Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates

• Decision Date: 29 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 3:95-CV-432RM.,3:95-CV-432RM.
• Citation: 926 F. Supp. 1381
• Parties: Glenn L. ATCHLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HERITAGE CABLE VISION ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership, d/b/a TCI of Michiana, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

926 F. Supp. 1381

Glenn L. ATCHLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HERITAGE CABLE VISION ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership, d/b/a TCI of Michiana, Defendant.

No. 3:95-CV-432RM.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

January 29, 1996.

William R. Groth, Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth and Towe, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.

Timothy W. Woods, Jones Obenchain Ford Pankow and Lewis, South Bend, IN, Eric P. Simon, Kreitzman Mortensen and Simon, New York City, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILLER, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by defendant Heritage Cable Vision Associates d/b/a TCI of Michiana and a motion to reconsider the court's refusal to remand filed by the plaintiffs. The court presumes a familiarity with its October 10, 1995 memorandum and order denying the plaintiffs' motion to remand. Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, 904 F.Supp. 870 (N.D.Ind. 1995). For the following reasons, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and grants the defendant's motion to dismiss.

The plaintiffs, all members of Local 1393, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the defendant, Heritage Cable Vision Associates, d/b/a TCI of Michiana are parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that covered the period December 8, 1994 to September 15, 1996. On April 28, 1995, Mr. Atchley and other members of Local 1393 filed an action against TCI in St. Joseph County Circuit Court. The complaint alleges that TCI violated IND.CODE § 22-2-5-1 (the "Wage Payment Statute") by its delinquent payment of wage increases and signing bonuses to the plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶ 9). Article 7 of the CBA between IBEW and TCI provides for the wage increases. The signing bonuses were agreed upon during negotiations that preceded the CBA's execution. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to IND.CODE § 22-2-5-2 for failure to pay the additional money in a timely fashion. Thus, the complaint frames the plaintiffs' cause of action as one arising under Indiana statutory law.

TCI removed the case to this court, contending that the plaintiffs' complaint alleged a breach of an obligation created by the CBA which must, pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, be resolved in a federal forum. The notice alleged that this court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 and 1446 and the LMRA. The plaintiffs sought the case's remand to the St. Joseph County Circuit Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing that the claims presented and the remedies sought in the complaint arise exclusively out of Indiana statutory law. On October 10, this court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand this action to the St. Joseph Circuit Court and determined that jurisdiction over the action exists.

TCI also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since § 301 of the LMRA completely preempts the plaintiffs' state law claims and since the plaintiffs did not exhaust a grievance and arbitration procedure, the complaint states no claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs responded to the motion to dismiss and moved to reconsider the October 10 order, again arguing that § 301 does not preempt their claim, that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and that the action should be remanded to state court. The plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is considered first.

I. MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The plaintiffs have cited no statutory or procedural authority or judicial precedent supporting their motion to reconsider the court's refusal to remand the action to state court. "Whether to reconsider an interlocutory order is within the sound discretion of the district court." Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 1289, 1294 (E.D.Wis.1995). Exercising this discretion, "a district court has the inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of a case before entry of final judgment." Fisher v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 152 F.R.D. 145, 149 (S.D.Ind.1993). Thus, motions to reconsider interlocutory orders may be entertained and granted as justice requires. Acme Printing Ink Co., 891 F.Supp. at 1295; see also Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 816 F.Supp. 1286, 1287 (N.D.Ill.1993); Continental Cas. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 732 F.Supp. 929, 931 (N.D.Ill.1990); Advisory Committee Notes to 1946 Amendment to Rule 60(b) ("Interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of Rule 60(b), but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford such relief as justice requires.").

A motion to reconsider, if entertained by the court, should be denied unless it clearly demonstrates manifest error of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Pyrrhus AG, 936 F.2d 921, 936 (7th Cir.1991); Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir.1985); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 822 F.Supp. 545 (N.D.Ind.1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.2d 658 (1994). The plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, which simply recasts and clarifies arguments that have already been presented to and considered by the court, does not meet this standard.

Essentially, the plaintiffs argue that although the CBA must be referred to when addressing their claim, the CBA is only tangentially related to the claim, and none of the elements of the claim under the Wage Payment Statute require the court to substantially interpret any provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the plaintiffs' argument concludes, the claim exists independently of the collective bargaining agreement and should not be preempted. These arguments do not raise any point that was not previously addressed by this court in the October 10 order.

The plaintiffs emphasize that determination of the date when their right to the wage increase and bonuses vested, rather than when the money was to be included in their paychecks, is decisive to their claim and merely requires reference to, rather than interpretation of, Article 7 of the CBA. This distinction between the vesting of rights and the inclusion of funds in paychecks, however, does not fundamentally alter the court's preemption analysis; resolution of the plaintiffs' claim is substantially dependent upon interpreting Article 7 of the CBA. The CBA is not "merely a tangential consideration in the resolution of an otherwise independent state law action." Loewen Group Int'l v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir.1995). The plaintiffs essentially allege that TCI administered the wage increases and bonuses improperly under standards set forth by the CBA. See Douglas v. American Information Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 573 n. 13 (7th Cir.1989). This is a cause of action for breach of the CBA dressed as a wage payment regulation claim arising under Indiana statutory law. Construed in this manner, the plaintiffs' claim is governed by federal law because § 301 "provides federal court jurisdiction over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements and also authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of those agreements." Loewen Group Int'l, Inc., 65 F.3d at 1421. "Thus, state-law claims preempted by section 301 are properly removable to federal court despite a plaintiff's failure to plead explicitly a federal cause of action." Douglas, 877 F.2d at 569.

The plaintiffs argue that their claim arises out of Indiana statutory law and so is independent of the CBA. The court recognizes that "federal labor policy does not prevent states from providing workers with substantive rights independent of the collective bargaining relationship." Douglas, 877 F.2d at 569. If the state law claim requires the court to interpret terms of the collective bargaining agreement, however, the independent state-created rights yield to substantive federal labor policy. Moreover, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the argument that a claim is not subject to preemption by virtue of the non-negotiable character of the right which gives rise to the claim:

While it may be true that most state laws that are not preempted by § 301 will grant nonnegotiable rights that are shared by all state workers, we note that neither condition ensures non preemption. It is conceivable that a State could create a remedy that, although nonnegotiable, nonetheless turned on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement for its application. Such a remedy would be preempted by § 301. Similarly, if a law applied to all state workers but required, at least in certain instances, collective-bargaining agreement interpretation, the application of the law in those instances would be preempted.

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 n. 7, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). Thus, the plaintiffs' claim would not automatically be immunized from the preemptive effect of § 301 even if the provisions of IND.CODE §§ 22-2-5-1 and 22-2-5-2 are characterized as a non-negotiable right equally shared by all employees in Indiana.

The Supreme Court recently revisited § 301 preemption in Livadas v. Bradshaw, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2079, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). The Court's reasoning in Livadas supports the conclusion reached by this court in the October 10 order. Section 203 of the California Labor Code is the enforcement provision of a California wage payment statute that provides that "if an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and immediately payable." Livadas, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2072. Although the Court held that a...