Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Worley

• Decision Date: 14 February 1894
• Citation: 25 S.W. 478
• Parties: ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. v. WORLEY.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

25 S.W. 478

ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. v. WORLEY.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

February 14, 1894.

Appeal from district court, El Paso county; T. A. Falvey, Judge.

Action by John C. Worley against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. P. Hague and Waters Davis, for appellant. Davis, Beall & Kemp and Hare, Edmundson & Hare, for appellee.

NEILL, J.

On March 31, 1890, the appellee (plaintiff below) sued the appellant in the district court of El Paso county, Tex., for $75,000 damages for personal injuries which he alleged he sustained by the negligence of appellant's servants in starting its train, upon which he was a passenger, without affording him sufficient time to get on it. Appellee alleged in his petition that he was a resident of the Indian Territory, and that appellant was a duly-incorporated company operating a line of railway through El Paso county, Tex., and that one A. J. Crone was its local agent in said county. On the 3d day of October, 1890, appellant filed its sworn plea to the jurisdiction of the court, alleging that it was a foreign corporation, existing only by virtue of the laws of the state of Kansas; that it had never done business, or had an agency, representative, or principal office, in El Paso county, or in Texas, since this suit was instituted; that A. J. Crone, upon whom the citation was served, was not the local agent, or any officer, of appellant; and that plaintiff (appellee) was a nonresident of this state, and that his cause of action arose in the state of Kansas. On June 15, 1892, the appellee excepted to appellant's plea in abatement on the grounds (1) that it was not presented to the court for its determination during the term at which it was filed; and (2) it does not negative the fact that appellant's railroad extends or is operated through or into the county in which the suit was instituted. The court sustained the exceptions, stating in the bill of exceptions taken by appellant to such ruling, as its reasons therefor, (1) that appellant had filed a motion to quash the citation on account of its not being served on appellant's agent, and the motion was not presented to the court, for several terms afterwards, for its action; (2) that appellee alleged in his petition that appellant operated a line of road in El Paso county, and appellant had not denied the allegation; and (3) the court submitted the question as to whether appellant operated a line of road in El Paso county to the jury for its determination. After appellant's plea to the jurisdiction of the court was overruled, it filed a general demurrer, a general denial, and a special plea of contributory negligence. The case was tried by a jury, and a verdict returned in appellee's favor for $7,500, upon which the judgment was entered from which this appeal is prosecuted.

Conclusions of Fact.

On the 30th day of April, 1889, the appellant was, and continued to be from that date up to the time of the trial of this cause, a common carrier, and operated a line of railroad into El Paso county, Tex. That on or about the date just mentioned the appellant, as such carrier, received from appellee a shipment of cattle at Piola, Ind. T., to be transported over its railroad to Kansas City, Mo. That when the shipment was made it was agreed by and between appellant and appellee that appellee was to accompany the cattle on the cars, and attend to and take care of them in transit. That prior to and at that time it was the usual custom, in shipping cattle over appellant's road, for the shippers of cattle to accompany them, and they were expected to keep them from lying down in the cars, and, at stations and stopping places, to get off the train, and prod up the cattle that were down, and force them to stand. That appellee, in pursuance of his agreement with appellant, accompanied the cattle, riding in the caboose of appellant's train. That the train carrying the cattle stopped at Hackney station, in the state of Kansas, for the purpose of allowing a passenger train to pass, and, while stationary, the appellee got off the caboose, some of his cattle being down in the cars, for the purpose of prodding them up. That the conductor in charge of appellant's train, knowing that appellee was on the ground, engaged in prodding his cattle, caused the train to be set in motion, without giving appellee sufficient or reasonable time, after warning had been given that it would be started, to board said train. That when notice was given that the train was about to start the appellee immediately endeavored to get aboard of it, and in doing so used such care and discretion as a man of ordinary prudence would have exercised under like circumstances; but, the train being in motion, when he tried to step on it his foot was caught, without any negligence on his part, under the car wheels, and so badly crushed that, to save his life, it became necessary to amputate it. He also sustained other serious, painful, and permanent physical injuries. That on account of the injuries so inflicted he was compelled to expend, for medical and surgical attention, nursing, extra board, and attention, and a cork foot, the sum of $2,400. The appellee was 38 years old when he was injured, and was a strong and healthy man. Before his injury, appellee was engaged in stock-raising, and since that time he has not, on account of his injuries sustained as aforesaid, been able to attend to his business.

Conclusions of Law.

There was no error in the court's overruling appellant's plea in abatement. The reasons given by the court for its ruling on this plea clearly demonstrate its correctness. An action such as this, based on personal injuries, is purely transitory, and follows the person of the wrongdoer, wherever he goes; and courts take jurisdiction, wherever he is found, to redress the wrong, without regard to where he or his victim resided, or the injury was inflicted. And we see no reason for, nor know of any principle, exempting corporations from this general rule of law. The question of public policy is one for the court whose jurisdiction is invoked to determine, and...