Common Cause of Montana v. Argenbright

• Decision Date: 04 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-323,95-323
• Citation: 917 P.2d 425,276 Mont. 382
• Parties: COMMON CAUSE OF MONTANA, a State Organization of Common Cause, a Washington, D.C., Non-profit Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ed ARGENBRIGHT, in His Capacity as Commissioner of Political Practices of the State of Montana, and the Office of the Commissioner of Political Practices of the State of Montana, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 425

917 P.2d 425

276 Mont. 382

COMMON CAUSE OF MONTANA, a State Organization of Common Cause, a Washington, D.C., Non-profit Corporation Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ed ARGENBRIGHT, in His Capacity as Commissioner of Political Practices of the State of Montana, and the Office of the Commissioner of Political Practices of the State of Montana Defendants and Respondents.

No. 95-323.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Feb. 21, 1996.

Decided April 23, 1996.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1996.

[276 Mont. 383] Appeal from District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark; The Honorable Jeffrey Sherlock, Judge presiding.

James P. Reynolds (argued) and Deborah S. Smith; Reynolds, Motl & Sherwood, Helena, for Appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, James M. Scheier, Ass't Attorney General (argued), Helena, for Respondents.

LEAPHART, Justice.

Pursuant to § 2-4-315, MCA, Common Cause filed a petition for rulemaking with the Commissioner of Political Practices (Commissioner) requesting the Commissioner to institute a rulemaking proceeding to clarify the definition of lobbying set forth in the Montana Lobbying Act, § 5-7-102(6), MCA. The Commissioner denied the petition. Common Cause then filed a complaint in District Court seeking declaratory relief and a peremptory writ of mandamus. The District Court granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. The court subsequently denied Common Cause's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Common Cause appeals from the order dismissing its complaint and the order denying its motion to alter or amend the judgment. We reverse and remand.

Common Cause presents the following issues on appeal:

1. Does § 2-4-315, MCA, grant the Commissioner discretion to deny a petition for mandatory rulemaking under § 5-7-111, MCA, without first initiating rulemaking proceedings?

2. Is Mandamus an appropriate remedy?

BACKGROUND

Since this matter was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., prior to the filing of a responsive pleading or the completion of any discovery, the only facts before the District Court were those alleged in Common Cause's complaint. As alleged in the complaint, the background leading up to this litigation is as follows: For many years Common Cause has worked to assure full public disclosure of the amounts of money that persons spend to lobby Montana legislators and public officials. As part of this effort, Common Cause wrote and then worked to pass Initiative 85 revising Montana's Lobbying Act and requiring that lobbying expenditures be reported to the Commissioner.

The Lobbying Act states that one of its purposes is "to require disclosure of the amounts of money spent for lobbying." Section 5-7-101(1), MCA. In 1981, this Court recognized that the purpose of Initiative 85 was "to provide for the disclosure of money spent to influence action of public officials and to require elected officials to disclose their business interests." Montana Automobile Ass'n v. Greely (1981), 193 Mont. 378, 399, 632 P.2d 300, 311. In order to gauge how effectively the Lobbying Act was accomplishing this purpose, Common Cause conducted two surveys, one in 1984 and one in 1994. These surveys sought responses from principals as to their understanding of what activities constituted "lobbying" under the Lobbying Act and, thus, which expenditures concerning those activities were required, by law, to be reported. The survey results, which were appended to the complaint, indicate that there is substantial disagreement among the principals as to which In light of these two surveys, Common Cause filed a petition for rulemaking pursuant to § 2-4-315, MCA, on April 29, 1994, requesting the Commissioner to institute a rulemaking proceeding for the purpose of clarifying the definition of lobbying set forth in the Lobbying Act at § 5-7-102(6), MCA. Common Cause's petition also invokes the Commissioner's specific duty under § 5-7-111, MCA, to promulgate rules necessary to carry out the purposes of the Lobbying Act. In its petition for rulemaking, Common Cause set forth a proposed rule defining lobbying. On June 24, 1994, the Commissioner denied the petition on the basis that the rule proposed by Common Cause would alter, amend and enlarge the Lobbying Act in a way not envisioned by the Legislature and that the rule proposed by Common Cause was not reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Lobbying Act.

                activities are included within the definition of "lobbying."   Common Cause alleged that this disagreement as to what are and are not reportable lobbying expenditures, results in inconsistent reporting of lobbying expenditures.  According to Common Cause, this inconsistency, in turn, thwarts the Lobbying Act's statutorily-stated purpose of making public the amounts of money spent for lobbying.  See § 5-7-101(1), MCA.  In other words, it is Common Cause's contention that unless there is consistency in the understanding of what must be reported, in the final analysis, the reports have no meaning
                

Thereafter, Common Cause filed an application for peremptory writ of mandamus and complaint for declaratory relief in the District Court. Common Cause requested a writ of mandamus requiring the Commissioner to institute a rulemaking procedure to promulgate rules specifying which activities are included in the Lobbying Act's definition of lobbying. Additionally, Common Cause sought a declaration that the Commissioner had violated the mandatory duty imposed on him by § 5-7-111, MCA, to "promulgate and publish rules necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Lobbying Act]...." The Commissioner moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., and the District Court granted his motion. Common Cause appeals.

DISCUSSION

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Lockwood v. W.R. Grace & Co. (1995), 272 Mont. 202, 207, 900 P.2d 314, 317.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., has the effect of admitting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. In considering the motion, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of fact contained therein are taken as true.

Lockwood, 900 P.2d at 317 (quoting Boreen v. Christensen (1994), 267 Mont. 405, 408, 884 P.2d 761, 762). The determination that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Lockwood, 900 P.2d at 317.

We have stated that we do not favor the short circuiting of litigation at the initial pleading stage unless a complaint does not state a cause of action under any set of facts. Tobacco River Lumber Co. v. Yoppe (1978), 176 Mont. 267, 271, 577 P.2d 855, 857. "This is especially true when the cause of action is based upon a statute that has not been previously interpreted and where no underlying factual record has been developed." Smith v. Video Lottery Consultants, Inc. (1993), 260 Mont. 54, 57-58, 858 P.2d 11, 13. In the present case, the section of the Lobbying Act in question, § 5-7-111, MCA, has not previously been interpreted by this Court.

Resolution of this appeal hinges upon the interpretation of two statutory provisions: Section 5-7-111, MCA, and § 2-4-315, MCA. Section 5-7-111, MCA, provides as follows:

Commissioner to make rules. (1) The commissioner shall promulgate and publish rules necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter in conformance with the Montana Administrative Procedure Act and, in particular, shall provide rules necessary to allocate salary, expenses, and any other payments between lobbying activities and other activities not connected with lobbying for any person whose activities are not solely limited to lobbying.

(2) Such rules shall be designed to effect and promote the purposes of this chapter, express or implied. Such rules shall be as simple and easily complied with as possible.

Common Cause argues that this statute mandates that the Commissioner "shall" publish rules necessary to carry out the provisions of the Lobbying Act and that the "necessity" is established by the well-pleaded, undisputed allegations of its complaint. Common Cause argues that § 5-7-111, MCA, creates a clear legal duty, the violation of which warrants the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The Commissioner focuses on the fact that he only has a duty to promulgate rules necessary to carry out the provisions of the chapter "in conformance with the Montana Administrative Procedure Act " (MAPA). He argues that MAPA, § 2-4-315, MCA, gives him discretion to determine whether the rule propounded by Common Cause is "necessary" or whether any rules are necessary. Section 2-4-315, MCA, provides as follows:

Petition for adoption, amendment, or repeal of rules. An interested person or, when the legislature is not in session, a member of the legislature on behalf of an interested person may petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.... Within 60 days after submission of a petition, the agency either shall deny the petition in writing (stating its reasons for the denial) or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with 2-4-302 through 2-4-305.

The Commissioner contends that he was within his discretion under the above statute when, within 60 days after receiving Common Cause's petition for rulemaking, he concluded that the rule proposed by Common Cause would impermissibly alter the statutory definition of the term "lobbying" enacted by the Montana legislature, and thus he denied the petition. He then contends that a writ of mandamus is not available to compel the exercise of a discretionary act.

The District Court...