Atkins v. Dodds
| Decision Date | 31 October 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 4940.,4940. |
| Citation | 121 S.W.2d 1010 |
| Parties | ATKINS et al. v. DODDS et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Kent County; Dennis P. Ratliff, Judge.
Suit by W. L. Dodds and others against A. A. Atkins and others to annul certain provisions of a written instrument and for partition, wherein defendants filed a cross-action for annulment of a power of attorney executed by plaintiffs and to quiet title to all property involved in themselves. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.
Reversed and cause remanded.
Lyndsay D. Hawkins, of Breckenridge, and Glover Engledow, of Jayton, for appellants.
Turner, Seaberry & Springer, of Eastland, for appellees.
The appellees, W. L. Dodds, C. W. Dodds, J. M. Dodds and Mattie Phillips, a widow, instituted this suit in the District Court of Kent County against appellants, A. A. Atkins, individually, and as guardian of the estate of Richard Atkins, a minor, Lela Knight and husband, A. J. Knight, Ethel Robbins and husband, J. A. Robbins, Pearl Robertson and husband, H. L. Robertson, Eunice Wright and husband, Randall Wright, to obtain, first, a judgment annulling certain provisions of a written instrument which they allege were inserted therein by fraud and that they were induced to sign such instrument by the false representations of A. A. Atkins, their stepfather, who was acting for himself and as agent for his wife, Sarah Atkins, the mother of appellees, and, second, to have the community estate of A. A. Atkins and Sarah Atkins partitioned between themselves and appellants.
The complete instrument, executed by appellees and which they sought to cancel, is as follows:
The appellants answered by general denial; alleged certain land claimed by appellees as the separate property of their deceased mother was the homestead of the surviving spouse, A. A. Atkins, and not subject to partition; pleaded the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument; the four years' statute of limitation; that the gifts asserted by appellees to be advancements to the Atkins children were absolute donations rather than advancements; the good faith expenditures for the protection of the community estate by A. A. Atkins; and that certain land claimed by appellees as a part of the community estate was the separate property of A. A. Atkins. They also urged and relied on laches and estoppel.
By way of cross-action, the appellants sought to have annulled a power of attorney executed by appellees to A. A. Atkins, on June 2, 1936, and to quiet the title to all the property involved in themselves.
Since no question is raised relative to the sufficiency of the pleadings of either the appellees or appellants, the foregoing, together with what is revealed by the special issues, the findings of the jury thereon, and such other matters as appear in the opinion are a sufficient statement of the pleadings.
In response to special issues, the jury found, in effect, that appellees agreed with A. A. Atkins shortly prior to June 6, 1900 to accept seventy-five head of cattle and twenty-five head of horses in settlement of their interest in their father's estate, and such agreement related to and included only their interest in the estate of their father; that they did not agree to relinquish their expectancy in the estate of their mother, and A. A. Atkins represented that he would have an instrument prepared to evidence their agreement, and that the instrument as prepared was only a release of their claims as heirs of their father; that the appellees believed the representations and relied thereon and would not have signed the instrument except therefor; that their stepfather did not advise them that the instrument contained provisions relinquishing their expectancy in their mother's estate and they did not know such provisions were in the instrument at the time of its execution, and did not discover prior to February 4, 1933 that the instrument included what they would inherit from their mother, Sarah Atkins; that in signing the instrument they intended to release only their interest in the estate of their father and not their rights in their mother's estate; that A. A. Atkins, without the knowledge of appellees, inserted the clauses in the instrument relinquishing the expectancy of appellees in the estate of their mother; that they did not read the instrument but relied on the representations of their stepfather as to its contents; that a reasonably prudent person situated as appellees were would not have read the instrument; that the instrument was not read to them; that they did not receive any consideration for the provisions which relinquished their expectancy in the property of their mother; that A. A. Atkins concealed from them the fact that the instrument contained a relinquishment of their expectancy in the estate of their mother; that a reasonably prudent person, situated as the appellees were, would not have discovered, prior to February 4, 1933, that the relinquishment included a release of what they would receive from their mother; that the reasonable market value of the cattle delivered to the Atkins children in 1935 was $30,000; that A. A. Atkins and his wife intended that the cattle so delivered should be advancements from their community estate; that A. A. Atkins, since the death of his wife on April 8, 1936, has in good faith expended $42,050.51 for the protection of such estate.
In response to special issues submitted at the request of appellants, inquiring separately as to each of the appellees, the jury found that neither of them knew or would have known by the exercise of ordinary diligence, prior to February 4, 1933, that the relinquishment dated June 6, 1900, covered and included what they would inherit from their mother.
In answer to special issues also requested by appellants, inquiring separately as to Lela Knight, Ethel Robbins, Pearl Robertson and Eunice Wright, the jury answered that neither of them knew at the time she signed the power of attorney of June 2, 1936, the effect of the relinquishment given by the Dodds children on June 6, 1900.
Upon these answers, judgment was rendered for appellees annulling the provisions of the instrument dated June 6, 1900 purporting to relinquish their expectancy in the estate of their mother at her death, and removing the cloud cast upon their title by virtue of such provisions. It was adjudged that appellees owned 4/18 of the property described in the judgment, including the $30,000 advancements made in 1935 to the Atkins children; set aside the homestead to the appellant, A. A. Atkins; ordered partition; appointed commissioners of partition; directed the payment of the advancements to the commissioners, and approved certain expenditures made by appellant, A. A. Atkins, for the protection of the community estate subsequent to the death of his wife; refused appellants any recovery on the cross-action, and denied all other relief.
We shall not discuss separately the 191 assignments of error urged by appellants under their 169 propositions. Such a detailed discussion, we think unnecessary, would be of no practical value, and would extend this opinion to an unreasonable length.
The appellants complain under numerous propositions that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their behalf because, (a) there was neither pleading nor proof that Sarah Atkins was guilty of fraud in connection with the instrument, certain provisions of which are sought to be cancelled; (b) no evidence was offered to show that A. A. Atkins was the agent of ...
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...641. In such transactions the husband for such purpose is not only agent for the community but he is agent for his wife. Atkins v. Dodds, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 1010; cf. Loveland v. Ingle, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W. 1054. When the husband is the agent of the wife, she is charged with and has......
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