Atkinson v. State

• Decision Date: 09 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. M2009–02587–COA–R3–CV.,M2009–02587–COA–R3–CV.
• Citation: 337 S.W.3d 199
• Parties: Shirley Ann ATKINSON, Administrator of the Estate of Robert Lee Pattee, Jr., Deceasedv.STATE of Tennessee.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

337 S.W.3d 199

Shirley Ann ATKINSON, Administrator of the Estate of Robert Lee Pattee, Jr., Deceased

v.STATE of Tennessee.

No. M2009–02587–COA–R3–CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,at Nashville.

May 26, 2010 Session.July 9, 2010.Application for Permission to Appeal

Denied by Supreme Court

Nov. 16, 2010.

David L. Raybin and Sarah Richter Perky, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Shirley Ann Atkinson.Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Mark A. Hudson, Senior Counsel, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

DAVID R. FARMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S. and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.DAVID R. FARMER, J.

This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission. The claimant/appellant alleged that state employees or their agents negligently caused the death of her fiancé, who committed suicide while incarcerated at the Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility in Nashville, Tennessee. The Commission determined the claimant was not entitled to recover because she failed to produce expert testimony to establish the standards of care by which to judge the conduct of the prison officials and mental health professionals allegedly responsible for the care, custody, and control of the deceased. Because the Commission correctly determined that the claimant is unable to prove a breach of duty without expert evidence to establish the applicable standards of care, we affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

This appeal concerns the suicide death of Robert Lee Pattee Jr., a prisoner who was serving a life sentence at the Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility (“DeBerry”) in Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Pattee was initially placed at DeBerry, a prison with medical and mental health facilities, after he attempted suicide while awaiting trial on first degree murder charges. Following his conviction, Mr. Pattee was permanently assigned to DeBerry, where a team of mental health professionals, nurses, and prison officials ensured that he received regular treatment to address his mental health issues, which included anxiety and depression.¹ Over the next few years, Mr. Pattee had a fairly unremarkable course clinically and progressed from an initial placement in Unit 7C, an acute psychiatric unit, to Unit 6B, an open unit in which inmates held jobs and dined in the cafeteria.

On August 9, 2002, Mr. Pattee was transferred from Unit 6B to Unit 7B, a restricted unit for chronically depressed inmates, in order to resolve a growing security concern arising out of his “close” relationship with correctional officer Mary Hilla. Although not determined to be “inappropriate,” the relationship between Mr. Pattee and Ms. Hilla gave the appearance to some that Ms. Hilla was protecting or favoring Mr. Pattee, which caused dissension in the unit.² Eventually, a rift developed and an “us versus them” mentality emerged, with inmates choosing sides between Ms. Hilla and the rest of the staff. Prison officials considered transferring Ms. Hilla to Unit 5 to resolve the situation, but the treatment team ultimately recommended Mr. Pattee's transfer to another unit. Within just one week of his transfer to Unit 7B, Mr. Pattee committed suicide, hanging himself from an air vent with his shoe laces.

Mr. Pattee's fiancé, Sherry Ann Atkinson, filed this wrongful death claim with the Division of Claims Administration, which transferred her claim to the Tennessee Claims Commission (“Commission”).³ See Tenn.Code Ann. § 9–8–402(c) (Supp.2009). She alleged in her complaint that the negligence of state employees charged with the care, custody, and control of Mr. Pattee was the proximate cause of his death. She contended that state administrative personnel, employees, and other state agents negligently failed to provide reasonably necessary medical care to Mr. Pattee so as to prevent his suicide; failed to timely and reasonably respond to clear signs of potential suicide; and neglected to take necessary precautions regarding Mr. Pattee's safety and security, including placing Mr. Pattee on suicide watch following his transfer. Her complaint requested a fair and reasonable amount of compensatory damages not to exceed the statutory limit of $300,000. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 9–8–307(e) (Supp.2009). The State of Tennessee (“State”) filed an answer denying Ms. Atkinson's substantive allegations and setting forth several defenses, including its contention that no act or omission of a state employee was the proximate cause of the alleged harm to Mr. Pattee.

At the subsequent hearing of her claim, Ms. Atkinson offered the fact and expert testimony of nurse Mary Griffis–Parrish as the principal proof in support of her position. Ms. Griffis–Parrish, in her capacity as an adult psychiatric nurse, made rounds on all of the units at DeBerry, prepared reports on each patient every thirty days, conducted face-to-face visits with each patient every ninety days, met with patients individually, managed problems with medication, and attended some meetings of the prison treatment team. She testified that Mr. Pattee's transfer caused a noticeable change in his behavior and that he “decompensated,” becoming severely depressed and suicidal. She specifically attributed this change to Mr. Pattee's transfer from Unit 6 to Unit 7 and testified that the warning signs would have been noticeable to any person with a mental health background.⁴ Ms. Griffis–Parrish reported her concerns to the treatment team, but she was ultimately in the minority. ⁵ After consultation, the treatment team reached a consensus that Mr. Pattee was not at an increased risk of suicide and that additional suicide precautions were not required. Importantly, the psychiatrist with authority to place Mr. Pattee on suicide watch, Dr. Casey Arney, agreed that it was unnecessary to implement additional suicide precautions.⁶

At the hearing, Ms. Griffis–Parrish testified that something more “should have been done” to prevent Mr. Pattee's death and that “[i]t would be indicated” that putting Mr. Pattee on suicide watch would have been within the realistic, acceptable standard of care. Ms. Griffis–Parrish, however, did not specifically testify as to the standards of care members of the treatment team owed to Mr. Pattee, either from the perspective of the medical professionals or the prison officials. She did not testify, for example, about the standard of care Dr. Arney, as a psychiatrist with authority to order suicide precautions, owed to Mr. Pattee. Although she indicated that prison officials also could have recommended suicide precautions, Ms. Griffis–Parrish did not outline the policies and procedures that governed the care and control of inmates at DeBerry, address the reasonableness of these policies and procedures, or identify any conduct on behalf of the TDOC's employees that fell below the acceptable standard of care.⁷ When asked whether there was something more the TDOC or the treatment team could have done to prevent Mr. Pattee's suicide, she vaguely responded:

I—it's better to be safe than sorry. Yes, they could—but hindsight is 20/20. You could look back and say they should have taken it more seriously. They should have had him on suicide watch. They should have seen him more frequently, but—I mean, practically, yes, looking back, there was a lot of things a lot of people could have done differently.But Ms. Griffis–Parrish, who was the only witness tendered as an expert, never specifically defined the applicable standards of care with respect to the individuals involved in the decision not to place Mr. Pattee on suicide precautions, never outlined what options were available to these individuals, and never testified that these individuals exhibited unreasonable conduct under the facts.

It was this shortcoming in Ms. Atkinson's case—the failure to produce any expert testimony on the standards of care—that the Commission primarily found controlling. In a lengthy and detailed judgment accounting for Mr. Pattee's prior suicide attempt, extended history of treatment at DeBerry, and the specific facts surrounding his transfer; the Commission held that Ms. Atkinson failed to proved the essential elements of her claim. The judgment stated, in pertinent part:

Although Ms. Griffis–Parrish testified that in her opinion Mr. Pattee should have been placed on suicide precautions, her testimony fails to set forth the standard of care, either for the correctional officials responsible for his incarceration or for the medical staff responsible for his treatment, by which the reasonableness of their actions can be judged.

Ms. Griffis–Parrish is not a correctional officer and there was no showing made that she had knowledge or training with respect to correctional practices or procedures relative to the protection of inmates from self-injury. To the extent that Griffis–Parrish's testimony might be relevant to the duty owed Pattee by the mental health professionals outside the nursing field, there was no showing that she was qualified to render an opinion as to the care and treatment that they provided.

This is not a case in which the decedent's depression went unnoticed and untreated. Mr. Pattee had been under continuous treatment for depression for the entirety of his incarceration in the TDOC, a period of more than three years. Ms. Atkinson does not claim and the proof did not show that Pattee should have been on suicide watch for the entire period of his incarceration. The questions [sic] raised here is whether it should have been foreseen that Pattee's transfer back to unit 7, where he had lived for approximately two years, would pose an imminent risk of suicide. Such a determination, the Commission finds, is outside the common knowledge and experience of laypeople and requires expert proof that Ms. Atkinson did not provide.

The Commission further held that the State could not be held liable under a...