Associated Press v. Montana Senate Republican Caucus, KECI-T
| Citation | 951 P.2d 65,286 Mont. 172 |
| Decision Date | 23 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | KECI-T,KFBB-T,KXLF-T,KTVQ-T,M,KRTV-T,No. 96-640,B,G,KULR-T,96-640 |
| Parties | The ASSOCIATED PRESS; Bigfork Eagle; The Billings Gazette; Bozeman Daily Chronicle; The Montana Standard; Great Falls Tribune; Havre Daily News; Helena Independent Record; The Daily Inter Lake;issoula;reat Falls;utte;reat Falls;illings;illings; Livingston Enterprise; Miles City Star; Missoulian; Montana Newspaper Association; News Montana, Inc.; (as publishers of Bighorn County News, Carbon County News, and Stillwater County News); Ravalli Republic; and The Society of Professional Journalists, Montana Chapter, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The MONTANA SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS; The Montana Senate Democratic Caucus; The Montana House of Representatives Republican Caucus; and The Montana House of Representatives Democratic Caucus, Defendants and Respondents. . Heard |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
James P. Reynolds, Reynolds, Motl and Sherwood, Helena, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Oliver H. Goe, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, Helena, for Defendants and Respondents.
This is an appeal from the District Court's November 16, 1995 order dismissing the Appellants' complaint. The trial court held that the Respondent Senate and House Republican and Democratic party in-session caucuses were not persons within the meaning of Rule 4 A, M.R.Civ.P., and that, therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction over them. Subsequently, on July 12, 1996, the court's order was converted into one for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
We address but one issue in this appeal: Under Montana law, are the Senate and House caucuses of the Republican and Democratic parties "persons" within the meaning of Rule 4 A, M.R.Civ.P.? We answer this question in the affirmative.
The Appellants (Plaintiffs in the underlying action) are twenty-two Montana newspapers, television stations and trade and professional news organizations, hereafter collectively referred to as the media. The Respondents (Defendants in the underlying action) are the State Senate and House caucuses of the Republican and Democratic parties. The Respondents are hereafter collectively referred to as the caucuses.
The media filed their complaint on February 17, 1995, alleging that, for a variety of reasons, the caucuses are public bodies or agencies of state government performing public functions in public facilities at public expense. The media further alleged that the proceedings and records of the caucuses were closed to the media and to the public in violation of Montana's Open Meetings law, Title 2, chapter 3, part 2, MCA; in violation of Montana's Public Records law, Title 2, chapter 6, part 1, MCA; and in violation of the Right-To-Know provision of Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution. The media prayed for declaratory and injunctive relief and for costs and attorney fees.
Four legislators serving in the 1995 Legislature, Senate Majority Leader John Harp, Senate Minority Leader Mike Halligan, Speaker of the House John Mercer and then-House Minority Leader Ray Peck, were served with process. These four legislators entered a special appearance, by counsel, without admitting that they were the proper persons to receive service of process on behalf of the caucuses. In due course they filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., contending, among other things, that the caucuses were not "persons" within the meaning of Rule 4, M.R.Civ.P., and that the caucuses were, therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Relying on our decision in Common Cause v. Statutory Committee (1994), 263 Mont. 324, 868 P.2d 604, the District Court effectively differentiated between the pre-session and the in-session party caucuses. The court held that, because pre-session caucuses are required by § 5-2-201, MCA, to meet and because they clearly perform a governmental or public purpose these caucuses are subject to the Open Meetings law. On the other hand, the court concluded that while the party caucuses are not the legislature nor are they an official body or committee of the legislature, the caucuses are "a 'de facto' part of the legislative process where important public policy issues are discussed by legislators." The court then ruled that the caucuses are not "persons" within the meaning of Rule 4 A, M.R.Civ.P., since the caucuses are neither unincorporated associations nor groups of two or more persons having a joint or common interest nor any other legal or commercial entity. Rather, the court concluded that the party caucuses are unofficial gatherings of legislators and not separate legal entities, and, therefore, they are not persons within the meaning of Rule 4 A. On this rationale, the District Court denied the motion to dismiss the media's complaint as to the pre-session caucuses, but granted dismissal, and later converted that to summary judgment, as to the in-session caucuses.
The media timely appealed the court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their complaint as to the in-session caucuses. No cross-appeal was filed by the caucuses, however, as to the court's ruling on the pre-session caucuses.
As stated above, the court dismissed the media's complaint for failure to state a claim and then converted the order of dismissal into one for summary judgment concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the in-session caucuses are not persons within the meaning of Rule 4 A, M.R.Civ.P. Under these circumstances our review of the trial court's decision, de novo, is clearly mandated.
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Moreover, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., has the effect of admitting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. In considering the motion, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of fact contained therein are taken as true. The determination that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law which we review de novo. Common Cause of Montana v. Argenbright (1996), 276 Mont. 382, 386, 917 P.2d 425, 427 (citations omitted).
In like manner, a court's determination of its jurisdiction is a conclusion of law over which our review is plenary. See Lurie v. 8182 Maryland Associates (1997), 282 Mont. 455, ----, 938 P.2d 676, 678, 54 St. Rep. 429, 430; Agri West v. Koyama Farms, Inc. (1997), 282 Mont. 167, 933 P.2d 808, 810; Bird v. Hiller (1995), 270 Mont. 467, 470, 892 P.2d 931, 932. Finally, as to motions granting summary judgment, it is well-settled that we review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Jefferson County (1997), 283 Mont. 486, ----, 943 P.2d 85, 88, 54 St. Rep. 756, 758 (citation omitted).
The media argue, and we agree, that the word "caucus" has two related, yet distinct meanings. On the one hand a "caucus" can be a group of persons sharing common interests and attempting to influence the decision of a larger group. In this context a caucus is "[a] group within a legislative or decision-making body seeking to represent a specific interest or influence a particular area of policy," American Heritage Dictionary 304 (3d ed.1992), or "a group of people united to promote an agreed-upon cause," Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 182 (10th ed.1997).
On the other hand, "caucus" can refer to the meetings of such groups. Under this usage of the word, caucus is variously defined as "a closed meeting of a group of persons belonging to the same political party or faction [usually] to select candidates or to decide on policy," Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 182 (10th ed.1997); "[a] meeting of the legal voters of any political party assembled for the purpose of choosing delegates or for the nomination of candidates for office," Black's Law Dictionary 220 (6th ed.1990); or "[a] closed meeting of party members within a legislative body to decide on questions of policy or leadership," American Heritage Dictionary 304 (3d ed.1992).
In their complaint, the media carefully differentiated between the two definitions, focusing their claims for purposes of this case on the first definition of caucus. Specifically, the media defined each of the four defendant caucuses as consisting of state senators or representatives elected, respectively, to the state Senate or House on either the Republican or Democratic party ticket.
In determining that the media's complaint should be dismissed, the District Court, however, effectively adopted the argument of the caucuses and rejected the first definition--i.e., that a caucus is a group of people sharing a common interest and seeking to promote a specific interest, policy or cause--and, instead, narrowed its determination to the second definition--i.e., that party caucuses are unofficial gatherings of legislators and not separate legal entities. While the court grounded its ruling on our decision in Common Cause v. Statutory Committee (1994), 263 Mont. 324, 868 P.2d 604, we did not address in that case the issue presented here, and, accordingly, we do not find our decision dispositive as to this issue.
If the "group" definition of caucus (as opposed to the "gathering" or "meeting" definition) is valid--and we have been cited to no authority that would lead us to the conclusion that it is not--then, the question simply becomes whether the caucuses as "groups of persons sharing a common interest" fit within the...
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