Bell v. Jendell

• Citation: 980 F.Supp.2d 555
• Decision Date: 31 October 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 12–CV–6666 (KMK).
• Parties: Amar BELL, Plaintiff, v. Alexis JENDELL, Ph.D., Director of Correct Care Solutions, c/o Dr. Adler, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

980 F.Supp.2d 555

Amar BELL, Plaintiff,

v.Alexis JENDELL, Ph.D., Director of Correct Care Solutions, c/o Dr. Adler, Defendants.

Case No. 12–CV–6666 (KMK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Oct. 31, 2013.

Amar Bell, Valhalla, NY, pro se.

James Christopher Freeman, Kent Hazzard, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff Amar Bell, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Drs. Alexis Gendelland Paul Adler for injuries arising out of medical treatment Plaintiff received while incarcerated in Westchester County Jail. ¹ For the reasons given below, Defendants' Motion To Dismiss is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff's Complaint and accompanying documents can be read to allege the following facts. Plaintiff was incarcerated in Westchester County Jail from at least March 23, 2012, until at least April 2, 2012. ( See Compl. at 3.) Prior to this period, Plaintiff suffered from “acid reflux,” a medical condition for which Plaintiff had been prescribed Protonix. ( See id.) On March 23, however, Plaintiff's prescription “had r[u]n out.” ( See id.) Two days later, on March 25, Plaintiff began to “put in multiple sick call request[s]” after experiencing a number of “acid reflux symptoms,” including “shortness of breath[ ] and vommitting [sic] acid through [his] mouth/nose at the same time in [his] sleep.” ( Id.) ²

On March 28, three days after his first sick-call request, Plaintiff “met with [Defendant] Dr. Adler.” ( See id.) During the meeting, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Adler “stated [that] he [would] renew the Protonix [prescription].” ( Id.) But Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Adler “was talking on his cell phone while examining [him].” ( Id.) Thus, even though Dr. Adler “thought ... he [had] put the order in” soon after the March 28 meeting, Plaintiff “suffered [five] more days of acid reflux symptoms before receiving the Protonix” on April 2. ( Id.) For this, Plaintiff seeks $9,000,000 in damages. ( Id. at 5.)

B. Procedural Background

On the morning of April 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaint informing the prison that he had not received his prescription refill. ( See Compl. at 3; Mot. Ex. B (“Grievance”) at unnumbered 2 (Grievance Form Part I).) The grievance was granted and Plaintiff received his medication.³

On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, ( see Compl. at 7), wherein Plaintiff alleges two claims-inadequate medical care and medical negligence. ( See id. at 5.) The Court construes the former claim to allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, see United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (noting that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment” (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422 (1947) (plurality opinion))), entitling Plaintiff to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It construes the latter claim to allege negligence under state tort law.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his [or her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). Instead, the Court has emphasized that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Plaintiffs must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. But if a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ( “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))).

In considering Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, the Court is required to consider as true the factual allegations contained in the Complaint. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (“We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gonzalez v. Caballero, 572 F.Supp.2d 463, 466 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (same). Moreover, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally and “interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Maisonet v. Metro. Hosp. & Health Hosp. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 345, 347 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir.2006). This admonition “applies with particular force when a plaintiff's civil rights are at issue.” Maisonet, 640 F.Supp.2d at 348;see also McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004). But the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Maisonet, 640 F.Supp.2d at 348 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Federal Claims

a. Claim Against Dr. Gendell

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged Dr. Gendell's personal involvement in his claims. ( See Mot. at 2–4.) Indeed, “[i]t is well settled that, in order to establish defendant's individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show ... the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.2013). In his Opposition to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff concedes that his “claims against [Dr. Gendell] should be ... dismissed.” ( See Opp. at unnumbered 1.) Thus, the Court grants Defendants' Motion with respect to the § 1983 claim against Dr. Gendell.

b. Claim Against Dr. Adler

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Adler provided inadequate medical care. In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was a convicted prisoner or a pre-trial detainee during the relevant time period. A convicted prisoner's claim is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that the Eighth Amendment governs medical claims of convicted persons because of that Amendment's prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment”). In the case of a pre-trial detainee, the same claim is analyzed under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment for federal detainees and the Fourteenth Amendment for state detainees. Compare Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir.2009) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to state detainee), with Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103, 106 (2d Cir.2000) (applying Fifth Amendment to federal detainee). However, Plaintiff's status is of no moment for these purposes, because “[c]laims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition ... should be analyzed under the same standard irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 72.

While prison officials should provide adequate medical care to prisoners, “not every lapse in medical care is a constitutional wrong.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir.2006). To make out a constitutional claim “arising out of inadequate medical care,” a plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant's “ ‘deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.’ ” Jones v. Vives, 523 Fed.Appx. 48, 49 (2d Cir.2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)); see also Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir.2003). Thus, to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “an inmate must allege that: (1) objectively, the deprivation the inmate suffered was sufficiently serious”; and “(2) subjectively, the defendant official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To determine if a Plaintiff alleging inadequate medical treatment has satisfied the objective prong, the Court must “examine how the offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has caused.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. In a case like this, where Plaintiff alleges that a prison doctor's failure timely to refill his prescription constitutedinadequate treatment, “the seriousness inquiry is narrower.” Id. Specifically, “if the prisoner is receiving on-going treatment and the offending conduct is an unreasonable delay or interruption in that treatment, the seriousness inquiry focus[es] on the...