Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Evans

• Decision Date: 20 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1080,95-1080
• Citation: 668 So.2d 287
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D496 ATLANTA CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Shirley T. EVANS (formerly Brinson), individually and as Guardian of Charlesie Bennett, Gladys Willis, and Leasha Willis, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 287

668 So.2d 287

21 Fla. L. Weekly D496

ATLANTA CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Shirley T. EVANS (formerly Brinson), individually and as Guardian of Charlesie Bennett, Gladys Willis, and Leasha Willis, Appellees.

No. 95-1080.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Feb. 20, 1996.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County; Van Russell, Acting Circuit Judge.

John H. Foote of Granger, Santry, Mitchell & Heath, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Fred H. Flowers, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

WEBSTER, Judge.

Appellant seeks review of an adverse final judgment entered in a declaratory judgment action brought by appellee to determine whether, at the time of an auto accident in which appellee and her children were injured, the policy previously issued to her by appellant afforded uninsured motorist coverage. Because we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that, at the time of the accident, "there was not in existence a currently valid written rejection of [uninsured motorist] coverage on behalf of [appellee] or her children"; and that, as a result, appellee and her children were entitled to uninsured motorist coverage; we reverse.

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. As of February 19, 1990, appellee and Larry Brinson had been married to each other for some four years. On that date, Mr. Brinson signed an application seeking auto insurance from appellant. The application listed both Mr. Brinson and appellee (who was then also named Brinson) as applicants. It requested bodily injury liability limits of $10,000.00 per person and $20,000.00 per accident, and a property damage liability limit of $10,000.00 per accident. Mr. Brinson also signed a form rejecting uninsured motorist coverage. That form appears to meet all statutory requirements, including that mandating that "[t]he heading of the form ... be in 12-point bold type and ... state: 'You are electing not to purchase certain valuable coverage which protects you and your family or you are purchasing uninsured motorist limits less than your bodily injury liability limits when you sign this form. Please read carefully.' " § 627.727(1), Fla.Stat. (1991) (providing that, if such a "form is signed by a named insured, it will be conclusively presumed that there was an informed, knowing rejection of coverage or election of lower limits on behalf of all insureds"). In response to the application, appellant issued policy number 01700516, covering the period from February 20, 1990, to February 20, 1991. That policy included the requested bodily injury and property damage liability limits, and provided no uninsured motorist coverage.

On December 3, 1990, Mr. Brinson and appellee were divorced. Approximately one month before the February 20, 1991, policy expiration date, appellant sent a renewal notice to the address which had been provided on the application, which appears to have been the address at which appellee continued to reside after the divorce. On February 20, 1991, appellee did, in fact, renew policy number 01700516. She also signed a "Florida Endorsement Request," asking for the "same coverage," but requesting that her former husband, Mr. Brinson, be deleted as a named insured and that her last name be changed on the policy from Brinson to Evans. Appellant made the requested changes, and issued endorsements to that effect. However, prior to issuing the renewal, appellant did not offer appellee uninsured motorist coverage; nor did it obtain from appellee a written rejection of such coverage. On July 7, 1991, while the renewal policy was in effect, appellee and her minor children were injured in an auto accident in which an uninsured motorist was at fault.

The dispositive issue in the case is whether appellant was obliged to offer appellee uninsured motorist coverage, and to obtain a written rejection from her, before it could issue the February 1991 renewal policy without uninsured motorist coverage. To resolve this issue, we look to section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1991), which, to the extent relevant, reads:

No motor vehicle liability insurance policy which provides bodily injury liability coverage shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any specifically insured or identified motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless uninsured motor vehicle coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. However, the coverage required under this section is not applicable when, or to the extent that, an insured named in the policy makes a written rejection of the coverage on behalf of all insureds under the policy.... Unless an insured ... requests such coverage ... in writing, the coverage ... need not be provided in or supplemental to any other policy which renews, extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces an existing policy with the same bodily injury liability limits when an insured ... had rejected the coverage.

(Emphasis added.) We find this language to be relatively clear in its intent--an insurer is not required to provide uninsured motorist coverage when "an insured named...