Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Coachman

• Decision Date: 04 March 1910
• Citation: 59 Fla. 130,52 So. 377
• Parties: ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. COACHMAN.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

52 So. 377

59 Fla. 130

ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. COACHMAN.

Florida Supreme Court

March 4, 1910

Headnotes Filed May 21, 1910.

In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Suwannee County; J. F. Harrell Referee.

Action by B. P. Coachman against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and fefendant brings error. Affirmed on condition that a remittitur be made.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The provisions of chapter 5618, Acts 1907, are not confined to railroads alone, but include all common carriers, thus making a classification in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution as to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.

The statute (chapter 5618, Acts 1907) may not be said to offend against the equal protection clause of the state Constitution (Bill of Rights, s 1), or the inhibition of article 14 of the federal Constitution, merely because it permits a recovery of interest and attorney's fees by the plaintiff shipper if he succeeds, and secures no such right to the carrier in the event it prevails in the suit.

It is not necessary that a statute passed in the exercise of the police power shall apply equally and uniformly to all persons of the state, but it is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal protection of the law if it implies equally and uniformly to all persons similarly situated.

Since railroads are created by the state for quasi public purposes and are, therefore, affected by a public interest, the Legislature may to the extent of such interest regulate and control them except in so far as it is restricted by the contract obligation imposed by the charter or statute under which the companies are incorporated, and subject of course to the constitutional restrictions against the impairment of vested rights, denial of the equal protection of the laws, or due process of law.

The police power of a state embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity or the public welfare.

The subject-matter of chapter 5618, Laws 1907, providing for a recovery of 50 per cent. interest and reasonable attorney's fees from common carriers for failure to pay claims for any freight or express lost or damaged within 60 days, meets the test of constitutionality.

A liberal rule of construction should be applied when the constitutionality of a statute is questioned, and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the statute assailed. The court should, in deference to the legislative department of the government, uphold a statute alleged to be unconstitutional, unless it is clearly made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional.

This court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the penalty of 50 per cent. per annum interest on the principal sum of a claim for freight or express lost or damaged by a common carrier allowed by the provisions of chapter 5618, Laws 1907 for failure to pay said claim within 60 days from its filing with or presentation to said common carrier, is so exorbitant and unreasonable as to render the statute unconstitutional.

The reasonableness of a penalty for the failure to perform a public duty is primarily for the judgment of legislators, and courts will not interfere with the discretion of the Legislature in this regard as long as it keeps within the fair and reasonable scope of its powers. If such liabilities be considered inexpedient or illogical, the court cannot say the Legislature had transcended its power.

Under a plea of not guilty, the contention that the testimony does not show that the consignee of live stock was the agent of the plaintiff, as alleged to be in the declaration, cannot be considered, as this allegation is merely one of the facts stated in the inducement of the declaration, and such fact was not put in issue by the plea.

In a suit against a railroad company for injuries to live stock the question whether one of the animals was thrown down in the car and injured by the negligent moving of the car is one of fact for the referee acting as the jury.

Where the shipper and the carrier fairly enter into a contract whereby the parties agree on a valuation of the property with a rate of freight based on the condition tht the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, such contract will be upheld as simply fixing the rate of freight and liquidating the damages, a proper and lawful mode of securing a true proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and also of protecting himself against extravagant and fanciful valuations.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is to be assumed that property accepted by a carrier for transportation is taken under the responsibility cast upon it by the common law, except as modified by statute; and, if lost under circumstances rendering the carrier liable by the general rule of law, it must respond, unless it can show that there was a contract, or a special acceptance equivalent to a contract, which exempts it from the ordinary liability of common carriers. The transaction must amount to a contract on the subject, wherein the minds of the parties meet as in the making of other contracts.

Contracts limiting the common-law liability of carriers are not favored by the courts. Exemption from liability will not be presumed, but must be found clearly expressed in the contract.

If by a rule of the carrier or a published schedule of tariff rates its liability is fixed by the rate of freight paid, and for the purpose of obtaining a certain rate of freight the shipper reports to the carrier a valuation on live stock shipped, having notice or actual knowledge of these terms at the time or before the delivery of the stock by him to the carrier to be transported and assenting thereto, the liability of the carrier is fixed by such agreement. If, however, the shipper has no notice of the rule or tariff rates of the carrier, and does not assent thereto, the rule is different.

Under the rules and regulations of the Railroad Commission of this state prescribing the maximum valuation in the shipment of horses and mules of $75 each for a certain released rate, and for every increase of 100 per cent. or fraction thereof in valuation there shall be an increase of 50 per cent. in rate, the shipper has the option to ship at his own or the carrier's risk, and he will not be bound, in the limit of his recovery, by the payment of the release rate, unless it be shown that he knew the rate paid was a released rate, and there was a fair meeting of the minds of the shipper and the carrier that, by payment of the released rate, the recovery of the shipper would be limited to a certain maximum sum clearly agreed upon.

Where the evidence is not so clear as to forbid any other inference than that the shipper consented to a specified valuation, the question must be left to the referee's determination acting as a jury in a trial of the case.

The maximum sum allowed by the statute as a reasonable attorney's fee, in a suit against a carrier upon a claim for freight or express lost or damaged, where the carrier has failed to pay said claim in 60 days after its presentation, is 15 per cent. on any amount recovered greater than the sum of $100. The 'amount recovered' means the amount of the claim recovered, and not that amount plus the 50 per cent. per annum interest also allowed by the statute.

COUNSEL Doggett & Smith and J. B. Johnson, for plaintiff in error.

Roberson & Small and F. L. Rees, for defendant in error.

OPINION

PARKHILL J.

The defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error in the circuit court for Suwannee county for loss and damage occasioned by the railroad company in the negligent and careless transportation of horses and mules belonging to the plaintiff.

By agreement of the parties, the cause was referred to J. F. Harrell, Esquire, a practicing attorney of the court, for trial.

The finding of the referee, upon a plea of not guilty, was as follows:

'I, J. F. Harrell, to whom the above-stated cause was heretofore referred as referee by the judge of the circuit court in and for Suwannee county, Fla., for trial, as such referee do hereby find upon the evidence taken before me for the plaintiff B. P. Coachman, and assess his damage at $450. I further find that plaintiff is entitled to the further sum of $225, or 50 per cent. interest on the above amount under the statute.

'I further find that the plaintiff is entitled to the further sum of $200 as attorney's fees.'

Afterwards, in accordance with an order made by the referee on a motion for a new trial, the plaintiff entered a remittitur for the sum of $98.75. Thereupon a final judgment for $776.25 was entered by the referee in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

On writ of error the defendant below contends that the statute authorizing the award of interest and attorney's fees herein is unconstitutional, because it offends against the equal protection clause of the state Constitution and the inhibition of article 14 of the Constitution of the United States.

The provisions of chapter 5618, Laws 1907, under which recovery of interest and attorney's fees herein was had, are as follows:

'Section 1. That it shall be the duty of all common carriers operating within this state, and they are hereby required when any person files with, or presents to, them or any station agent of said common carrier to be filed, his claim for any freight or express lost or damaged by said common carrier, or for any overcharge made by such common carrier on any freight or express, to pay the said claim within sixty days from its filing...