reveal that the race meeting ended on 10 December 2000 and the Stewards' order was issued on 18 April 2001.³⁰ This information alone is not proof that Stewards' lacked jurisdiction over the matter. According to the state, the alleged defect that is critical for a challenge to the Stewards' subject-matter jurisdiction—the dates of the race meeting and when OHRC acted to extend the Stewards' jurisdiction—forms no part of the administrative record.³¹ The state contends that one must look outside the four corners of the record to obtain this information. Although the materials provided by Ashikian do not affirmatively show the...