Askew v. Lindsey
| Decision Date | 16 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-CV-7496 (KMK) |
| Parties | TIMOTHY A. ASKEW, Plaintiff, v. P.O. LINDSEY; P.O. YOUMAN; P.O. MOTA; LT. JOHNSTONE; MONTICELLO POLICE CHIEF MIR; COUNTY OF SULLIVAN; TOWN OF THOMPSON; VILLAGE OF MONTICELLO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Timothy A. Askew
Woodbourne, NY
Ralph L. Puglielle, Jr., Esq.
and Village of Monticello
Thomas J. Cawley, Esq.
Sullivan County Attorney's Office
Monticello, NY
Michael B. Mednick, Esq.
Law Office of Michael B. Mednick
Monticello, NY
Counsel for Defendant Town of Thompson
Timothy A. Askew ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this Action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging claims for false imprisonment, unlawful arrest, and assault against P.O. Lindsey ("Lindsey"), P.O. Youman ("Youman"), P.O. Mota ("Mota"), Lt. Johnstone ("Johnstone"), Police Chief Mir ("Mir"), Village of Monticello (the "Village"), County of Sullivan (the "County"), and Town of Thompson (the "Town"). Johnstone, Mir, and the Village (collectively, "Village Defendants"), the County, and the Town each filed a separate Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (collectively, the "Motions"). For the following reasons, the Motions are granted.
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motions.
On September 5, 2014 at approximately 12:55 p.m., Lindsey, Youman, and Mota, all officers with the Monticello Police Department, appeared at Plaintiff's home and informed him that they had received a 911 call from his residence, concerning an assault. (Compl. 2 (Dkt. No. 2).) They told Plaintiff to open his door, and he complied. (Id.) Upon opening the door, Plaintiff "was tackled to the ground . . . and punched repeatedly in the face . . . ." (Id.) He was then handcuffed and arrested on "false charges." (Id.) A dentist at the jail told Plaintiff that he needed a root canal, and a nurse there sent Plaintiff "to the hospital for x-rays, because his nose and face were swollen." (Id. at 3.) "Plaintiff is in constant pain." (Id.)
Plaintiff was never charged with any crime in relation to the 911 call, but rather was charged with other crimes "to cover up these officer[s'] criminal acts . . . against [him]." (Id.)He "was falsely incarcerated" for approximately 58 days and then "had to continue to go to court[] to defend himself" until the charges were dismissed on June 3, 2015. (Id.)
According to the Complaint, the Monticello Police Department has "ongoing practices and policies . . . of violating people[']s constitutional and civil rights . . . ." (Id. at 4.) The Village, the Town, and the County were "aware of [these] actions" but "refus[ed] to correct []or deter this blatant disregard of this continuing violation of people[']s constitutional and civil rights." (Id.) Additionally, Mir failed to discipline Lindsey, Youman, and Mota for their "assaultive behavior." (Id.)
These events "caus[ed] Plaintiff a great deal of emotional stress and anxiety." (Id. at 3.) He seeks compensatory and punitive damages as a result. (Id. at 4.) He further requests payment of his filing fees. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on September 22, 2015. (Dkt. No. 2.) Pursuant to a briefing schedule adopted by the Court on January 5, 2016, (Dkt. No. 12), and modified on January 21, 2016, (Dkt. No. 17), the Town filed its Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers on February 4, 2016, (Dkt. Nos. 23-28), and the County filed its own Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers that same day, (Dkt. Nos. 29-34). Pursuant to a Scheduling Order adopted by the Court on March 16, 2016, (Dkt. No. 39), Village Defendants filed their Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers on May 13, 2016, (Dkt. Nos. 45-49). Plaintiff has filed no opposition.
The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of hisentitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ( ; id. at 678-79 ().
"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and "draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff," Daniel v. T&M Prot.Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).
Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must "construe[] [his] [complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga Cty., 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) .
The Town, the County, the Village, Mir, and Johnstone all seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against them. (See Dkt. Nos. 23, 29, 45.)1 The Court will address, in turn, the Complaint as to each Defendant.
A municipal defendant "cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (italics omitted); see also Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (). Rather, for a plaintiff to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant, he must satisfy the requirements set forth in Monell and its progeny, which adhere to the well-settled principle that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable [under § 1983] unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also Hunter v. City of N.Y., 35 F. Supp. 3d 310, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ().
A plaintiff may satisfy the "policy or custom" requirement by alleging one of the following:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into...
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