Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Danneman

• Decision Date: 11 March 1920
• Docket Number: 10720.
• Citation: 102 S.E. 542,25 Ga.App. 43
• Parties: ATLANTA COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO. v. DANNEMAN.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

102 S.E. 542

25 Ga.App. 43

ATLANTA COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO. v. DANNEMAN.

No. 10720.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

March 11, 1920

Syllabus by the Court.

An accident may arise from a mere casualty for which no one is to blame, or it may be brought about by the acts or conduct of persons, other than the defendant, charged with the duty of providing or maintaining the instrumentality causing the injury, or it may be occasioned by reason of the conduct of the plaintiff himself, or by the joint action of the plaintiff and defendant. Whenever the allegations of the petition, or the facts shown in support thereof, are such as might reasonably support the inference that the accident might have been thus occasioned, no presumption can arise that the accident was occasioned by negligence, or by the particular acts or omissions charged against the defendant. Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S.E 443. But where the event is unusual and extraordinary in its nature, and there is nothing to indicate an external cause but the peculiar character of the accident is sufficient within itself to indicate that it must have been brought about by negligence on the part of some one, and where the most reasonable and probable inference which can be rationally drawn from the happening of such an event is that it would not and could not have taken place, had not the person charged with furnishing or maintaining the instrumentality causing the accident been guilty of the particular acts or omissions set forth by the plaintiff as constituting the actual cause, then the jury is authorized to apply the rule of evidence known as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in determining whether or not the accident must have been thus occasioned (Central Railway Co. v. Blackman, 7 Ga.App. 766, 68 S.E. 339[5]); and if the jury should decide that it had been thus brought about, and should further determine that such causal acts or omissions on the part of the defendant constituted negligence, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover (Augusta Railway & Electric Co. v. Weekly, 124 Ga. 384, 52 S.E. 444[2]). The contention of plaintiff in error in this case that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot have application unless, in the opinion of the jury, the circumstances are such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis as to the cause of the accident save the alleged negligence of the defendant, is met under the foregoing rule. Just as in civil cases facts are proved by a mere preponderance of evidence so in the application of this doctrine, if in the opinion of the jury the most reasonable and most probable inference which can be drawn from the nature and character of such an extraordinary event is that it would not and could not have happened, had not the defendant been guilty of the...