Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Long
| Decision Date | 07 December 1926 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 17907 |
| Parties | ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. v. LONG, County Assessor, et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Constitutional Law--Distribution of Governmental Powers--Invalidity of Initiated Measure Attempting to Restrict Judicial Discretion of Courts. A section of an initiated measure adopted by a vote of the people under the initiative and referendum laws of the state of Oklahoma, which provides that the district courts shall try certain classes of cases within ten days after the defendant has answered and that appeals must be taken within ten days from the rendition of judgment, except for good cause shown the trial court may extend this time for a period not to exceed 20 days, and the Supreme Court shall determine the appeal at the earliest possible moment, is unconstitutional and void, it being an attempt by the legislative branch of the government to usurp the powers conferred upon the judicial branch of the government by the Constitution and to limit or abolish the judicial discretion belonging to the courts and necessary for the proper administration of justice.
2. Courts--Unconstitutionality of Initiated Measure Authorizing District Judges to Decide Causes Outside County Where Pending. A provision in an initiated measure approved by a vote of the people under the initiative and referendum laws of the state of Oklahoma, providing that district judges may hear and determine causes and render judgment in another county than the county where such cause is pending, is void, it being in conflict with section 25 of article 7 of the Constitution of Oklahoma, providing that "the terms of the district court shall be held at the county seat of the respective counties."
3. Statutes -- Statute Unconstitutional in Part--Test as to Whether Remaining Portions Enforceable. The question as to whether portions of a statute which are constitutional shall be upheld while other divisible portions are eliminated as unconstitutional is primarily one of intention. If the objectionable parts of a statute are severable from the rest in such a way that the law-making power of the state, whether it be by initiative petition or by the Legislature, would be presumed to have enacted the valid portion without the invalid, the failure of the latter will not necessarily render the entire statute invalid, but the statute may be enforced as to those portions of it which are constitutional. If, however, the constitutional and unconstitutional portions are so dependent on each other as to warrant the belief that the law-making power intended them to take effect in their entirety and would not otherwise have enacted the measure, it follows that, if the whole cannot be carried into effect, it will be presumed that the law-making power would not have passed the residue independently, and accordingly the entire statute is invalid.
Rainey, Flynn, Green & Anderson and Courtland M. Feuquay, for plaintiff in error.
Roscoe Cox, County Atty. of Lincoln County, George F. Short, Atty. Gen., Wm. L. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Erwin & Erwin, for defendants in error.
¶1 At the regular primary election held in Oklahoma on August 3, 1926, there was submitted to the voters of the state, as provided by our initiative and referendum laws, State Question No. 141, Initiative Petition No. 92, being an act regulating the manner of assessing taxes, which question was adopted by a vote of the people.
¶2 Section 2 of the act provided, in brief, that when the county excise boards of the several counties in the state have made their levies for taxation for the ensuing year for county, city, school district, and all other purposes for which they are authorized to make levies, that such excise boards shall certify the amounts of the levies so made, together with the total rate of taxation in such county and the subdivisions thereof, and file the same with the county assessor; further providing that the State Equalization Board, upon making a levy for state purposes, shall make a similar certificate and cause the same to be filed and spread of record in its office.
¶3 Section 3, in full, reads as follows:
¶4 In pursuance to the provisions of this act, plaintiff in error filed its action for injunction in the district court of Lincoln county against the defendants in error, Ora Long, county assessor, and Paul Prince, county treasurer. When the cause was called for trial the defendants contended that the act constituted an unwarranted interference with the judicial powers of the state and is, therefore, violative of the provisions of our Constitution, which contention was sustained by the district court and the cause dismissed, from which order and judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
¶5 The sole question presented by the appeal is whether the act, and particularly section 3 thereof, is in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of Oklahoma. The act, having been initiated and enacted by a vote of the people, stands, so far as the questions presented here are concerned, in the same position it would have stood in if it had been a measure enacted by the Legislature.
¶6 It is urged that the act is void as being violative of section 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, providing that:
"The powers of the government of the state of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, executive, and judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others."
¶7 The law is well settled that the powers and functions of the three several co-ordinate branches of the state government must be and forever remain separate and distinct, each one designed for a separate purpose and each functioning in its own sphere, and we are in thorough accord with the sentiment expressed by this court in Re County Commissioners, 22 Okla. 435, 98 P. 557, wherein it, speaking through Mr. Justice Williams said:
"The distribution of the powers of government, into three separate departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, is the basic principle of our constitutional system."
¶8 In that opinion we also find a quotation from Webster's Works, volume 3, p. 29, wherein that eminent authority said:
"It cannot be denied that one great object of written Constitutions is to keep the departments of government as distinct as possible; and for this purpose it imposes restraints designed to have that effect."
¶9 In that case this court had under consideration an act of the Legislature attempting to confer upon this court the power and authority, in a certain judicial district, where, in the judgment of this court, the necessity existed, to recommend to the Governor that an additional district judge be appointed by him for such length of time as in the judgment of the Supreme Court might be necessary, for a proper disposition of the business, and it was there held that the act attempted to delegate to the judicial branch of the government powers vested exclusively by the Constitution in the legislative branch of the government.
¶10 If it can be said that the act in question, by its provisions, in any manner limits or restricts the judicial arm of the government in properly exercising its discretion in discharging the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution, it is void and must fall, and...
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