Astro Kings, LLC v. Scannapieco

• Decision Date: 01 July 2020
• Docket Number: Index No. 607027/18,2019-03166
• Citation: 127 N.Y.S.3d 493,185 A.D.3d 537
• Parties: ASTRO KINGS, LLC, Appellant, v. Edward J. SCANNAPIECO, etc., Defendant, Silvio Sports, Inc., etc., et al., Respondents (and an interpleader action).
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

185 A.D.3d 537

127 N.Y.S.3d 493

ASTRO KINGS, LLC, Appellant,

v. Edward J. SCANNAPIECO, etc., Defendant,Silvio Sports, Inc., etc., et al., Respondents (and an interpleader action).

2019-03166

Index No. 607027/18

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—April 30, 2020

July 1, 2020

Andrew M. La Bella, Scarsdale, NY, for appellant.

Sahn Ward Coschignano, PLLC, Uniondale, N.Y. (Christian Browne and Joseph R. Bjarnson of counsel), for respondents.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective business relations, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Stephen A. Bucaria, J.), entered January 4, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Silvio Sports, Inc., and Dennison Silvio which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff, the owner of certain commercial real property located in Rockville Centre, commenced this action against, among others, the defendants Silvio Sports, Inc., and Dennison Silvio (hereinafter together the Silvio defendants), alleging that the Silvio defendants tortiously interfered with a lease between the plaintiff and its tenant, Rockville Centre Spa Corp., and tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's prospective business relations. The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the Silvio defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiff appeals.

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the Silvio defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for tortious interference with contract asserted against them. The elements of a cause of action to recover damages for tortious interference with a contract are: "(1) the existence of a contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant's intentional inducement of the third party to breach or otherwise render performance impossible; and (4) damages to plaintiff" ( Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 90, 94, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d 289 ; see Oxford Health Plans [NY], Inc. v. Biomed Pharms., Inc., 181 A.D.3d 808, 122 N.Y.S.3d 47 ; Kimso Apts., LLC v. Rivera, 180 A.D.3d 1033, 119 N.Y.S.3d 519 ; Nero v. Fiore, 165 A.D.3d 823, 825, 86 N.Y.S.3d 96 ). The plaintiff must also establish that the defendant intentionally procured the breach of contract "without justification" ( Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney, 88 N.Y.2d 413, 424, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 668 N.E.2d 1370 ; see Oxford Health Plans [NY], Inc. v. Biomed Pharms., Inc., 181 A.D.3d at 808, 122 N.Y.S.3d 47 ). Here, the Silvio defendants established, prima facie, that they did not intentionally induce or procure any breach of the lease. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 ).

Moreover, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the Silvio defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for tortious interference with prospective business relations asserted against them. To succeed on this cause of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that the defendant's interference was accomplished by "wrongful means" or that the defendant acted "for the sole purpose of harming" the plaintiff ( Law Offs. of Ira H. Leibowitz v. Landmark Ventures, Inc., 131 A.D.3d 583, 585, 15 N.Y.S.3d 814 ; see Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 3 N.Y.3d 182, 190, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359, 818 N.E.2d 1100 ; NBT Bancorp v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 87 N.Y.2d 614, 621, 641 N.Y.S.2d 581, 664 N.E.2d 492 ; Caprer v. Nussbaum, 36 A.D.3d 176, 204, 825 N.Y.S.2d 55 ). "Wrongful means include...