Askew v. MGIC Development Corp. of Fla., 71--866

• Decision Date: 04 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71--866,71--866
• Citation: 262 So.2d 227
• Parties: Reubin O'D. ASKEW, Governor of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. MIGIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 227

262 So.2d 227

Reubin O'D. ASKEW, Governor of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. MIGIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

No. 71--866.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 4, 1972.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1972.

Robert Lee Shapiro, of Levy, Plisco & Zalla, West Palm Beach, Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and W. E. Bishop, Jr. and Terry Williams, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellants.

Frank E. Booker, of Ryan, Taylor, Booker & Law, North Palm Beach, for appellee.

OWEN, Judge.

By interlocutory appeal the defendants in a taxpayer's suit filed in the Circuit Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 194.171, F.S.1969, F.S.A., ask us to review an order denying their motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.

The complaint was filed December 8, 1970. Although the complaint did not allege the date upon which the defendant tax assessor had certified the assessment roll as provided in Section 193.381, F.S.1969, F.S.A., the defendant's affidavit filed in support of his motion for summary judgment established that the roll was certified on October 5, 1970, and delivered to the tax collector the same date.

It is our opinion that appellee's complaint was not timely filed and is therefore effectively barred by the provisions of Section 194.151, F.S.1969, ¹ F.S.A. In Dade Drydock Corp. v. Broward County, Fla.App.1971, 250 So.2d 286, we said that where the taxpayer's suit was filed more than sixty (60) days from the time the assessment roll was certified, the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, citing as authority Harvey W. Seeds Post No. 29, American Legion Dept. of Fla. v. Dade County, Fla.App.1970, 230 So.2d 696 and Henry v. Dade County, Fla.App.1963, 149 So.2d 89. In the case of Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 27, we referred to this statute (or more accurately, its predecessor, Section 192.21(2), F.S.1967, F.S.A.) as a statute of limitations. Whichever is the better view is a matter of academic interest in this case because the defendants pleaded the 60-day limitation in bar of the suit and established factually that the suit had not been filed within the 60 days following the tax assessor's certification of the assessment roll.

Appellee contends that there are two reasons why the 60-day limitation of Section 194.151, F.S.1969, F.S.A., is inapplicable to its case.

In the first place, says appellee, at the time this suit was filed on December 8, 1970, there was no statute of limitations applicable to this suit. This is so, it contends, because (1) Section 194.151, F.S.1969, F.S.A., only established a time for seeking appeals to courts from the decisions of the Board of Equalization, (2) this agency had passed out of existence when its function was taken over by the Board of Tax Adjustment on January 1, 1970, (3) it was the Board of Tax Adjustment to which appellee had unsuccessfully applied for relief, and (4) Chapter 70--243, which provided a statute of limitations for seeking appeal to courts from decisions of the Board of Adjustment, did not become effective until January 1, 1971, and hence was not applicable to the present suit. We reject this as sophistry and caution that the statutory section headings, inserted by the statutory revisors and/or legislative service bureau as a convenient visual reference to the content, are not themselves a part of the statute. The substance of the statute has been an integral part of the statutory...