Ashley v. U.S. Dept. of Interior
| Decision Date | 01 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-2066.,04-2066. |
| Citation | 408 F.3d 997 |
| Parties | Vernon ASHLEY; Mary Ashley; Beatrice Whiting; Menia Mann; Grace Donner; Gail M. Pomani; Wallace Ashley; James W. Ashley; Joseph A. Ashley; Marice Ashley; Rebecca St. John; Ervin Yellow Robe, Jr.; John Howe, Sr.; Shawn St. John; Edward Howe; Rose Howe; Teresa His Law; Dominic Red Water; Guy St. John, Sr.; Neil Howe; Janice Howe; Raynard Howe; Irwin Fire Cloud; Lori Drapeau; Mabel Grey Cloud; Quentin Drapeau; Marlon Sitting Crow; Nicole M. Drapeau; Sarah Drapeau; Shirley Odea; Deanna Eare; Christina Eare; Myron Sitting Crow; Victor Sitting Crow; Darlene Medicine Crow; Marlow Medicine Crow; Doris St. John; Valerie Medicine Cedar; Fred Fleury, Jr.; Harry Flute; Sandra Flute Harmon; Michael Harmon, Sr.; Raynel Gonzales; Wallace Wells; Glenda St. John; Marlin Ross; Raymond Gonzales, Jr.; Richard Taylor; Priscilla St. John; Angela Long Crow; Emilee Gibson; Cameron Ross; William Shields; Wanda Sazue; Pedro St. John; Madeline Big Eagle; Carl Howe, Sr.; Charlotte Rockwood; Dawn Dubray; Linda Ross; Alfred St. John; Wilfred Keeble; Leonard Marks; June Ashes; Kitty M. Wells; Kymberly Rockwood; Martha Fleury; Jon Bird; Margaret Fleury; Hester Fleury; Lorenzo Fleury; Alan Fleury; James Crowe; Magdaline White Mouse; Patrick Wounded Knee; Ronald Wounded Knee; Carl Medicine Crow; Ernest G. Middletent; Daniel Azure; Chris Gravatt; Kendra Kirkie; Patsy Marquez; Dauna Gravett; Joyce Reed; Becky Taylor; Shannon Shields; Roland St. John; Ron Kirkie; Royce Kirkie; Arlene Voice; Willard Voice; Joseph Shields; Lyle Medicine Crow; Brenda St. John; Mary Lou Boyzo; Glenda Wounded Knee; Eric Thompson; Virgil Crowe; Valentina Merritt; Lester Thompson; Eunice St. John; Daisy Merritt; Hope His Law; James Sazue; George Comes Flying, Jr.; Renita Taylor; Werdna Wounded Knee; Loren Michael Bagola; Feanette Griffith; Mary Morin; Lakes of the Brave, Inc., for themselves and all others similarly situated; Lynette Charging Whirlwind, Appellants v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR; Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior; James Steven Griles, Deputy Secretary of the Interior; Government Capital Corporation; Crew & Associates, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
George Francis Johnson, argued, Gregory, SD (Rick Johnson, on the brief), for appellant.
Cheryl Schrempp Dupris, argued, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Pierre, SD (William Taylor and James E. Moore, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
Vernon Ashley and over one hundred other members of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe appeal the district court's decision to dismiss their complaint. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not establish an injury in fact and had failed to join an indispensable party. We too hold that the plaintiffs lack standing, but for a different reason: a judgment in their favor is not likely to remedy the harms about which they complain.
Congress created a trust fund for the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe with the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe Infrastructure Development Trust Fund Act of 1996 (the Act). Pub.L. No. 104-223, 110 Stat. 3026 (1996). The Act obligates the Secretary of the Interior to make periodic payments to the Tribe and requires the Tribe to prepare a plan for use of the payments. Id. at §§ 4(d)(2), 5. Under the Act, the plan must allot money for an educational facility, a health facility, a water system, and other things of like nature, and the Tribe must consult with the Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human Services when drafting the plan. Id. at § 5.
After Congress passed the Act, the Tribe issued bonds to fund land purchases, loan consolidation, and tribal government improvements. The Government Capital Corporation, a private entity, underwrote the bonds, and Crew & Associates, Inc., purchased the bonds. As part of the transaction agreement, the Tribe assigned its payments from the trust fund to Crew through the year 2012. Pursuant to a statute in effect at the time, 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1994) (), the United States government had to approve the agreement before it went into effect. The government signed off on it, and Crew began receiving its yearly payments.
The plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case, naming government and private parties (but not the Tribe) as defendants. The complaint contains a raft of claims, all of which spring from either 25 U.S.C. § 81, 25 U.S.C. § 464 (), the Act, or the government's fiduciary duty to the Indian people. The crux of the complaint is that the trust money is not being used (and will not be used) for the purposes laid out in the Act. To remedy this situation, the plaintiffs ask the court to undo the assignment to Crew, rescind the waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity that is included in the bond agreement, and instruct the government defendants to ensure that the Tribe spends the money in conformance with the Act.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in the district court, arguing, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. The court granted the motion for two reasons. First, the court concluded that it could not exercise jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs lacked standing: They could not establish that they had suffered an injury in fact, the court maintained, because Congress intended the trust payments to benefit the Tribe and not individual members of the Tribe. Second, it held that dismissal was appropriate because the plaintiffs had failed to join an indispensable party, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7), 19, namely, the Tribe. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the defendants have adopted the district court's argument on standing. The plaintiffs, needless to say, have not. No matter; we conclude that the plaintiffs lack standing for a different reason: We could not issue an order in this case that would be likely to remedy the injuries complained of—including the primary complained of injury, i.e., the alleged current and prospective misuses of the trust money—because the Tribe is not a defendant and none of the defendants controls the Tribe's challenged behaviors. In light of this holding, we decline to address either of the bases for dismissal relied upon by the district court.
A brief methodological note is appropriate before we give our reasons for concluding that the plaintiffs lack standing. Though at this stage we must accept as true the factual allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, see, e.g., National Fed'n of the Blind of Mo. v. Cross, 184 F.3d 973, 979 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 533, 145 L.Ed.2d 413 (1999), we need not accept as true their legal conclusions even if they are "cast in the form of factual allegations," Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, 328 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.5 (9th Cir.2003); see Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir.1998), or go to the merits of the suit, see, e.g., Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1997). Treating factual allegations differently from legal conclusions is sensible. Factual allegations are taken to be true at the motion-to-dismiss stage because the plaintiff has not had a full opportunity to conduct discovery and thereby uncover facts that support his or her claim. Legal conclusions, on the other hand, will not benefit from discovery; the court is fully equipped to resolve legal issues at this stage of the case, so there is no reason to forbear. To the contrary, given the Supreme Court's admonition to lower courts that we assure ourselves that jurisdiction exists (which includes determining whether a plaintiff has standing) before proceeding to the merits, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), we have an obligation to deal with legal issues to the extent that they relate to standing.
Article III of the Constitution requires three things to be true for a plaintiff to have standing to bring a suit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Only the third requirement matters for our purposes, and it is that "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotations omitted). Redressability is "substantially more difficult to establish" when "the plaintiff himself is not the object of the government action or inaction" because in that case it depends on "choices made by independent actors not before the court." Id. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotations omitted); see also Pritikin v. Dep't. of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 799-800 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1133, 122 S.Ct. 1076, 151 L.Ed.2d 977 (2002). We first apply these principles to the plaintiffs' claims against the government defendants.
One remedy that the plaintiffs seek is rescission of the government's approval of the bond agreement. According to the plaintiffs, the bond deal is ultra vires because it constitutes a use of the money for a purpose other than that specified by Congress in the Act. To cure this difficulty, they ask us to void the government's approval of the agreement.
A rescission order, however, would not be likely to remedy the alleged harm because it would not be likely to prevent the Tribe from spending trust money on a new bond deal of the same sort. Congress amended § 81 in 2000, see Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46, 46-47, and it no longer directs the Secretary of the Interior to approve almost every contract...
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