Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc. v. Board of Ed., Union Free School Dist. No. 3, Town of Huntington

• Decision Date: 27 November 1972
• Citation: 40 A.D.2d 122,338 N.Y.S.2d 45
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: , 73 Lab.Cas. P 53,298 In the Matter of ASSOCIATED TEACHERS OF HUNTINGTON, INC., Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 3, TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, Appellant.

Page 45

338 N.Y.S.2d 45

40 A.D.2d 122, 73 Lab.Cas. P 53,298

In the Matter of ASSOCIATED TEACHERS OF HUNTINGTON, INC., Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 3, TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Nov. 27, 1972.

Joseph W. Campanella, Plainview, for appellant.

Kaplowitz & Galinson, New York City (Daniel Galinson, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Before RABIN, P.J., and HOPKINS, MUNDER, LATHAM and SHAPIRO, JJ.

SHAPIRO, Justice.

The issues before us are whether certain members of the petitioner (an association of teachers and other professional personnel employed by the appellant) had an enforceable contractual right to sabbatical leave prior to April 12, 1971 and, if not, whether the finding of an arbitrator that they had such a right was in excess of his powers and must therefore be vacated.

The collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the appellant Board of Education covered the period 1969--1971. It provided that applications for sabbatical leaves mst be filed before April 1 of the preceding school year and that the board shall ordinarily take action on such applications during the month of April. A number of teachers submitted timely applications for sabbatical leaves to commence with the school year beginning July 1, 1971.

On April 12, 1971 the Legislature amended article 5 of the Civil Service Law, effective immediately, by adding section 82 thereto, which declared a one-year moratorium on leaves of absence and sabbatical leaves of absence, commencing July 1, 1971. Subdivision 3 of section 82 provides that the amendment shall not be construed to impair any contractual rights to sabbatical leaves if those rights were 'in existence and enforceable' prior to the statute's effective date.

On May 1, 1971, William Keough, the Superintendent of Schools, notified all teachers that, in accordance with this legislation, the board would grant no leaves of absence for the 1971--1972 school year. No action had yet been taken on any of the applications for sabbatical leave.

Three teachers invoked the grievance procedure established in the contract between the parties. The dispute could not be resolved and an arbitrator was appointed. After a hearing, he concluded that the board had improperly denied all applications for sabbatical leave, on the ground that the teachers had had a contractual right thereto prior to April 12, 1971. The board was thereon directed to consider each application on its merits in accordance with the criteria set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's award was confirmed at Special Term.

The collective bargaining agreement between the parties establishes the maximum number of sabbatical leaves allowable in any one year at three percent of the staff. In passing upon such applications the superintendent and the board are required to consider the following factors: years of service since the last sabbatical leave; the type of research, study, travel or other activity planned; the value of the research or study to the school district; the urgency of the proposed research or study; and the relationship of the research or study to the professional growth of the applicant.

The agreement does not contain an undertaking on the part of the board to grant requests for sabbatical leaves upon a mere demand therefor. On the contrary, it clearly vests discretion in the board to grant or deny applications for sabbatical leave after applying the enumerated criteria. It is therefore clear that the contractual rights, if any, which teachers may have had to sabbatical leaves were not 'in existence and enforceable' prior to April 12, 1971 (see Legislative Conference of City Univ. of N.Y. v. Board of Higher Educ. of City of N.Y., 67 Misc.2d 648, 324 N.Y.S.2d 924, mod. on other grounds 38 A.D.2d 524, 327 N.Y.S.2d 1; Matter of Ewen v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 18 of Plainedge, 39 A.D.2d 605, 331 N.Y.S.2d 957).

Having determined that section 82 of the Civil Service Law barred the grant of sabbatical leaves for the school year 1971--1972 to teachers employed by the appellant, the remaining issue to be determined is whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers in construing the collective bargaining agreement to mean that the teachers in question had enforceable contractual rights to sabbatical leaves prior to April 12, 1971 and ordering that the appellant consider and process the applications therefor.

The general rule is that, if a matter is properly before an arbitrator, a mistake of law or fact on his part will not justify vacatur of his award (Matter of Burt Bldg. Materials Corp. (Local 1205, Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters), 18 N.Y.2d 556, 558, 277 N.Y.S.2d 399, 223 N.E.2d 884; see, also, Matter of Granite Worsted Mills (Aaronson Cowen, Ltd.), 25 N.Y.2d 451, 455, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 937, 255 N.E.2d 168, 169). This rule, however, is not applicable in cases in which the award of the arbitrator contravenes public policy or violates a State statute.

In Matter of Aimcee Wholesale Corp. (Tomar Prods.) (21 N.Y.2d 621, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 237 N.E.2d 223), the court noted that resolution of antitrust problems, involving, as they do, considerations of public policy of the first magnitude, is not a proper subject for arbitration.

Since the courts thus have the power to prevent an arbitrator from rendering an award which requires the doing of an act which is prohibited by law or is offensive to public policy (matter oF nationaL equip. Rental (American Pecco Corp.), 35 A.D.2d 132, 135, 314 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841, affd. 28 N.Y.2d 639, 320 N.Y.S.2d 248, 269 N.E.2d 37; Matter of Allied Van Lines (Hollander Express & Van Co.), 29 N.Y.2d 35, 323 N.Y.S.2d 693, 272 N.E.2d 70; Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle Inc. (Eddington Fabrics Corp.), 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493), it follows by a parity of reasoning that, if the arbitrator's award entails the commission of acts prohibited by State statute, the award should be vacated (see Matter of Western Union Tel. Co. (Amer. Communications Assn., C.I.O.), 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162).

Section 82 of the Civil Service Law was enacted as an emergency measure upon a message of necessity from the Governor as one of a number of laws deemed necessary to meet a grave fiscal crisis which confronted the State and virtually all local governments (see Central School Dist. No. 2 v. Ramapo Cent. School Dist. No. 2 Teachers Assn., 67 Misc.2d 317, 320, 324 N.Y.S.2d 260). As such, it represented a clear public policy. The arbitration award before us contravenes that policy and not only authorizes but directs the doing of an act prohibited by statute.

Hence, as a matter of law, the award exceeded the powers of the arbitrator (CPLR 7511, subd. (b), par. 1, cl. (iii)) and must be vacated. Accordingly, the order and judgment under review should be reversed on the law, without costs, and the application to confirm the award should be denied and the cross motion to vacate the award granted, without costs.

In a proceeding to confirm an arbitrator's award, the appeal is from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, entered November 24, 1971, which granted the application and denied appellant's cross motion to vacate the award, and (2) a judgment of the same court, entered December 8, 1971, which confirmed the award.

Order and judgment reversed, on the law, without costs, and application to confirm the award denied and cross motion to vacate the award granted, without costs.

HOPKINS, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order and the judgment, with an opinion, in which SAMUEL RABIN, P.J., concurs.

MUNDER and LATHAM, JJ., concur.

HOPKINS, Justice (dissenting).

I do not find any violation of public policy in the arbitration process in which the parties before us engaged. ¹ There is nothing in the statute which prevents the enforcement of the arbitrator's award; indeed, as I read the statute, it authorizes the consideration of the issues before the arbitrator.

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