Associates Discount Corp. v. Haynes Garage, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 December 1939
• Citation: 24 N.E.2d 685,304 Mass. 526
• Parties: ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORPORATION v. HAYNES GARAGE, Inc., et al. (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

304 Mass. 526

24 N.E.2d 685

ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORPORATION

v.HAYNES GARAGE, Inc., et al. (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Dec. 27, 1939.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; Williams, Judge.

Two actions of tort by the Associates Discount Corporation against the Haynes Garage, Incorporated, and Charles T. McCaffrey, for the alleged conversion of two automobiles. The plaintiff brings exceptions to trial judge's directing jury to return verdict for defendant in each case and to the exclusion of certain evidence.

Exceptions sustained.

K. C. Tiffin, of Boston, for plaintiff.

C. S. Maddock, of Boston, for defendants.

DOLAN, Justice.

These two actions of tort are brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the alleged conversion of two automobiles by the defendant. The cases were tried to a jury. Before the plaintiff completed its evidence, the judge directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant in each case. The cases come before us on the plaintiff's exception to this action of the judge and to the exclusion of certain evidence.

The Associates Discount Company, a partnership, had engaged in the business of financing the purchase of automobiles by dealers until some time in 1937, when it became incorporated under the name of Associates Discount Corporation. This corporation is the plaintiff in the present actions. After incorporation, the plaintiff's Boston branch manager, who had also been the Boston branch manager of the predecessor partnership, did business with Grannone Motors, Inc., which had a ‘general retail auto sales agency selling new and used cars.’ The plaintiff ‘floor-planned automobiles for Grannone * * * floor plan service means the buying and financing of automobiles by the finance company and placing them on the floor of the dealer, so that he may resell them to his retail trade.’ The plaintiff ‘floor-planned the two cars involved’ in these actions for ‘Grannone’ under the following circumstances: On July 6, 1937, after receiving notice from the Cambridge Trust Company that a certain sight draft had been drawn on ‘Grannone’ in connection with the purchase by the latter of one of the automobiles involved, Adams, the plaintiff's local manager, or someone under his supervision, prepared a bill of sale of the vehicle in question (but including others), running from ‘Grannone’ to the former partnership. A check of the corporation was drawn by Adams and given to the trust company in payment of and in return for the drafts, the invoices and the bills of lading. On the same day or a few days later, ‘Grannone’ executed a ‘trust receipt’covering the automobiles involved in the first action, in which it was recited that the vehicle (and others not here involved) were the property of the ‘Associates Discount Corporation.’ ‘Grannone’ received the automobile in question and sold it sometime before July 23, 1937, to the defendant, although no permission to sell had been given by the plaintiff. On July 7, 1937, the day following the execution of the bill of sale, it was sent to the home office of the plaintiff at South Bend, Indiana, which was also the home office of the partnership. About the middle of August, 1937, the bill of sale was returned to the plaintiff's Boston office, and when received an assignment in writing was pinned to it. The assignment was in the following form: ‘Assignment. For value received, all our rights, title and interest in the within contract and to the chattel described therein is hereby assigned to Associates Discount Corp. without recourse or liability whatsoever. Associates Discount Company, By Lew Fleming, one of the partners.’ The transaction with relation to the automobile involved in the second action was identical in detail, except for certain dates, and need not be reviewed.

There was evidence that on July 6, 1937, and July 12, 1937 (controlling dates), the partnership was still doing business. At this point in the presentation of the plaintiff's cases the judge said: ‘You will...