Associated Employers Lloyds v. Howard
| Decision Date | 24 October 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. A-5828,A-5828 |
| Citation | 294 S.W.2d 706,156 Tex. 277 |
| Parties | ASSOCIATED EMPLOYERS LLOYDS, Petitioners, v. Joe B. HOWARD, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Cantey, Hanger, Johnson, Scarborough, & Gooch, Howard Barker and Ed Reichelt, Ft. Worth, Fred Minor, Denton, Black & Stayton, Austin, for petitioners.
Boyd & Boyd, Denton, W. C. Culp, Gainesville, for respondent.
Respondent, Joe B. Howard, sued petitioner, Associated Employers Lloyds, to set aside a compromise settlement agreement and a release, executed by him, in order that he might seek recovery of additional benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 8306 et seq. Trial was by the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment for respondent. The judgment was affirmed by he Court of Civil Appeals. 288 S.W.2d 861.
A chronological history of events leading up to the suit will make the issues more understandable. The events related will be those shown by undisputed evidence and those assumed from viewing the evidence in its light most favorable to respondent.
On January 5, 1952, respondent, an employee of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company, sustained an injury in the course of his employment. As a result of the injury respondent was forced to undergo an operation and was absent from his employment for approximately three and one-half months. During his absence from his employment petitioner, Kimbell-Diamond's insurance carrier, paid him weekly compensation benefits in the sum of $24.75.
On April 18, 1952, respondent returned to work. On April 22, 1952, an adjuster for petitioner, by representing that it was only a 'release to go back to work', induced respondent, who could not read and could only write his name, to sign a Compromise Settlement Agreement by which he acknowledged payment of compensation benefits to that date in the sum of $321.75 and agreed to settle his claim for additional compensation benefits for the sum of $35. On April 25, 1952, the purported compromise settlement agreement was approved by the Industrial Accident Board.
On April 30, 1952, respondent procured from the post office at Sanger, Texas, where he lived, an envelope from petitioner containing a check for $35 and a Compromise Settlement Receipt. The face of the check contained the statement that it was 'In payment of compromise settlement agreement entered into and approved by the Industrial Accident Board.' On the back of the check, above the line for the signature of the payee, was the following writing: 'When Properly Endorsed This Draft Becomes and Constitutes a Receipt for Compensation Benefits Stated on the Face Hereof.' The Compromise Settlement Receipt which was to be and was executed by respondent acknowledged receipt from petitioner of the sum of $35 'in full compromise settlement, accord and satisfaction of all compensation and claims for compensation' which he had or could have against petitioner by reason of injuries received by him. Respondent took the contents of the envelope to his bank where he endorsed the check and had it cashed by an employee of the bank who signed the Compromise Settlement Receipt as a witness to respondent's signature. Shortly thereafter respondent, being physically unable to continue to do the heavy work to which he was assigned, left his employment permanently. On January 20, 1953 this suit was filed.
Respondent seeks to set aside the Compromise Settlement Agreement and the Compromise Settlement Receipt on the ground that the same were procured by fraud. His contention with respect to the Compromise Settlement Agreement signed by him on April 22nd is that he was unable to read it and that he was induced to sign it by the false representation of petitioner's adjuster that it was only a 'release to go back to work.' His contention with respect to the Compromise Settlement Receipt executed by him at the time he received and cashed the check for $35 on April 30th is set out in a trial amendment as follows: 'Plaintiff alleges that due to his unlettered condition and his illiterate condition Defendant was under a duty to inform him of what he was asked to sign, but that in furtherance of the fraud and as a part of said fraud previously perpetrated on plaintiff, defendant did not even send a covering letter or an explanatory letter, although defendant required said release to be witnessed, and had such letter been sent said witness could have explained to plaintiff what he was signing.' Respondent's testimony did not support his pleading that the instruments he was asked to sign on April 30th were in furtherance of or a part of the fraud perpetrated on him on ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Atkins v. Womble, 15196
...complete bar to any later action based on matters included in the settlement agreement and covered by the release. Associated Employers Lloyds v. Howard, Tex., 294 S.W.2d 706; Hart v. Traders & Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 146, 189 S.W.2d 493. We think the rule is applicable in this case. Under the c......
-
Readyone Indus., Inc. v. Lopez
...ability, however, illiteracy is no defense against the enforcement of an arbitration clause. Associated Emp'rs Lloyd v. Howard, 156 Tex. 277, 294 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1956). In Delfingen, our decision did not turn solely on Valenzuela’s, the employee, lack of English speaking and reading s......
-
Delfingen United States-Texas, L.P. v. Valenzuela
...to have read and understood the contract unless he was prevented from doing so by trick or artifice. Associated Employers Lloyds v. Howard, 156 Tex. 277, 294 S.W.2d 706, 708 (1956); Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. W.L. Macatee & Sons, 129 Tex. 166, 101 S.W.2d 553, 556–57 (19......
-
Doskocil Mfg. Co. v. Nguyen
...the contract, unless she was prevented from doing so by trick or artifice. Delfingen, 407 S.W.3d at 801; see Associated Emp'rs Lloyds v. Howard, 294 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1956); Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. W.L. Macatee & Sons, 101 S.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Tex. 1937); Big 8 Food Stores, 166 S.W.......