Atkins v. Hardison
| Decision Date | 14 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | Docket No.36859,No.551,551 |
| Parties | RAYMOND W ATKINS,Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN HARDISON; OLIVIA CRAVEN,Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Raymond Watkins, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; William M. Loomis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondents.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, District Judge.
Order of the district court dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus, affirmed.
Raymond Watkins appeals from the district court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, Watkins contends the district court erred in not appointing counsel to assist him and in granting the Respondents Warden Hardison and Olivia Craven's summary judgment motion. We affirm.
In November 1999, Watkins was given a unified sentence of fifteen years with three years determinate upon his conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen. His first parole hearing was held in June 2002, after which the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole ("Commission") denied Watkins parole and "passed" him to his full-term release date of November 2014. Among other things, the Commission cited Watkins' longhistory of inappropriate sexual and criminal behaviors, "poor history of community supervision," and his "lack of any sex offender programming" as reasons for denial of parole.1
In 2003, Watkins submitted a self-initiated progress report (SIPR)2 which the Commission denied, again mentioning Watkins' criminal and sexual crimes history and stating that he had been offending against children "over a very long period of time" and was considered "a very high risk to re-offend." Watkins submitted a second SIPR in 2005, which the Commission likewise denied, again noting his long criminal history, the fact that during his initial parole hearing the Commission had been concerned that Watkins had not attended sex offender programming, and concluding there had been "no significant change" since his last review.
At some point following the Commission's first denial of parole, Watkins attempted to enroll in a class for sex offenders, but was not successful in gaining admittance. In 2004, he wasplaced on a waiting list for the S.A.N.E. sexual offender treatment class. In January 2008, he filed a third SIPR. Before the Commission could respond, in March 2008, Watkins filed a motion for appointment of counsel to assist him in filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. In April 2008, the Commission responded to Watkins' third SIPR, stating:
The Commission notes that subject will complete his sentence in November 2014. [Watkins'] sexual offending has been a life-time [sic] for him. However, the Commission is not certain they want him released without supervision to monitor his behavior and have him in treatment. They elect to grant a hearing in 10/2012 to consider parole [of] the last part of his sentence. He is to get into the SANE treatment program prior to this hearing....
On April 21, 2008, Watkins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his rights were violated and the Commission exceeded its discretion by requiring sex offender treatment that was not immediately available to him. The Respondents filed a motion for a more definite statement, which the district court granted. Watkins filed a response to the order for a more definite statement and, on the same day, filed a motion for summary judgment. The Respondents filed a response and moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that Watkins had not provided a more definite statement, had not shown exhaustion of administrative remedies, and had not shown that he was an applicant or eligible for medical parole under Idaho Code § 20-223(f). The district court issued an order requesting supplemental briefing on two of Watkins' claims: (1) that the Commission had violated the separation of powers by denying him parole and requiring completion of sex offender program that is not available to him until he is two years from finishing his sentence; and (2) whether the above situation resulted in a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The parties complied and the district court entered an order dismissing Watkins' petition for writ of habeas corpus. Watkins appeals.
On appeal, Watkins contends that the district court erred in not appointing him counsel to assist in his habeas corpus petition.
There is no statutory basis for appointing counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding. Quinlan v. Idaho Com'n for Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729-30, 69 P.3d 146, 149-50 (2003);Dopp v. Idaho Com'n for Pardons and Parole, 144 Idaho 402, 405, 162 P.3d 781, 784 (Ct. App. 2007). Nor does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings apply in this case. Because habeas corpus actions are civil in nature, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach. Id. See also Wilbanks v. State, 91 Idaho 608, 610, 428 P.2d 527, 529 (1967);Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 180, 392 P.2d 542, 548 (1964). This Court noted in Dopp, however, that there is some suggestion inWilbanks, 91 Idaho at 611, 428 P.2d at 530, and Freeman, 87 Idaho at 180, 392 P.2d at 548, that in special circumstances, the Due Process Clause could require appointment of counsel. Dopp, 144 Idaho at 405, 162 P.3d at 784. We then concluded that no extraordinary circumstances existed in Dopp such that the absence of appointed counsel violated Dopp's due process rights. Id. Specifically, we noted that because the only factual issue for resolution had been conceded by the state and the only legal issues turned upon the interpretation of the language of a single statute, this case was not "unusually complex or too challenging for a pro se presentation." Id.
In denying Watkins' request for appointment of counsel, the district court stated:
Petitioner herein has not show any special circumstances necessitating the services of an attorney herein and has not offered any authority or basis for appointment of counsel. The Court is, thus far, able to understand the nature of Petitioner's pleadings, claims, and arguments. Thus, it does not appear that Petitioner will be denied a fair and meaningful consideration of his Petition if counsel is not appointed.
We agree with the district court that no special circumstances were present such that Watkins' due process rights required appointment of counsel. The record indicates that the district court invested considerable effort in sorting out the issues presented in Watkins' habeas petition in an effort to understand and evaluate them. Further, the facts applicable were not particularly complex, with the crux of the petition depending on Watkins' right to sex offender treatment immediately upon request which the district court thoroughly addressed. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Watkins' request for appointment of counsel.
Watkins also contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 127, 376 P.2d 704, 706 (1962);Dopp v. Idaho Com 'n of Pardons and Parole, 139 Idaho 657, 659, 84 P.3d 593, 595 (Ct. App. 2004). When reviewing an exercise of discretion in a habeas corpus proceeding, the appellate court conducts a multitiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Duvalt v. Sonnen, 137 Idaho 548, 551-52, 50 P.3d 1043, 1046-47 (Ct. App. 2002). If a petitioner is not entitled to relief on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the decision by the petitioned court to dismiss the application without an evidentiary hearing will be upheld. Dopp, 139 Idaho at 660, 84 P.3d at 596. When a court considers matters outside the pleadings on an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Id.;Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990).
When considering a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Quinlan, 138 Idaho at 729, 69 P.3d at 149; Barnes v. Barnes, 135 Idaho 103, 105, 15 P.3d 816, 818 (2000). This Court must liberally construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving party and determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In making this determination, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002). The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. Id. Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist. The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by affidavits or as otherwise provided in the rules, to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Failure to do so will result in an order granting summary judgment.
The overall thrust of Watkins' petition is that his rights have...
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