Astemborski v. Manetta
| Decision Date | 01 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 352066 |
| Parties | LEONARD ASTEMBORSKI and DEBORAH ASTEMBORSKI, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. CHERYL MANETTA and MELISSA SCOTT, as Co-Trustees of the LYLE D. SCOTT TRUST and the YVONNE ELAINE SCOTT TRUST, JON E. UNRUH, and BONNIE A. UNRUH, Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Roscommon Circuit Court LC No. 15-722743-CH
Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Cameron and Rick, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal a November 14, 2019 judgment of no cause of action that was entered by the trial court on the basis of the court's conclusion that defendants were not liable for trespass or nuisance because defendants held a prescriptive easement. Defendants cross-appeal the trial court's November 6, 2017 order, which granted plaintiffs' partial motion for summary disposition. We affirm the trial court's November 14, 2019 judgment and, consequently, do not need to consider defendants' arguments concerning the November 6, 2017 order.
This case arises from a dispute over defendants' rights to use a portion of plaintiffs' riparian property. Harry Groak originally owned all of the property underlying the dispute in this case. In the mid-1960s, Groak partitioned the property into three parcels. Groak retained one of the parcels (the servient estate), which is the only parcel that abuts Higgins Lake. Groak sold the other two parcels to Howard and Mable Diehl in 1964 and to Lyle and Yvonne Scott in 1965. Groak granted a 20-foot-wide easement across his parcel "for access to Higgins Lake[.]"
A dock that extended from the easement was thereafter installed, and it was utilized by the Diehls, Lyle, and Yvonne, as well as their family and guests. The easement dock was stored on the easement during the months that it was not in Higgins Lake. The Diehls, Lyle, and Yvonne moored boats and installed boat hoists. They also used the easement for other recreational activities, such as sunbathing and picnicking. There is no evidence that Groak or his son gave the Diehls, Lyle, or Yvonne permission to engage in these activities.[1]
In 1980, Robert and Mary Ann Russom, who were the original plaintiffs in this matter, entered into a land contract to purchase the servient estate. According to Robert, he made a verbal agreement with Howard in 1981 that Howard could "put his boat and stuff out there." When asked if he had a similar deal with the Scotts, Robert responded that Howard was "kind of the spokesman." However, Robert denied that he had made "any deals verbally with" Lyle or Yvonne, who later transferred interests in the property to their respective trusts, defendants the Lyle D Scott Trust and the Yvonne Elaine Scott Trust. In 1993, the Diehls sold their property to Linda Cauzillo, who later sold the property to Carl and Lucy Scott in 2001. After Carl died, Lucy transferred her property to defendants Jon and Bonnie Unruh in 2014.
In September 2015, the Russoms informed defendants that the language of the easement only allowed access to Higgins Lake and that no other uses of the easement or the area extending from the easement would be permitted. Defendants did not remove the easement dock. In November 2015, the Russoms filed suit, alleging that defendants had impermissibly used the easement for purposes beyond mere lake access. The Russoms requested declaratory relief and damages in relation to claims for trespass and nuisance. Defendants argued that the grant of access to Higgins Lake included a full range of riparian or littoral rights, along with use of the easement's beach area for recreational activities. In the alternative, defendants argued that they had acquired prescriptive rights to continue the challenged uses. In 2016, the Russoms sold the property to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs were substituted as the named plaintiffs in this case.
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the easement only contemplated access to Higgins Lake. The case then proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court held that defendants had a prescriptive easement for the seasonal installation and removal of the easement dock, to moor boats, and to engage in certain recreational activities on the easement. As a result, the trial court entered a judgment of no cause of action on plaintiffs' claims for nuisance and trespass. These appeals followed.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that defendants "had proven by clear and cogent evidence that they or their predecessors had continuously used the easement [for purposes outside of the scope of the express easement] for longer than the statutory period in a manner that was hostile and adverse to the rights of" the owners of the servient estate. We disagree.
"A trial court's factual findings in a bench trial are reviewed for clear error." Prentis Family Foundation v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich.App. 39, 59; 698 N.W.2d 900 (2005). Smith v Straughn, 331 Mich.App. 209, 215; 952 N.W.2d 521 (2020) (alteration in original; quotation marks and citations omitted). We review a trial court's conclusions of law in a bench trial de novo. Chelsea Inv Group, LLC v Chelsea, 288 Mich.App. 239, 250; 792 N.W.2d 781 (2010).
"Land which includes or is bounded by a natural watercourse is defined as riparian." Thies v Howland, 424 Mich. 282, 287-288; 380 N.W.2d 463 (1986). It is well established that a riparian owner enjoys "certain exclusive rights," which include "the right to erect and maintain docks along the owner's shore, and the right to anchor boats permanently off the owner's shore." Id. at 288. (citations and footnote omitted). A nonriparian owner, on the other hand, has "a right to use the surface of the water in a reasonable manner for such activities as boating, fishing and swimming," as well as "the right to anchor boats temporarily." Id. However, "a riparian owner may grant nonriparian owners the right to access and enjoy a lake by easement or license." Little v Kin, 249 Mich.App. 502, 510; 644 N.W.2d 375 (2002).
"An easement is a limited property interest; it is the right to use the land burdened by the easement for a specific purpose." Smith, 331 Mich.App. at 215. "[A]n easement may be created by express grant, by reservation or exception, or by covenant or agreement[.]" Bayberry Group, Inc v Crystal Beach Condo Ass'n, 334 Mich.App. 385, 399; 964 N.W.2d 846 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Easements may also be acquired by prescription. Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke S.C. Props, LLC, 501 Mich. 192, 202; 912 N.W.2d 161 (2018).
Before trial, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the plain language of the easement established that Groak only intended for the owners of the dominant estates to have access to Higgins Lake and that Groak did not intend for those owners to have unlimited use of the easement or riparian rights. Following trial, the trial court held that defendants had an easement by prescription.
"An easement by prescription is based upon the legal fiction of a lost grant, and results from action or inaction leading to a presumption that the true owner of the land, by his acquiescence, has granted the interest adversely held." Slatterly v Madiol, 257 Mich.App. 242, 260; 668 N.W.2d 154 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "An easement by prescription results from use of another's property that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of fifteen years." Plymouth Canton Community Crier, Inc v Prose, 242 Mich.App. 676, 679; 619 N.W.2d 725 (2000) (citations omitted).
To establish an easement by prescription there must be: First, continued and uninterrupted use or enjoyment; second, identity of the thing enjoyed; third, a claim of right adverse to the owner of the soil known to and acquiesced in by him. The accepted rule is that the user must be exercised by the owner of the dominant tenement, and must be open, peaceable, continuous, and as of right. It is sometimes declared that it must also be exclusive, but the term exclusive use does not mean that no one may use the way except the claimant of the easement. It means no more than that his right to do so does not depend on a like right in others. [Plymouth Canton Community...
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