Atlanta & W.P.R. Co. v. Smith
| Decision Date | 30 June 1894 |
| Parties | ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO. v. SMITH |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. There is no presumption of law that a minor over 14 years of age, who applies for a position involving dangerous service is aware of the danger, and needs no instruction.
2. The obligation to instruct an employé, before putting him to work, as to any of his duties which are dangerous, does not necessarily follow, as matter of law, from his minority when employed, his inexperience, the fact that the service is dangerous, and the fact that his inexperience is known to the employer. In a case like the present, it is a question for the jury whether the particular service was so dangerous, and its dangers so obscure, or whether the information of the employé was so limited or his mind so immature, at the time he was injured, as to render it needful and proper that instruction should have been given when he was employed, or at some time previous to the injury.
3. On the question whether, in the particular instance, the plaintiff used due care for his own safety, evidence of his character for prudence or recklessness in the conduct of such business is inadmissible, either against him or for him.
4. In order for a minor to recover of his employer on account of lost time, due to a permanent personal injury inflicted by his employer, damages for the whole period of his life from the infliction of the injury, he must show, so as to cover the interval between the time of the injury and the time he would attain his majority, that his earnings for that period if he had not been incapacitated, would have belonged to himself, and not to his father.
5. Where the mortuary table and the annuity table are both before the jury, any instruction given by the court as to their use in ascertaining present value should not leave it uncertain as to which table is to be consulted for that purpose, but the jury should be told that the annuity table alone is applicable. And the court should also put the jury on their guard against overlooking that there are two columns in the table, one applicable to 6 and the other to 7 per cent.
Error from city court of Atlanta; T. P. Westmoreland, Judge.
Action by J. W. Smith against Atlanta & West Point Railroad Company for personal injuries. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Dorsey, Brewster & Howell, for plaintiff in error.
Smith & Pendleton, for defendant in error.
The plaintiff, a youth about 17 years of age, and an employé of the defendant, in the capacity of train hand, while endeavoring to couple two cars, received an injury resulting in the loss of his right arm. On the trial the jury returned a verdict in his favor for $7,000. The defendant's motion for a new trial contained a large number of grounds. We will not attempt to discuss all of them, but have endeavored to condense in the headnotes the principles of law applicable to the case, upon all the material questions in controversy. The recovery was very large, and for this reason we have, in determining whether or not a new trial should be granted, felt constrained to give the railroad company the benefit, in the strictest sense, of all its legal rights in the premises. At the same time, we have not been unmindful of the legal rights of the plaintiff, and have endeavored to bear them in mind in laying down rules for the guidance of the trial court upon the next hearing.
1. Among the charges of the court, complained of, was the following: "If you find from the evidence that he was a minor at the time, but over fourteen years of age and that when he applied for the position he stated that he knew the duties of a car coupler, and could discharge them, the defendant had the right to accept the statement as true, and act on it; and it would not be under any obligations to instruct the plaintiff as to the dangers attending the work, or as to how to avoid them, unless you should believe from the evidence that the circumstances were such as to require a prudent person, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, to give such instructions." It was insisted that this charge was erroneous for several reasons, but we shall notice only one of them. It was stated thus: "If the boy was more than fourteen years old, and applied for the position of brakeman, the defendant had a right to presume that he knew how to discharge the duties of such a position, whether he represented that he knew them or not." The position of counsel for the railroad company, broadly stated, is that if a minor above the age of 14 years applies for a position involving dangerous services, ipso facto, a presumption of law arises that he is aware of the danger, and needs no instruction. We have no...
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