Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Campen Bros. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1934
• Citation: 154 So. 131,114 Fla. 386
• Parties: ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. CAMPEN BROS. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

154 So. 131

114 Fla. 386

ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. CAMPEN BROS. CO.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

April 2, 1934

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.

Action by the Campen Brothers Company against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, commenced in a civil court of record. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court, and defendant brings certiorari.

Judgment quashed.

COUNSEL

Doggett & Doggett, of Jacksonville, for petitioner.

John F Hall and George E. Turner, both of Jacksonville, for respondent.

OPINION

TERRELL Justice.

At the time this cause of action accrued R. L. Taylor was a traveling salesman for Printz-Beiderman Company, and his wife, Mae F. Taylor, was a traveling saleswoman for the Campen Brothers Company. In December, 1927, R. L. Taylor went to the baggageroom of the petitioner in Jacksonville, handed the agent his scrip book, and instructed him to check three sample trunks, designating them to Gainesville and to let them go out that night. He did not indicate to whom the trunks belonged, so the natural presumption was that they were his. Taylor's instructions were complied with and the amount of the excess baggage required for transportation was extracted from his scrip book. Taylor and his wife proceeded to Gainesville the following day by bus, and on reaching there found that the trunks had arrived as per schedule but had been left on a truck outside the baggageroom and the contents of two of them being dress goods, owned by respondent and used by Mrs. Taylor as samples, had been badly damaged by a heavy rain that had fallen in the meantime.

A common-law action brought by respondent as plaintiff in the civil court of record for Duval county resulted in a judgment for $1,216 damages against petitioner as defendant. This judgment was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court and is brought here for review on certiorari.

It is urged that the judgment below was contrary to the essential requirements of the law because: (1) The declaration sounded on a contract between respondent and petitioner, as a common carrier of passengers and baggage for hire while all the proof shows that no such contract existed, but that if in fact such a contract was made, it was made between petitioner and R. L. Taylor; and (2) the trial court in his charge to the jury in effect instructed a verdict for respondent and thereby withdrew from them their prerogative to consider and weigh the evidence and make up their verdict from that.

The declaration is unquestionably predicated on a contract between respondent and petitioner as a common carrier of passengers and baggage for hire, and not on a contract of affreightment as contended by respondent. The contents of the declaration and the testimony show that the parties to the alleged contract so considered it at the time it was entered into. It is a fact, however, that Mrs. Taylor, the agent of the respondent, was not present when the trunks were checked and while it is now shown that they were the property of respondent, it is not shown that at the time of checking relator was advised that respondent had any connection with or claim on them.

'Baggage' is generally limited to such articles as are necessary to the personal convenience and comfort of the passenger during his trip. Adger v. Blue Ridge Ry., 71 S.C. 213, 50 S.E. 783, 110 Am. St. Rep. 568. But if a carrier with notice and without objection receives and transports, as baggage, sample trunks and articles which are not properly such, it will be liable to the owner for them as baggage. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Matthews, 114 Ky. 973, 72 S.W. 302, 60 L. R. A. 846, 102 Am. St. Rep. 316; Brick v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 145 N.C. 203, 58 S.E. 1073, 122 Am. St. Rep. 440, 13 Ann. Cas. 328.

The last-cited case holds that baggage carried must be personal to the passenger, and if this is not the case it is a fraud on the carrier unless that fact is made known to it. If not made known there is no contract and the liability of the carrier is that of a gratuitous bailee, responsible only for gross negligence or willful injury; but if made known and accepted for carriage, a contract is created and the carrier becomes responsible as an insurer of the baggage. This...