Atlanta & W.P.R. Co. v. Camp
| Decision Date | 31 January 1908 |
| Citation | 60 S.E. 177,130 Ga. 1 |
| Parties | ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO. v. CAMP. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where for the purpose of increasing its earning opportunities, a railroad company adopts the policy of offering inducements to procure settlers along its line; and where, in contemplation of such policy, a prospective settler, A., and the railroad company, B., negotiate, A. proposing to purchase certain land along the line of road, if B. will establish and maintain during the life of its charter, a station at a point near the land, and B. responding that it will establish and maintain during the life of its charter a station at a point near the land, and put into effect a schedule under which two trains will stop at the station from each direction daily, if A will purchase the land, and where, induced by such negotiations, the land is purchased by A., and, in pursuance of the same negotiations, B. establishes the station and maintains the schedule, such negotiations and actions thereunder are sufficient to constitute a contract binding B for the maintenance of the station and schedule, except as qualified by the ruling announced in the second headnote, and sufficient to give a right of action to A. for damages resulting from a breach.
[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 41, Railroads, § 133.]
The contract by a railroad company to locate a station at a given point is not per se void. Such a contract is enforceable against the railroad company so long as it is possible for the company to discharge the duties owed by it to the public, and, at the same time, discharge the duties incumbent upon it by the contract. Whenever a time arrives that the company is hampered in the discharge of its duties to the public, by its undertaking under the contract to establish the station, the station may be abandoned, notwithstanding the contract, as it is to be presumed that the parties to the contract entered into the same with full knowledge of the duty of the railroad company to subordinate private interests under contracts made by it to the public rights, whenever there is a conflict between the same. But, in a given case, it is incumbent upon a railroad company, before it could be discharged from a contract to locate a station, to establish satisfactorily that there has arisen such a conflict between its public duties on the one hand and its duties under the contract on the other that it is impossible for it to discharge the former without entirely abandoning the latter.
[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 41, Railroads, § 133.]
A judgment of a trial judge, holding that a petition has been framed in compliance with the pleading act of 1893 (Civ. Code 1895, § 4961, p. 56), requiring all petitioners to "set forth the cause of action in orderly and distinct paragraphs, numbered consecutively," will not be reversed unless it is apparent that there has been an utter disregard of the provisions of the act.
Error from Superior Court, Campbell County; L. S. Roan, Judge.
Action by H. H. Camp against the Atlanta & West Point Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
Dorsey, Brewster, Howell & Heyman, for plaintiff in error.
J. F. Golightly, for defendant in error.
1. In the plaintiff's petition it is alleged that the defendant was one among a number of competing railroad companies for through travel and local business over its line of railway; that, for the advancement of its interests in that behalf, the defendant entered upon the policy of encouraging settlers along its line of railroad who would beautify their homes; that petitioner did not live on the defendant's road, but was in search for a place to settle and advised the defendant of his object. The defendant then informed petitioner that, if petitioner would invest in a home on its line of road and beautify the same, the defendant would offer inducements. Afterwards petitioner ascertained that a certain tract of land on the line of defendant's road was for sale; that petitioner then proposed to defendant that he would purchase said tract of land, provided the defendant would locate thereon a permanent station, to continue during the life of the charter of the company. In response the defendant informed petitioner that, if petitioner would purchase the property, defendant would locate the station as suggested, and would commence by causing two trains per day in each direction to stop at the station, and that from time to time thereafter the number of trains would be increased. Upon the faith of the defendant's proposition to locate the station and stop the trains as already recited, petitioner knowing the effect thereof would be to enhance the value of property, purchased the property and erected thereon a dwelling house at a cost of $4,000. The defendant immediately established a station in pursuance of its promise and called it "Camp's," and put into effect a schedule requiring two of its trains in each direction to stop at the station on each day. This schedule was continued for several years. It was also alleged that, in order to carry out the plaintiff's contract with the defendant, the plaintiff, after building the dwelling house, made other improvements, which were specified, but not necessary here to state, all of which tended to beautify his home and render the view from the railroad attractive, and to carry out the defendant's policy, to which reference has already been made. After maintaining the station and schedules hereinbefore recited for several years, the defendant wrongfully, without the consent of the plaintiff, abandoned the same. The effect of the abandonment was greatly to depreciate the market value of the plaintiff's property. The suit was for damages for breach of the contract. The plaintiff's entire negotiations were with one alleged to be the industrial agent of the defendant, who it was alleged had authority to bind the defendant in making a contract of the character alleged. It was further alleged that after the negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant, relied upon as showing the agreement which induced the plaintiff to purchase and improve the property, the defendant ratified all of the promises made in its behalf, and, in pursuance of its promises, established the station and put into effect the schedules for the stop at such station of two trains per day going in each direction, as promised by the agent.
The allegations were sufficient to show an obligation upon the part of the defendant to establish a station at a point near the property purchased by the plaintiff, and to cause as many as two trains per day, going in each direction, to stop at such station after it was established. The point is made that the plaintiff only proposed that he would buy land in which the defendant had no interest, if the defendant would establish the station, and that the defendant did not accept the proposition, but submitted a counter proposition that it would establish the station and maintain a given schedule, if the plaintiff would buy the property. In other words, that both parties spoke conditionally, and no agreement to do anything was actually made. The petition as a whole is entitled to a broader interpretation. The allegations are sufficient to show that the parties did more than merely submit the propositions. They understood each other, and while their propositions were pending, both proceeded to perform in execution of their understanding. Performance by each was acceptance of the other's proposition. Such acceptance eliminated all conditional features connected with the transaction, rendered certain the intention of the parties, introduced the feature of mutuality, showed the presence of consideration moving each ...
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