Ashker v. International Business Machines Corp.
| Decision Date | 06 December 1990 |
| Citation | 563 N.Y.S.2d 572,168 A.D.2d 724 |
| Parties | , 63 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 100, 1 NDLR P 155 Susan J. ASHKER, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Seward & Kissel (Michael J. McNamara, of counsel), New York City, for appellant.
Griffen & Smith (L. David Zube, of counsel), Binghamton, for respondent.
Before KANE, J.P., and CASEY, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and MERCURE, JJ.
Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Coutant, J.), entered February 5, 1990 in Broome County, which denied defendant's motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action in the complaint.
Plaintiff, a 59-year-old executive secretary, brought this suit against defendant and several of its employees after she was allegedly forced into early retirement. According to the complaint, plaintiff routinely received excellent performance reviews during her 33 years of employment with defendant. Shortly after receiving one such annual job performance evaluation in July 1988, plaintiff's superior informed her that she must either report to the staff psychiatrist or one of her own choosing, for she was considered dangerous to herself and others. The justification for the expressed fear is not explained in the record; however, it is intimated that plaintiff displayed argumentative and disruptive behavior. In any event, under threat of termination or retirement, plaintiff eventually sought outside psychological evaluation. Plaintiff's psychologist, Vincent Monastra, opined that plaintiff had a low likelihood of exhibiting violent behavior, but would work best with a management style that was firm, direct and "by the book". He further indicated that plaintiff could resume employment, in her current position, immediately. Before Monastra forwarded his analysis to defendant, plaintiff attempted to return to work. She was not permitted to enter the building and allegedly was forcibly escorted from the premises.
During the next several days, defendant gave plaintiff the option of accepting one of two new positions or retiring early. She was advised that should she not choose one of these alternatives (the nature of the jobs offered are undisclosed), she would be discharged. Plaintiff notified defendant that although she did not plan to retire for some years, she felt that this latter option was her only recourse given defendant's harassing behavior. Plaintiff's retirement became effective September 30, 1988.
Originally, five causes of action were asserted in the complaint; three have been dismissed. On appeal, defendant urges that the remaining two--age discrimination and discrimination for perceived disability--do not state prima facie causes of action. We disagree and affirm.
New York's Human Rights Law prohibits employers from discharging an employee based upon the latter's age or disability (Executive Law § 296[1][a]. Generally, a prima facie case of discrimination includes the following elements: (1) that the employee was a member of the class protected by the statute, (2) that the employee was actively or constructively discharged, and (3) that the employee was qualified to hold the position from which he was terminated. Also, when age discrimination is charged, the complaint must also allege that someone younger replaced the terminated employee, or include direct evidence of discriminatory intent or statistical evidence of discriminatory conduct (Brown v. General Elec. Co., 144 A.D.2d 746, 748, 534 N.Y.S.2d 743; Mayer v. Manton Cork Corp., 126 A.D.2d 526, 510 N.Y.S.2d 649; see, International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge No. 967 v. General Elec. Co., 713 F.Supp. 547, 550). In this case, the complaint facially failed to meet this last requirement. Employing a liberal reading of defendant's affidavit (see, Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 635-636, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314, 357 N.E.2d 970), which reveals that a 52-year-old employee assumed plaintiff's responsibilities, allows for an inference that an age discrimination claim may exist.
Defendant maintains that it did not hire a replacement for plaintiff (see, Stanton v. Owego Water Works, 108 A.D.2d 1029, 485 N.Y.S.2d 598), that her job functions were absorbed by another and that the mere allocation of job responsibilities does not constitute replacement. It is not claimed that plaintiff...
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