Little v. Kin

• Decision Date: 01 May 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 220894.
• Citation: 644 N.W.2d 375,249 Mich. App. 502
• Parties: Robert LITTLE and Barbara Little, Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellees, v. Steven KIN, Rosalyn Kin, Thomas Trivan and Darlene Trivan, Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

644 N.W.2d 375

249 Mich. App. 502

Robert LITTLE and Barbara Little, Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellees, v. Steven KIN, Rosalyn Kin, Thomas Trivan and Darlene Trivan, Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.

Docket No. 220894.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 11, 2001, at Detroit.

Decided February 1, 2002, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication May 1, 2002.

Butzel Long, P.C. (by Ronald E. Reynolds), Birmingham, for the plaintiffs.

Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C. (by Michael R. Turco), Troy, for the defendants.

Before: WHITE, P.J., and SAWYER and SAAD, JJ.

SAAD, J.

Defendants appeal as of right from the trial court's orders granting summary disposition to plaintiffs. We reverse and remand.

I. Nature of the Case

In addition to the surrounding Great Lakes, the state of Michigan boasts thousands of inland lakes ¹ that provide considerable enjoyment and recreation to its citizens. Unfortunately, much litigation also arises from property disputes relating to the rights and interests of those owning land on and around these lakes. Here, the dispute involves a disagreement between a riparian² property owner and neighboring nonriparian "backlot" owners regarding the scope of their right to enjoy Pine Lake. Despite the original owner's grant of an easement and full "riparian rights" to the defendant backlot owners, plaintiffs claim that, because their property abuts the lake, they have superior rights to use and enjoy the water. In contrast, defendants argue that plaintiffs bought their lakefront lot with full knowledge that the original owner intended to grant all lot purchasers substantial rights to use the lake and easement, which includes the right to build and maintain a boat dock.

After reviewing applicable case law from our Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals, we hold that, while full riparian rights and ownership may not be severed from riparian land and transferred to nonriparian backlot owners, Michigan law clearly allows the original owner of riparian property to grant an easement to backlot owners to enjoy certain rights that are traditionally regarded as exclusively riparian. Because the trial court erred in interpreting Michigan case law and erred in resolving the scope of defendants' rights under the easement as a matter of law rather then as a question of fact, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Facts and Procedural History

After a 1974 fire gutted C.A. Muer Corporation's Charley's Crab restaurant on Pine Lake in West Bloomfield, the corporation subdivided the property into two three-lot columns, consisting of two lots with approximately one hundred feet of lakefront each, designated as lots A and B, and two lots stacked behind each lakefront lot (lots C and E behind lot A, and lots D and F behind lot B), for a total of six lots. To maximize the market value for each of the six lots, the corporation resolved to guarantee all lot purchasers substantial access to and use of Pine Lake. To that end, the corporation divided each of the one-hundred-foot shoreline lots into three equal sections and specified that the "frontlot" owners have the exclusive use of thirty-three feet of shoreline and, in a duly recorded easement, provided that the backlot owners hold a non-exclusive, permanent easement over the remaining sixty-six by thirty feet of shoreline "for access to and use of the riparian rights to Pine Lake." This case involves a dispute between the owners of lot B and the owners of lots D and F.

Plaintiffs Robert and Barbara Little bought frontlot B for $40,000 in 1977. Documents in the record reveal that plaintiffs purchased their lot with notice of the easement, which appeared in their title commitment, in the plat survey, and in the recorded easement.³ Defendants Thomas and Darlene Trivan bought their home on backlot F the late 1980s for $550,000, and defendants Steven and Rosalyn Kin bought a home on backlot D in 1995 for $475,000. Before defendants' purchase of these lots, the Findlays, who formerly owned backlot D, approached plaintiffs about building a dock on the sixty-six-foot easement. Though information in the record differs regarding the intended size of the dock, evidence indicates that the Findlays built the dock in 1988 and used it for launching their boat, sunbathing, and picnicking. Defendants maintain that they continued to use the boat dock after they bought their backlots.

On May 13, 1998, plaintiff filed this action to prevent defendants from maintaining a boat dock on Pine Lake. Specifically, plaintiffs sought an injunction for removal of the dock and to prevent the building of future docks, and a declaration of defendants' rights under the easement. Thereafter, defendants filed a countercomplaint alleging that plaintiffs intentionally placed thorny bushes and landscape timbers on the easement, which interfered with their use and enjoyment of their easement rights. The parties filed motions for summary disposition on both claims and, following oral argument, the trial court granted summary disposition to plaintiffs. In a written opinion, the trial court reasoned that defendants, as owners of backlots, are not riparian owners and that, as a matter of law, an easement permits only a right of access to and use of the lake and cannot confer the right to construct a boat dock. Regarding the countercomplaint, the trial court issued a second written opinion and stated that it granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions. The order states that plaintiffs may not interfere with or obstruct defendants' right of access to the lake, but does not require plaintiffs to remove their plantings or other landscaping.

III. Legal Analysis

A. Standards of Review

The extent of a party's rights under an easement is a question of fact for the trial court, which we review for clear error. Dobie v. Morrison, 227 Mich.App. 536, 541-542, 575 N.W.2d 817 (1998). However, we review de novo a trial court's decision regarding a motion for summary disposition in a declaratory judgment action. Michigan Educational Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turow, 242 Mich.App. 112, 114, 617 N.W.2d 725 (2000); Dobie, supra at 538, 575 N.W.2d 817. We also review de novo a trial court's rulings on equitable issues, including the grant of injunctive relief. Cipri v. Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc., 235 Mich.App. 1, 9, 596 N.W.2d 620 (1999); Dobie, supra at 541-542, 575 N.W.2d 817.

B. Applicable Supreme Court Cases

Plaintiffs argue, and the trial court agreed, that, as a matter of law, nonriparian lot owners may not maintain a dock on another's riparian land.

The courts of our state have long recognized that "[t]he basis of the riparian doctrine, and an indispensable requisite to it, is actual contact of the land with the water." Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 218, 233 N.W. 159 (1930); see also Richardson v. Prentiss, 48 Mich. 88, 11 N.W. 819 (1882). Indeed, "`[r]iparian land' is defined as a parcel of land which includes therein a part of or is bounded by a natural water course." Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 677, 154 N.W.2d 473 (1967) (opinion of Kavanagh, J.). Further, "[a] `riparian proprietor' is a person who is in possession of riparian lands or who owns an estate therein." Id. Here, the parties agree that defendant backlot owners are not "riparian owners" because they do not own land adjacent to Pine Lake. However, defendants contend that the original property owner, C.A. Muer Corporation, granted backlot owners full riparian rights through an easement, which includes the right to build and maintain a boat dock.

Our Supreme Court has established that persons who own riparian land "enjoy certain exclusive rights," including the right to erect and maintain docks. Thies v. Howland, 424 Mich. 282, 288, 380 N.W.2d 463 (1985). In contrast, nonriparian lot owners who hold an easement for lake access have the limited "right to use the surface of the water in a reasonable manner for such activities as boating, fishing and swimming." Id. Plaintiffs argue that these principles compel our conclusion that a riparian landowner may not transfer riparian rights, including the right to maintain a dock, to a nonriparian landowner and that any attempt to do so is invalid.

The extent to which traditionally recognized riparian rights may be claimed, reserved, or transferred has been addressed by our courts in numerous published opinions. Before 1967, our Supreme Court held in several cases that, by operation of law, riparian rights attach to lots bounded by natural water courses unless the deed contains a reservation or declaration that riparian rights do not pass under it. Bauman v. Barendregt, 251 Mich. 67, 69-70, 231 N.W. 70 (1930); see Schweikart v. Stivala, 329 Mich. 180, 191, 45 N.W.2d 26 (1950); Blain v. Craigie, 294 Mich. 545, 548, 293 N.W. 745 (1940); Holda v. Glick, 312 Mich. 394, 403, 20 N.W.2d 248 (1945). These holdings suggest that the owner of land abutting a body of water may reserve to himself the riparian rights normally attaching thereto by simply selling the land with an appropriate restriction. Indeed, in some cases, the Court went further and asserted that a riparian landowner may convey riparian rights separate from the fee. Pleasant Lake Hills Corp. v. Eppinger, 235 Mich. 174, 178-179, 209 N.W. 152 (1926); St. Helen Shooting Club v. Mogle, 234 Mich. 60, 207 N.W. 915 (1926).

Notwithstanding these prior declarations, our Supreme Court in Thompson v. Enz clarified that a deed reservation or restriction does not constitute a grant of riparian rights, but merely a right of way to access the beach and waters. Thompson, supra at 685, 154 N.W.2d 473, relying on Schofield v. Dingman, 261 Mich. 611, 613, 247 N.W. 67 (1933) (a grant of "riparian rights" in a deed "can be given no greater meaning than right of access to the beach and enjoyment thereof for the purposes of recreation").

In Thompson, the defendant bought a parcel of land abutting...