Ates v. State, 59932
| Decision Date | 02 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 59932,59932 |
| Parties | ATES v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Douglas W. Mitchell, III, Macon, for appellant.
Dewey Hayes, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Robert Ates brings this appeal following his conviction of possession of more than an ounce of marijuana.
1. Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Deputy Faulkner testified that he received a telephone call from a Broxton police officer informing him that a reliable informant had reported that Ates was en route to the river to pick up some marijuana and that he would be returning within an hour and that he was driving an older model yellow and black Buick Riviera bearing a front tag with the name "Pappy" on it. The officer informed Faulkner that he had personally observed Ates leaving Broxton heading for the river. Faulkner testified that he did not have time to obtain a warrant and immediately got in his personal automobile and headed for the road Ates was reportedly taking. After spotting the defendant's automobile, he radioed to a deputy in a patrol car and asked him to stop Ates. After he was stopped, Ates consented to a search of his automobile and a bag of green leafy material was discovered. We find that there was a founded suspicion based upon articulable facts justifying the stop. In Radowick v. State, 145 Ga.App. 231, 244 S.E.2d 346 (1978), this court held that an anonymous tip received by the Cobb County Police Department which described the defendant's vehicle in detail and the direction in which it was travelling to be sufficient to justify a brief investigatory stop. Unlike the situation in Radowick, supra, there is no evidence that the consent to search was obtained by coercion. At the hearing, the officer testified that the defendant gave his consent immediately after he was stopped. At trial, the defendant admitted that he gave his consent when the officers asked permission to search shortly after he was stopped. We find no error.
2. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in allowing the District Attorney to administer the oath to the panels of jurors for the purpose of voir dire examination over his objection because Code Ann. § 59-704.1 provides in part: "This oath shall be administered by the trial judge."
This section was added to the code in 1979 ". . . so as to make mandatory administering an oath to jurors to compel jurors to give a truthful answer to questions asked during the voir dire of all cases; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes." Ga.Laws 1979, p. 1048. In determining the legislative intent of this statute, we must first examine Code Ann. § 59-709. Prior to 1978, this code section did not specify who administered the oath to the jury in criminal cases and it was...
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...judge or clerk of court to perform this duty was forbidden by statute in 1979. Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 15-12-132 (1982). In Ates v. State, 155 Ga.App. 97, 270 S.E.2d 455 (1980), the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a conviction obtained following prosecutorial swearing of jurors in violation of ......
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...that the jury was in fact sworn to give true answers on voir dire, and that the oath was administered by a judge. Ates v. State, 155 Ga.App. 97(2), 270 S.E.2d 455 (1980), relied on Defendant also complains that the voir dire oath was given outside his presence. He argues that he has a right......
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Taylor v. State, A03A1274.
...order to render a conviction "binding and conclusive." Slaughter v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 28 S.E. 159 (1897). Neither is Ates v. State, 155 Ga.App. 97, 270 S.E.2d 455 (1980), relied on by Taylor, persuasive. In Ates, the correct oath was given, but the trial court allowed the district attorne......
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Whisenhunt v. State
...the trial judge." Code Ann. § 59-704.1 (Ga.L.1979, p. 1048). This court has held that this procedure was fatal error. Ates v. State, 155 Ga.App. 97, 270 S.E.2d 455 (1980). However, the record does not reflect that this act occurred. A defendant has the burden of showing error affirmatively ......