ASSOCIATION, ETC. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Civ. A. 10043.

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
• Writing for the Court: MARSH
• Citation: 107 F. Supp. 692
• Docket Number: Civ. A. 10043.
• Decision Date: 02 October 1952
• Parties: ASSOCIATION OF WESTINGHOUSE SALARIED EMPLOYEES et al. v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

107 F. Supp. 692

ASSOCIATION OF WESTINGHOUSE SALARIED EMPLOYEES et al.
v.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

Civ. A. 10043.

United States District Court W. D. Pennsylvania.

October 2, 1952.

107 F. Supp. 693

Albert C. Shapira, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.

Mahlon E. Lewis, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.

MARSH, District Judge.

Plaintiff is an unincorporated association and the collective bargaining representative for certain salaried employees of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the defendant, at the latter's East Pittsburgh and Homewood, Pennsylvania, plants.

On November 19, 1951, plaintiff association filed a complaint to which was attached the collective bargaining agreement effective between the parties as of November 1, 1950. The complaint alleges that under the terms of this agreement the defendant is obligated "to pay all of the employees represented by the plaintiff * * * their full monthly salary for the month of April, 1951, regardless of whether or not such employees missed a day's work during said month, * * *"; that the defendant refused to pay not less than 4,000 of said employees their full monthly salaries "having deducted therefrom a proportionate amount attributable to absence from work on April 3, 1951"; and that the aggregate amount due and unpaid is not less than $45,000. Plaintiff prayed for judgment against the defendant corporation in that amount with interest and costs.

Jurisdiction is stated to be under Section 301 of Title III of the Labor Management Relations Act of June 23, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest within the meaning of Rule 17, F.R.C.P., 28 U.S.C.A., and is therefore not a proper party plaintiff; (2) that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) that the complaint fails to state a claim against the defendant upon which relief can be granted.

On the day fixed for hearing on the motion, the plaintiff filed a "First Amended Complaint," and the defendant renewed its motion to dismiss for the same reasons.

The amended complaint is substantially different from the original complaint. First, it states as an additional basis for jurisdiction the "Declaratory Judgment provisions of the Judicial Code, 28 United

107 F. Supp. 694

States Code, Sections 2201 and 2202." Second, the plaintiff association in the amended complaint has added that it brings the action "in behalf of the individuals in interest whom it represents" as well as for itself "individually." It is alleged that the plaintiff is the collective bargaining agent for not less than 5,000 salaried employees at the defendant's plants aforesaid, engaged in an industry "affecting commerce," and that defendant failed and refused to pay not less than 4,000 of these employees their full monthly salaries by deducting a proportionate amount because of their absence from work on April 3, 1951. Third, in addition to averring a breach of the bargaining contract, it asserts that the defendant's failure and refusal to pay as aforesaid was in violation of the provisions of certain instruments, attached as exhibits, which were supplemental to and incorporated into the bargaining contract. Fourth, instead of asking judgment in favor of the association for $45,000 as set forth in the original complaint, it requests a judgment

"* * * against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff interpreting the aforesaid contract and declaring the rights of the parties thereunder * * *; and to compel the Defendant to make an Accounting setting forth the individual names and amounts of unpaid salaries * * *; and to enter judgment against the Defendant and in favor of the individual employees set forth in paragraph 21 hereof, for the unpaid amount of their salaries, for the month of April 1951, together with interest from April 30, 1951, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee."

The not less than 4,000 employees, allegedly absent from work on April 3, 1951, were not joined as parties plaintiff or named in the complaint.

The defendant contends that the court does not have jurisdiction because these claims arise from "the individual employment contract rather than from the Collective Bargaining Contract," and that Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Law gives jurisdiction to a federal court only in the event that the contract in suit was entered into between the employer and the labor organization as distinguished from an individual contract of hiring entered into between the employer and the individual employee. Defendant cites Milk Wagon Drivers Union, etc. v. Associated Milk Dealers, Inc., D.C.N.D.Ill.1941, 42 F.Supp. 584 and Joint Council Dining Car Employees, etc. v. New York Cent. R. Co., D.C. N.D.Ill.1946, 7 F.R.D. 376, in support of this theory. In the opinion of the court, this contention fails because the complaint under consideration is based exclusively upon the collective bargaining contract between the association and the corporation and not upon the contracts of hiring between the corporation and the individual employees.

We think that the situation sub judice is ruled by the case of American Federation of Labor v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 6 Cir., 1950, 179 F.2d 535. There the labor organization brought suit against the company upon a collective bargaining agreement which provided that a prior existing company pension plan should remain in full force and effect. The complaint alleged that the...