Atlanta Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Bates
| Decision Date | 21 January 1898 |
| Citation | 30 S.E. 41,103 Ga. 333 |
| Parties | ATLANTA CONSOL. ST. RY. CO. v. BATES. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The relation of common carrier and passenger exists between a street-railroad company and a passenger until he has reached his destination, and has had a reasonable opportunity to alight safely from the car; and the carrier, during this period, is bound to extraordinary diligence, on behalf of itself and its agents, to protect the life and person of the passenger.
2. This doctrine of extraordinary diligence is not only applicable to the agents of the carrier on the car on which the passenger is traveling, but also to its agents having control of another car, approaching on a parallel track, after the latter have discovered that the former car was about to stop for the purpose of discharging passengers, who might alight dangerously near such parallel track. It was therefore not error for the judge, in his charge to the jury, to apply this rule in the present case.
3. A harmless answer to an illegal question is not ground for a new trial.
4. For the judge to instruct the jury, in his charge, that he permitted such a question and answer for a certain purpose without intimating what had or had not been testified to or proven upon the subject, is not reversible error.
5. In an action for damages for injuries to the person, where it is claimed by the plaintiff that his capacity to earn money has been diminished one-half, it is not error for the court to admit testimony as to the value of plaintiff's services before the injury, in the particular occupation he was then following.
6. The habit or practice of the plaintiff in departing from cars on other occasions, either before or after the injury complained of, is not admissible testimony for the purpose of illustrating his conduct at the particular time under investigation.
7. Where it was alleged by the plaintiff in his petition that "the defendant, well knowing that it was dangerous to allow passengers to alight from a car on the side next to that from which another car was approaching, neverthless took no steps to prevent passengers from alighting," it was not error to admit testimony showing that the defendant had placed no ropes, gaurds, or other protection to prevent passengers from alighting on that side of its car next to said paralled track; the question was to whether such omission amounted to negligence being left entirely to the jury.
8. A rule of the defendant company requiring its motormen to keep their cars under full control on approaching all street crossings, and, when there is a car standing at a crossing taking on or letting off passengers, or if they see that they are about to meet a car on a street crossing, to slow up and see that the track is clear before attempting to pass, was admissible in evidence, as tending to show that the company regarded such a point on its line, when being approached by one of its cars, as more or less dangerous to passengers and others.
9. Where it appeared from the testimony that the hearing of the plaintiff was impaired, and it was inferable that for this reason he did not hear the approaching car that struck him it was not error for the court to charge the jury that "the fact that he was partially deaf, if such was the fact, would not affect or lessen the degree of care required of him; that care being the degree of care which every prudent man would exercise under the same or similar circumstances."
10. The charge of the court, construed in its entirety, fairly laid before the jury the contentions of the parties as presented by the pleadings and the evidence; and there was no material error in any of the rulings of the court complained of in the grounds of the motion for new trial, not covered by the proceeding notes.
11. The questions of diligence and negligence in such cases being peculiarly for the jury to determine, and the verdict being not without evidence to support it, this court will not overrule the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant a new trial.
Error from city court of Atlanta; H.M. Reid, Judge.
Action by M.L. Bates against the Atlanta Consolidated Street-Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
For the judge to instruct the jury that he permitted a certain question and answer for a stated purpose, without intimating what had been testified to upon the subject, is not reversible error, though an instruction as to the matter thus attempted to be proved would have been improper.
The following is the official report:
Bates sued the railway company for $10,000 damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by his being knocked down by a car of the defendant, approaching from an opposite direction, as he stepped from the rear platform of a car of the defendant upon which he was a passenger, and which had stopped, in the usual and customary manner, for the purpose of letting him off. He alleged that the defendant was guilty of negligence in each of the following particulars: (1) The car which ran upon the plaintiff was running at a reckless and unusual rate of speed. (2) The employés of the defendant on that car were guilty of negligence in not stopping it when they saw that the car upon which plaintiff was had stopped to let off passengers. (3) The car which ran against plaintiff was not provided with a proper brake chain, so as to enable it to be checked up with sufficient quickness. (4) The conductor of the car upon which plaintiff was knew of the danger to which plaintiff was exposed, and nevertheless allowed plaintiff, who was ignorant of the danger, and could not perceive it, to alight from the car and be injured. (5) The defendant, well knowing that it was dangerous to allow passengers to alight from a car on the side next to that from which another car was approaching, neverthless took no steps to prevent passengers from alighting, and by customarily allowing it done, without warning the passengers of the danger, impliedly invited passengers so to do. (6) When the motorman or conductor, or both, of the advancing car which struck plaintiff, saw that the car upon which plaintiff was had stopped for the purpose of letting off a passenger, and when they saw, or ought to have seen, plaintiff in said place of danger, the advancing car should have been checked up and gotten under control, so that, even though it had not stopped, it would have advanced slowly, and so that plaintiff could have gotten out of the way; but such was not done. (7) The officers (motorman and conductor, one or both) in charge of the advancing car were guilty of gross negligence in continuing to go forward at a reckless rate of speed, in striking and running over plaintiff under the circumstances before detailed, and after becoming aware of plaintiff's danger, who was not aware of the danger, and was himself without fault. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,000 and costs, and the defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and it excepted. The motion was upon the following grounds:
(1-3) The verdict is contrary to law and the evidence.
(4) While Dr. Hagan was being examined in behalf of the plaintiff, and after he had stated the effects of plaintiff's fall, as set forth in the declaration, he was asked by plaintiff's counsel: "What effect would the injuries that you have described as suffered by Mr. Bates have on his system, as to the probable duration of his life?" This was objected to because there was no allegation in the pleadings as to any shortening of his life nor had it been averred that the pain described would shorten a man's life, and, if so, how much. The court allowed the witness to answer:
(5) While the plaintiff was being examined by his counsel, he was asked: "In the condition you were in, with your arm crippled party by a wound received in battle, and your impaired hearing, which had been going on for about a year, I believe you stated, at the date of your injuries, what were you services, as a banker on a salary, fairly worth?" This question was objected to by defendant's counsel-First, generally, as being merely speculative; and, second, because there was no averment to recover any salary of any sort; to which plaintiff's counsel replied that he was simply asking plaintiff what he is worth as a banker generally, that he was not trying to recover for the loss of profits, that it was sufficient for his purpose to show that plaintiff is not able to render the service as an employé as before, and that this was the question, he wanted him to answer when it was objected to. The court overruled the objection, and allowed plaintiff to answer the question, and thereupon plaintiff's counsel said: "Do you recall the question that I asked you, about what would be a fair salary to be paid to you?" and plaintiff answered, "My salary varied, sir." Then his counsel said, "Not what it really was, but what it would be fairly worth;" and plaintiff answered, "$3,000 a year."
(6) Pending the cross-examination of Ernest Woodruff, the vice president of defendant, counsel for plaintiff asked him "Isn't it true that Mr. Kitchens was a man, at that time, more or less addicted to intemperance?" This was objected to because there was no charge of his drinking, and defendant was not put on notice to sustain its character. Counsel for plaintiff contended that it was relevant, because he was charged with reckless running, and anything...
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