Asmussen v. United States

• Citation: 304 P.3d 552
• Decision Date: 01 July 2013
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SA96
• Parties: Rodney ASMUSSEN and Linda Asmussen, Husband and Wife, For Themselves and As Representatives of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

304 P.3d 552

Rodney ASMUSSEN and Linda Asmussen, Husband and Wife, For Themselves and As Representatives of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant.

Supreme Court Case No. 12SA96

Supreme Court of Colorado.

July 1, 2013

Certification of Question of Law United States Court of Federal Claims Case No. 1:09CV00129, Honorable Marian Blank Horn, Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiffs: Lathrop & Gage, LLP, Phillip S. Lorenzo, James E. Dallner, Denver, Colorado, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, LLC, Thomas S. StewartElizabeth McCulleyKansas City, Missouri

Attorneys for Defendant: United States Department of Justice Nicholas A. DiMascio Washington, D.C.

En Banc

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Pursuant to C.A.R. 21.1, we agreed to answer a certified question of law posed to us by the United States Court of Federal Claims. The question arises out of a class action lawsuit asserting a Fifth Amendment takings claim against the federal government. Plaintiffs are landowners in Weld County who own property abutting a former railroad right-of-way. The United States authorized the former railroad right-of-way to be used as a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241–1251 (2006) (“Rails–to–Trails Act”). The issue before the United States Court of Federal Claims is whether, by authorizing recreational trail use for the right-of-way, the United States effected a taking of property for which Plaintiffs should receive just compensation. SeePreseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a taking occurs when, under the Rails–to–Trails Act, reversionary interests in property are eliminated by converting a railroad right-of-way to trail use).

¶ 2 To determine whether a compensable Fifth Amendment taking has occurred, the Court of Federal Claims must first determine whether each Plaintiff held a vested property interest in the right-of-way at the time of the alleged taking. Although it is undisputed that Plaintiffs own property adjacent to the right-of-way, the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs have established that they own the land underlying the right-of-way and are, therefore, entitled to compensation. According to the certification order, the Plaintiffs acquired their respective properties following multiple real estate transactions that span more than 100 years. Plaintiffs nevertheless allege that because they own property abutting the railroad right-of-way, it is presumed that they own a reversionary interest in the land to the centerline of the right-of-way, and the United States must compensate them for extinguishing that reversionary interest when it authorized recreational trail use of the former railroad right-of-way.

¶ 3 At common law, a conveyance of land abutting a road or highway is presumed to carry title to the center of that roadway to the extent the grantor has an interest therein, unless a contrary intent appears on the face of the conveyance. This general rule is known as the “centerline presumption.” Plaintiffs contend that this general rule functions as an evidentiary presumption, and it applies with equal force in the context of railroad rights-of-way in Colorado. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, because they own land abutting the railroad right-of-way, under the centerline presumption it is presumed that Plaintiffs own fee title to the centerline of the right-of-way, and it is the United States' burden to produce evidence to rebut that presumption.

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The United States argues that the centerline presumption does not apply in the context of railroad rights-of-way, and even if it does, the centerline presumption is not an evidentiary presumption to be rebutted, but rather, is a common law rule of conveyance that applies only where an adjacent landowner presents evidence that its title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. The United States contends that the common law does not vest ownership in adjacent landowners by the mere fact of their adjacency. Rather, a grantor's conveyance of land adjacent to a right-of-way presumptively carries title to the centerline of the right-of-way only if the grantor owned the land underlying the right-of-way. Thus, the United States contends, establishing mere ownership in the land abutting the right-of-way, without more, is insufficient to establish fee title in the land underlying the right-of-way. Rather, the landowner must establish that he or she received the abutting property from the owner of the fee underlying the right-of-way in order to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of the right-of-way. The United States argues that, because Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving ownership of the land underlying the right-of-way before the United States must compensate them for the alleged taking, Plaintiffs must provide their chains of title to close the evidentiary gap between the original landowners' conveyances to the railroad in the early 1900s and Plaintiffs' eventual acquisition of the abutting properties.

¶ 5 The Court of Federal Claims' certified question asks:

When a railroad obtains an easement for a railroad right-of-way through deed or condemnation, does Colorado law presume that, if the railroad later abandons the easement, the landowners on each side of the railroad right-of-way at the time of abandonment own the land from their respective property lines abutting the right-of-way to the centerline of the right-of-way.

¶ 6 We agree with the United States that the centerline presumption is a common law rule of conveyance. The rule is meant to effectuate the presumed intent of the grantor, and it applies only where the grantor owns the fee underlying the right-of-way. With this purpose in mind, we hold that the centerline presumption applies to railroad rights-of-way in Colorado. However, we also hold that the centerline presumption is not applicable where the landowner does not adduce evidence proving that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. We hold that a landowner is not presumed to own fee title to an abandoned railroad right-of-way merely because the landowner's property abuts the right-of-way. Rather, to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of the right-of-way under the common law centerline presumption, the adjacent landowner must produce evidence that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 7 In 1901, the Great Western Railway Company constructed a railroad line across Weld County, Colorado, which included an 11.7–mile stretch of railroad corridor running between Windsor and Eaton, Colorado, known as the Eaton Subdivision. The Great Western Railway Company acquired easements for the railroad right-of-way from individual landowners through deed or condemnation. In 2003, the Great Western Railway of Colorado, the successor in interest to the Great Western Railway Company, filed a petition to abandon the Eaton Subdivision.

¶ 8 The Rails–to–Trails Act includes a mechanism, known as railbanking, for a railway to discontinue its use of a rail line without abandoning the right-of-way. See16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2006). The United States Congress enacted this mechanism out of concern that the national rail system was becoming disintegrated as railroad rights-of-way were being abandoned. Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 5, 110 S.Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Railbanking authorizes the interim use of a right-of-way for recreational trails, thereby preventing any reversionary interest in the right-of-way from vesting and preserving the possibility of future railroad use. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). The United States Department

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of Transportation's Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) oversees the railbanking process. Once a railroad begins the process to abandon its right-of-way, a potential trail sponsor may file a request that the STB issue a notice of interim trail use (“NITU”), which stays the effective date of the abandonment to allow the railroad and the trail sponsor to negotiate a railbanking and interim trail use agreement. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1) (2012). If the parties reach an agreement, the NITU automatically authorizes the interim trail use and the trail sponsor assumes management of the right-of-way, subject to reactivation for future rail service. Caldwell v. United States, 57 Fed.Cl. 193, 195 (2003).

¶ 9 In 2004, the STB issued a NITU regarding Great Western Railway of Colorado's right-of-way. In 2006, the Great Western Trail Authority, a government entity formed by the municipalities of Eaton, Severance, and Windsor, Colorado, and the Great Western Railway of Colorado reached a donative agreement and signed a donative quitclaim deed and bill of sale. The Great Western Trail Authority thereby assumed management of the right-of-way for interim trail use, subject to the future restoration of rail service.

¶ 10 Plaintiffs, including Rodney and Linda Asmussen, are some, but not all, of the landowners whose property abuts the railroad right-of-way.¹ In 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that when the STB issued a NITU, the federal government denied Plaintiffs their reversionary interests in the right-of-way located on their properties. Under Plaintiffs' theory, converting the right-of-way to trail use under the Rails–to–Trails Act constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.

¶ 11 The parties stipulated that Plaintiffs own property abutting the right-of-way. The parties also stipulated that, in all but one instance, the original landowners only conveyed easements to the railroad, not fee title. The parties dispute, however, the scope of the easements and who now owns the land underlying the right-of-way. Plaintiffs provided to the Court...