Atchley, Application of
| Decision Date | 23 April 1957 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 5749 |
| Citation | 310 P.2d 15,48 Cal.2d 408 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | Application of C. L. ATCHLEY for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. |
Michale di Leonardo, San Jose, for petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier and J. M. Sanderson, Deputy Attys. Gen., and Joseph L. Heenan, Dist. Atty., Marysville, for respondent.
By his petition for habeas corpus C. L. Atchley, an inmate of Folsom State Prison, attacks the validity of a judgment of conviction of first degree murder and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder. His basic contention is that his pleas of guilty to the charges of murder and the described assault, and his stipulation that the murder was of the first degree, are vitiated by violations of fundamental constitutional rights, particularly by asserted inadequacy and misrepresentation of defense counsel, as hereinafter described. We have concluded that, on the contrary, petitioner was ably and faithfully represented by his trial counsel and benefited by such representation, and that the relief sought should be denied.
The petition for habeas corpus alleges that petitioner is 'an uneducated person, who can only, with great difficulty, read, or understand very simple words,' and that 'a 'friend' whose qualification cannot be revealed in this action, prepared this petition for your petitioner in the interests of justice.' This court issued an order to show cause and appointed counsel for petitioner. By affidavits and argument it developed that petitioner's contentions of law rested upon assertions of fact which were controverted by the attorney general, who represents respondent warden. This court appointed a referee to take evidence and make findings and a report upon the following questions:
Was there unqualified, untrue factual representation of the public defender, petitioner's counsel, that a responsible officer of the state had entered into a bargain purporting to commit the state to give petitioner a lesser punishment than he might otherwise receive, in exchange for pleas of guilty; was such representation apparently substantially corroborated by acts or statements of a responsible state officer; and did petitioner change his pleas from not guilty to guilty in reliance in good faith upon such representation and not in the exercise of his own free will and judgment? (See People v. Gilbert (1944), 25 Cal.2d 422, 443, 154 P.2d 657.)
Did the public defender fail to have reasonable consultation with petitioner, unreasonably refuse to present witnesses suggested by petitioner, or otherwise fail to represent petitioner properly and effectively?
At the hearing concerning the foregoing questions, the referee diligently performed his duty and petitioner's present court-appointed counsel diligently represented petitioner. The referee determined that the answer to the question first stated above, in its entirety and in each part, is 'no.' As to the second question stated above, the referee determined that the public defender did not fail to have reasonable consulation with petitioner, but that the public defender did 'fail to represent defendant (petitioner) properly and effectively.' The referee expressed his high regard for the integrity and ability of the public defender, but explained that he (the referee) reached his last quoted determination because 'for some unexplained reason, from the very first, it is apparent * * * (that the public defender) did not want to represent defendant,' and because the public defender refused to call one Onis Belt as a witness for defendant-petitioner.
It is petitioner's theory that the shootings which resulted in his convictions were in self-defense, and that Belt witnessed and could have testified to circumstanes of the shootings which would have supported petitioner's claim of self-defense. The public defender told petitioner at the time of trial, and testified before the referee, that he would not use Belt as a witness because he feared that Belt's testimony would be discredited and that petitioner, if he relied on Belt's discreditable testimony, would receive the death penalty. It was the opinion of the referee that the public defender might properly have refused to present Belt's testimony if counsel had been 'sure' that such testimony would be false, but that because counsel was only 'suspicious' that the testimony would be false and because petitioner, informed by counsel that he might receive the death penalty if Belt's testimony were used, still insisted that he wished Belt to testify.
The referee's findings and report are not binding upon this court (In re Egan (1944), 24 Cal.2d 323, 332, 149 P.2d 693; In re Mooney (1937), 10 Cal.2d 1, 17, 73 P.2d 554) but in considering his determinations we give due regard to his opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their statements in connection with their manner on the stand (In re Mitchell (1950), 35 Cal.2d 849, 855, 221 P.2d 689; In re Marvich (1946), 27 Cal.2d 503, 516, 165 P.2d 241; In re De La Roi (1945), 27 Cal.2d 354, 364, 164 P.2d 10). Our determinations in this matter, both those which agree with the report of the referee and those which differ from his report, are based upon consideration of the following matters revealed by the affidavits filed by both parties, the transcript of proceedings on petitioner's arraignment, the transcript on petitioner's appeal from the judgment of conviction, and the transcript of the proceeding before the referee.
According to prosecution evidence, the following facts led to the charges and convictions of murder and assault: In August, 1953, petitioner met Helen, the victim of the subsequent assault. Beginning shortly thereafter, petitioner and Helen lived together as man and wife until the end of June, 1954. Immediately after petitioner and Helen separated, Helen met Mr. Hilliard. On July 10, 1954, Helen and Hilliard intermarried. Helen and Hilliard resided in a cabin near the ranch house of Richard Moore. Petitioner unsuccessfully tried to persuade Helen to returne to him. On July 27, 1954, petitioner, armed with a revolver, went to the Moore ranch, entered the ranch house, and shot Moore. In the ranch house was a shot gun. Moore ran from the house and fell, dying. Helen ran from the porch of the house to Moore. Petitioner came from the house carrying both the shot gun and the revolver. With the revolver petitioner shot Moore again and also shot Helen twice. As a result of the shots Moore died and Helen was seriously wounded. Petitioner stated several times, shortly after the shootings, that he had killed both Moore and Helen. On the day of the shootings, petitioner told the district attorney and the sheriff that he had shot both Helen and Moore. He suggested that he shot Moore after the latter threatened to shoot him, but he did not then intimate that Helen had a weapon or that she threatened him. That fact becomes significant because of the claims that he now makes, as hereinafter developed.
When petitioner was arraigned in the justice court, the public defender was appointed as his counsel. In the justice court and again when petitioner was arraigned in the superior court the public defender asked to be relieved of his appointment. The record and the referee's report disclose that on both occasions this request was on the stated ground that the public defender believed that petitioner had sufficient assets to employ private counsel. The committing magistrate and the superior court judge reached the contrary conclusion, and thereafter the public defender faithfully and efficiently represented petitioner. Although petitioner testified before the referee that the public defender had not desired to represent petitioner, it does not appear that the public defender's personal feelings in this respect (if he had any such feelings other then those hereinafter related which arose during the trial in respect to the proposed use of Belt and one Morse as witnesses) interfered with his performance of his duty.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges of murder and assault, and trial before a jury began. The People presented evidence on Wednesday and Thursday, November 17 and 18, 1954. After the second day of the taking of prosecution evidence, petitioner and the public defender disagreed as to how the defense of petitioner should be handled.
On Friday, November 19, 1954 (before the taking of additional prosecution evidence began and out of the presence of the jury), the public defender, petitioner, and the district attorney appeared before the trial judge and the colloquy quoted in the margin occurred. 1 From this colloquy standing alone, it might seem that the trial judge forced petitioner to continue to be represented by the public defender against the wishes and judgments of both the public defender and his client, in order that the county might be spared loss of time and expense. However, as will hereinafter be related, it appears from the record viewed as a whole that petitioner and the public defender decided, without any misrepresentation to, or coercion of, petitioner by the public defender or by the trial judge or by the prosecuting attorney, that petitioner should change his plea and should not present a defense which the public defender honestly and for reasonable cause believed would be false, would be discredited by the jury, and might well result in the death penalty.
After the colloquy quoted in footnote 1, the People presented more evidence to the jury. Then, at noon on Friday, November 19, 1954, the case was adjourned until Monday morning, November 22, 1954. On that Monday morning the trial judge, at the request of the public defender, permitted petitioner to change his pleas. Petitioner personally pladed guilty and it was stipulated that the murder was of the first degree.
On Friday, November 26, 1954, the trial...
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