Assad v. Assad

• Citation: 200 A.D.3d 831,161 N.Y.S.3d 92
• Decision Date: 15 December 2021
• Docket Number: 2021–00158,Index No. 706429/20
• Parties: Maria ASSAD, appellant, v. Mohammed ASSAD, respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

200 A.D.3d 831

161 N.Y.S.3d 92

Maria ASSAD, appellant,

v.Mohammed ASSAD, respondent.

2021–00158

Index No. 706429/20

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—November 4, 2021

December 15, 2021

Friedman & Friedman, PLLC, Garden City, NY (Jennifer Moran of counsel), for appellant.

Petitti PLLC, New York, NY (Danielle R. Petitti of counsel), for respondent.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated September 13, 2016, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), entered January 4, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, (1) denied, without a hearing, those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to modify the parties’ stipulation of settlement dated January 29, 2016, which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce, so as to permit her to relocate with the parties’ children to Texas, or, in the alternative, to upwardly modify the defendant's child support obligation and award her sole custody of the children, (2) granted that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was for an award of attorney's fees to the extent of awarding him attorney's fees in the sum of $5,000, and (3), sua sponte, enjoined the plaintiff, absent an emergency, from instituting further actions or filing motions without first obtaining written leave of the court and directed that if the plaintiff attempted to re-litigate the same issues in the future, sanctions would be imposed against her for the defendant's full costs and fees of defending the action.

ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the order as, sua sponte, enjoined the plaintiff, absent an emergency, from instituting further actions or filing motions without first obtaining written leave of the court and directed that if the plaintiff attempted to re-litigate the same issues in the future, sanctions would be imposed against her for the defendant's full costs and fees of defending the action, is deemed to be an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701[c] ); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was for an award of attorney's fees to the extent of awarding him attorney's fees in the sum of $5,000, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the cross motion; (2) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to modify the parties’ stipulation of settlement so as to upwardly modify the defendant's child support obligation; and (3) by deleting the provisions thereof, sua sponte, enjoining the plaintiff, absent an emergency, from instituting further actions or filing motions without first obtaining written leave of the court and directing that if the plaintiff attempted to re-litigate the same issues in the future, sanctions would be imposed against her for the defendant's full costs and fees of defending the action; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a hearing on that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to modify the parties’ stipulation of settlement so as to upwardly modify the defendant's child support obligation, and a new determination thereafter of that branch of the plaintiff's motion.

The parties were divorced by judgment dated September 13, 2016, which incorporated, but did not merge, a stipulation of settlement of the parties dated January 29, 2016. Pursuant to the stipulation of settlement, the parties shared joint legal custody of their three children, with primary residential custody to the plaintiff and a parental access schedule for the defendant. The stipulation of settlement also provided that the plaintiff was prohibited from relocating with the children outside of New York City without prior written consent of the defendant, or court order.

On June 16, 2020, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to modify the stipulation of settlement so as to permit her to relocate with the children to Texas, or in the alternative, to upwardly modify the defendant's child support obligation and award her sole custody of the children. The defendant cross-moved, among other things, for an award of attorney's fees. In an order entered January 4, 2021, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied, without a hearing, those branches of the plaintiff's motion, granted that branch of the defendant's cross motion to the extent of awarding him attorney's fees in the sum of $5,000, and, sua sponte, enjoined the plaintiff, absent an emergency, from instituting further actions or filing motions without first obtaining written leave of the court, and directed that if the plaintiff attempted to re-litigate the same issues in the future, sanctions would be imposed against her for the defendant's full costs and fees of defending the action. The plaintiff appeals.

The Supreme Court properly denied, without a hearing, those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to modify the stipulation of settlement so as to permit her to relocate with the children to Texas or, in the alternative, to award her sole custody of the children. Contrary to the court's determination, the plaintiff did not waive her current contentions regarding relocation and custody as a result of a so-ordered amendment to the stipulation of settlement and judgment of divorce dated April 10, 2018 (hereinafter the 2018 amendment). However, the court properly determined that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she complied with the requirement of the 2018 amendment that, "prior to filing an application for enforcement, violation or modification of the Stipulation, Judgment of Divorce or this Amendment, [the parties would] seek the advice and counsel of the Parent Coordinator to assist in attempting to resolve the issue at hand without Court intervention." The plaintiff failed to substantiate any attempts to seek the advice and counsel of the parent coordinator involving the instant issues, wherein the 2018 amendment requires that "the Parties shall spend at least one (1) and no more than three (3) sessions with the Parent Coordinator[.]"

In any event, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there had been a change in circumstances such that a modification was necessary to ensure the best interests of the children (see Matter of Feliciano v. King, 160 A.D.3d 854, 855, 74 N.Y.S.3d 342 ; Matter of Phillips v. Nabial, 154 A.D.3d 695, 696, 61 N.Y.S.3d 649 ). "Modification of a court-approved stipulation setting forth terms of custody or [parental access] is permissible only upon a showing that there has been a change in circumstances such that a modification is necessary to ensure the best interests and welfare of the child" ( Greenberg v. Greenberg, 144 A.D.3d 625, 629, 41 N.Y.S.3d 49 ; see Sukul v. Sukul, 196 A.D.3d 661, 151 N.Y.S.3d 684 ; Walter v. Walter, 178 A.D.3d 991, 992, 112 N.Y.S.3d 512 ). "A parent seeking a change of custody is not automatically entitled to a hearing; rather, he or she must make an evidentiary showing of a change in circumstances demonstrating a need for a change of custody in order to insure the child's best interests" ( Matter of Feliciano v. King, 160 A.D.3d at 855, 74 N.Y.S.3d 342 ).

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the requirement to demonstrate a change in circumstances applies to requests to relocate with the children where, as here, the parties’ stipulation of settlement prohibits relocation outside New York City (see Matter of Phillips v. Nabial , 154 A.D.3d at 696, 61 N.Y.S.3d 649 ; McMahan v. McMahan , 102 A.D.3d 841, 842, 958 N.Y.S.2d 212 ; Abbott v. Abbott , 96 A.D.3d 887, 888, 946 N.Y.S.2d 511 ; Matter of Sweetser v. Willis , 91 A.D.3d 963, 964, 937 N.Y.S.2d 322 ; cf. Matter of Conroy v. Vaysman , 191 A.D.3d 977, 980, 142 N.Y.S.3d 99 ; Lipari v. Lipari , 146 A.D.3d 870, 870–871, 45 N.Y.S.3d 196 ). The basis for the plaintiff's current request to relocate is almost identical to her previous request proffered during the divorce litigation, which was resolved by the stipulation of settlement prohibiting the plaintiff from relocating outside New York City. Further, the plaintiff failed to...