Ashley v. Sioux City

• Decision Date: 30 January 1903
• Parties: ASHLEY v. SIOUX CITY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

93 N.W. 303

ASHLEY

v.SIOUX CITY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 30, 1903.

Appeal from district court, Woodbury county; John F. Oliver, Judge.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from defective sidewalk. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.J. N. Weaver, for appellant.

F. E. Gill, for appellee.

McCLAIN, J.

A considerable portion of appellant's argument is taken up with a discussion of the evidence, for the purpose of having this court determine that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, and is for an excessive amount. But the case is plainly one of conflict in the evidence, and therefore we cannot interfere with the verdict of the jury. It is further contended, however, that an instruction directing the jury that they might include in the damages compensation for future pain and suffering and anguish was erroneous, because there was no evidence tending to show that there would be future pain and suffering. But there was medical testimony that plaintiff was suffering from injuries likely to be permanent in their effects, and that such injuries were the result of her fall on the sidewalk in question. The cases of Fry v. Railway Co., 45 Iowa, 416, and Ford v. City of Des Moines, 106 Iowa, 94, 75 N. W. 630, are relied upon; but the instructions given in these cases were found objectionable because they did not limit recovery for future suffering to such as was reasonably certain from the evidence would be suffered, but allowed the jury to enter into the domain of speculation on the subject. In this case the court properly limited the jury in this respect, and we see no error. Other general criticisms of the instructions are without merit. Nor is there any merit in the assignments which are argued with reference to the admission or exclusion of evidence. It is easy for counsel to go through a record and point out rulings as to isolated questions or answers, and contend with some plausibility that such rulings are erroneous; but an examination of the record may nevertheless show that the rulings are not prejudicial, because the evidence sought for in the particular questions to which exceptions have been sustained has been fully given in some other connection, or that the answers to improper questions could have worked no prejudice, because the same testimony has elsewhere been received without objection. It would be of no advantage in such cases for this court to point out...