Assembly of God Church of Pawtucket v. Vallone

• Decision Date: 09 April 1959
• Docket Number: No. 9885,9885
• Citation: 89 R.I. 1,150 A.2d 11
• Parties: ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH OF PAWTUCKET, R. I. v. Joseph M. VALLONE, Director of Public Works. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 11

150 A.2d 11

89 R.I. 1

ASSEMBLY OF GOD CHURCH OF PAWTUCKET, R. I. v. Joseph M. VALLONE, Director of Public Works.

Ex. No. 9885.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 9, 1959.

Crowe, Hetherington & Chester, Benjamin C. Chester, Pawtucket, for petitioner.

J. Joseph Nugent, Jr., Atty. Gen., Archie Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PAOLINO, Justice.

This is a petition under Public Laws 1953, chapter 3105, sec. 11, for the assessment of damages caused through the taking by eminent domain on December 20, 1956 of petitioner's real property by the state for freeway purposes. The condemnation was effected pursuant to the provisions of P.L.1953, chap. 3105, and General Laws 1938, chap. 75, § 2, as amended. The property consisted of a parcel of land with buildings and improvements thereon which were used for church purposes. The respondent herein will sometimes be referred to as the state.

The parties waived a jury trial and thereafter the case was heard by a justice of the superior court. Prior to such hearing they had agreed that petitioner had a fee simple title in the condemned premises; that the petition was properly before the court; and that the only issue remaining for the determination of the trial justice was the value of the property taken. The written appraisals of experts for both petitioner and respondent were admitted in evidence by agreement of the parties. The only other evidence was the oral testimony of an expert presented by petitioner. After the hearing the trial justice entered a decision awarding petitioner damages in the sum of $105,450. The case is now before us on respondent's exception to such decision.

The property in question consisted of two adjoining parcels of land. On the first parcel there was a two and one-half story building which was originally built for a residence between 1910 and 1915. Sometime after its construction it had been extensively remodeled for use as a church and was so used by petitioner. On the second parcel there was a two-story brick and cement building which had been remodeled and converted into a rectory or parsonage. As remodeled it consisted of a three-car garage and an office on the first floor and a five-room apartment on the second floor. The property also had a paved parking area, many well-developed trees and flowering shrubbery, an excellent lawn and other improvements.

In the written appraisal of Charles H. Lawton, Jr., which had been presented by petitioner, Mr. Lawton stated that the highest economic use of the property in question was for church and parsonage purposes as it was then being used; that properties similar to the condemned premises were not available for purchase at any price and that they just did not exist; and that in placing a value on said property he had taken into consideration the economic factors involved, the replacement cost of land and buildings and the use to which the property was being put.

In deciding what in his opinion was the fair market value of the property condemned, Mr. Lawton estimated the cost of replacing the structures with comparable materials and facilities at $137,520, from which he deducted 30 per cent, or $41,256, as reasonable depreciation due to physical and economic factors, making the net value of the buildings $96,264. On the basis of these figures he further reduced his estimate of the value of the buildings to $94,000. He placed a value of $12,000 on the land and stated in his opinion that the fair market value of the property was $106,000.

John L. Marshall, who qualified as an expert in construction work, was presented by petitioner for the sole purpose of testifying as to the replacement costs of the buildings and other improvements on the land. He stated in substance that he had examined the church and parsonage; that the church building was in excellent condition; that it was constructed of the best materials especially made for it; and that the property was ideal for use as a church but would have no market for any other use. He estimated that the total cost of reconstructing the buildings and other improvements on the land would be $125,840. He stated that he felt a 25 per cent depreciation rate would be a fair deduction from said reconstruction costs and concluded that at the time he examined the property the net value of the buildings and other improvements, exclusive of the land value, was $94,300. It appears from the record that no objection was made to any portion of Mr. Lawton's written appraisal or to any part of Mr. Marshall's testimony.

As we have already noted, the only evidence presented by respondent was two written appraisals by a real estate expert, Leo V. Boyle. These were also admitted without objection. The first of these related to the land on which the parsonage stood. Mr. Boyle valued the land at $4,350 and the improvements at $14,200, a total of $18,550. He stated that his 'Judgment of value is integrated from level of land values in the area, plus the depreciated reproduction cost of the improvements.' He also stated that 'Comparable approach could not be used for there are no similar properties of which sales records are available.' This report also observes that the building is appropriate for its use and is especially suitable for it.

Mr. Boyle's other written appraisal relates to the land on which the church building is located. He placed a value of $6,800 on this land and $31,700 on the improvements thereon, making a total valuation of $38,500. In his report he stated: 'Land value has been integrated from few sales made in the general area, adjusted for time lapse and differences in comparability. Estimate of building is on basis of replacement cost less depreciation, and confirmation is found in a consideration of a theoretical one story building built especially for this particular use, i. e. church, and sunday school, and which would provide the facilities now furnished by the present building.' Mr. Boyle further stated that a good one-story brick building with basement could be built for about $40,000; that after allowing for depreciation of 25 per cent the value would be $30,000; and that this amount plus the value of the land and other improvements would amount to $39,200. Thus it appears that the state's total appraisal for both parcels as of the date of condemnation was $57,050, or $57,750 if Mr. Boyle's estimate of $39,200 is adopted.

In his decision the trial justice stated in effect that the parties had agreed that the value of the property taken was the sole issue. In referring to the appraisals of Mr. Lawton and Mr. Boyle, he stated that he was familiar with the integrity and long experience of both as real estate dealers, agents and appraisers and that he had confidence in them. However, after commenting on the qualifications of Mr. Marshall with reference to his expert knowledge of reproduction costs, the trial justice said that he placed great weight on the testimony of Mr. Marshall.

He also stated in substance that the state is required to pay in full the cash value of the property taken; that in the absence of evidence of comparable sales it was necessary to use some other method of valuation; and that in so far as the church building was concerned petitioner was entitled to replacement cost less depreciation. On the basis of the record before him he accepted as fair the state's valuation of the land at $11,150 and Mr. Marshall's figures on replacement cost of improvements less depreciation, namely, $94,300. In arriving at the final amount of damages he made some small allowance for the differences between the appraisals, added interest at 6 per cent from the date of taking, and rendered a decision for $105,450.

The respondent's exception is based on the contention that the trial justice should have considered, along with the evidence of reproduction cost less depreciation of the property taken, the cost of producing comparable property having facilities for a church and rectory equivalent to those provided by the condemned property. The respondent argues that the use of reproduction cost less depreciation as a measure of damages led the trial justice to exclude from his consideration that portion of the appraisal made by the state's witness, Mr. Boyle, which dealt with the cost of building a 'theoretical' one-story church as distinguished from the cost of reproducing the church which had been condemned. He further contends that the trial...