Atkinson v. Insurance Co.
| Decision Date | 02 February 1926 |
| Docket Number | 19183 |
| Citation | 114 Ohio St. 109,150 N.E. 748 |
| Parties | Atkinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. Et Al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Life insurance - Right to change beneficiary absolute, when - Consent by insurer not essential - Method of changing beneficiary subject to reasonable regulations - Any written notice, accompanied by policy, sufficient, when - Provisions for change may be waived by insurer - Waiver by insurer interpleading in action on policy.
1. Where a life insurance policy contains therein written a condition that such "policy is written with the right of the insured to change the beneficiary," such right is absolute and may be exercised at any time during the lifetime of the insured and the consent of the insurance company is not essential thereto.
2. The mode and manner of making such change by the insured is subject to reasonable regulations, provided that such regulations are expressed in the insurance policy.
3. Where the policy contains a provision concerning the change of beneficiary, that the same can be made "by filing written notice thereof at the home office of the company accompanied by the policy for suitable indorsement," any notification in writing by the insured, or his agent designating a different beneficiary, which communication is accompanied by the policy, is sufficient to effect the change, and the new beneficiary therein designated is entitled to receive payment of the proceeds of the policy without further action on the part of the insurance company.
4. The provisions in a policy of insurance regulating the mode and manner of making a change of beneficiary are for the benefit of the insurance company and may be waived by it.
5. In the event of a controversy between a former named beneficiary and a new beneficiary, if the insurance company interpleads in an action by a claimant to recover the proceeds of the policy it thereby waives any interest in the outcome of the action and thereupon the
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Life Insurance, 37 C. J. § 350;
Id.;
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cause shall proceed between the respective claimants uninfluenced by any rights or interests of the insurance company.
In the court of common pleas of Columbiana county this cause originated by the petition of Elizabeth Atkinson, mother of Joseph Atkinson, against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, of New York, to recover upon a policy of insurance upon the life of her deceased son. The insurance company filed an interpleader, admitting its liability to pay the amount of the policy to the person entitled thereto, and further alleged that Eliza Atkinson, the wife of the insured claimed to be the beneficiary thereof, wherefore it asked that Eliza Atkinson be made party defendant and that the court determine the rights of the respective claimants to the proceeds of the policy. Thereupon Eliza Atkinson answered and filed a cross-petition.
By the pleadings and the agreed statement of facts submitted in the trial court it is established that the wife was the original beneficiary of the policy and that on February 1, 1922, because of marital troubles, the assured caused the mother to be made beneficiary under the policy; that thereafter, on July 1, 1923, a reconciliation was effected between the husband and wife, and they lived together thereafter until the death of the husband on November 19, 1923. As an inducement to the reconciliation the husband agreed to again effect a change of beneficiary and have the policy made payable to the wife. Pursuant to this agreement, on August 28, 1923, Harry F. Paisley, an agent of the insurance company, was called to the Atkinson home and was there told by the insured that he desired to again cause the wife to be the beneficiary of the policy, and insured was thereupon advised by Paisley, in the presence of the wife, that it would be necessary to send the insurance policy to the home office to have an endorsement written thereon, "which endorsement would be mailed to said Harry F. Paisley, to secure the execution thereof by the said Joseph Atkinson."
Thereupon the policy was delivered to Paisley, and Paisley "mailed the same to the company along with a request for the proper form of endorsement to be prepared to bring about the desired change of beneficiary," and such endorsement was prepared and mailed to Paisley.
For some reason, which is not explained, the signature of Atkinson was never secured, land nothing further was done before his death on November 199 1923. No endorsement of change of beneficiary was in fact placed on the policy. No written notice was ever given to the company of the desire to make the change, except the letter written by the agent Paisley, which letter was accompanied by the policy of insurance. The policy contained the following provision:
When Eliza Atkinson filed her answer and cross-petition, setting up the foregoing change as a defense and cause of action, the plaintiff, Elizabeth Atkinson, demurred thereto, and this demurrer was overruled by the resident judge of Columbiana county. A reply was filed putting the allegations of the answer in issue, and thereafter the cause came on to be heard upon the pleadings and the agreed statement of facts by a judge designated from another county, who found in favor of the wife.
Error was prosecuted to the Court of Appeals, and the judgment was there reversed and final judgment entered in favor of the mother. The cause is in this court upon allowance of motion to certify the record.
Mr. K. L. Cobourn, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Billingsley & Moore, Mr. H. W. Hammond, and Messrs. Moore, Barnum & Hammond, for defendants in error.
The major question in this case is one of correct interpretation of that provision of the policy quoted in the foregoing statement. The first two lines of that provision define the right of the insured to make a change of beneficiary. That right is without qualification. The remainder of the paragraph regulates the manner of the exercise of that right. The first two lines are mandatory upon the company, and the right thereby created may not be denied or abridged. Neither those two lines nor any other provisions of the policy which have been brought to our notice give to the company the exercise of any judgment or discretion. We need not in this case inquire into the latitude of the insured in selecting a beneficiary of the policy, because it is quite clear that the wife living with the husband has an insurable interest and that no objection could be interposed by the company in any event to the husband selecting her as his beneficiary. Neither the insurance policy nor public policy permits the company to interfere with his wishes in that respect. The agreed statement of facts leaves no doubt of the husband in fact desiring to make a change and to designate his wife as the beneficiary in the policy.
The insured having instructed Paisley to transmit the policy to the home office to have an indorsement written thereon, and Paisley having written a letter to the home office pursuant to that request, and a proper endorsement having been prepared by.the company and mailed to Paisley, without the matter having again come to the notice of the insured before his death, the question arises whether enough was done by the insured to effect a change of beneficiary.
This question requires us to determine whether the insured had omitted anything which was essential to be done by him to comply with the essential regulations governing the manner of exercising his right to change the beneficiary. This again must turn upon the proper interpretation of the condition of the policy and the strictness of such interpretation. Let us first assume that the condition should be strictly construed. It required that a written notice of the insured's desire to designate a new beneficiary be filed at the home office, accompanied by the policy for suitable indorsement. The written notice was sent to the home office, accompanied by the policy, with the request that a suitable endorsement be made thereon to designate the wife as the new beneficiary. The written notice was not signed by the insured, but must necessarily have been signed by Paisley, because the agreed statement shows that the United States mails were employed and nothing short of a written communication was therefore possible. Paisley was either the agent of the insured or the agent of the company. If, as seems to be assumed by both parties to this controversy, he was the agent of the insured, then his act of writing the letter advising the home office of the desire to designate a new beneficiary necessarily constituted his act a written notice, and he being the agent of the insured his act was that of his principal. If...
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