Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 28 March 1911 |
| Parties | ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. WALLACE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Suwannee County; B. H. Palmer Judge.
Action by Mary Wallace, by her next friend, against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
Where negligence is the basis of an action, and particular negligent acts are specifically alleged, the recovery depends upon proof of the negligence as alleged.
Where a declaration states a cause of action for any recovery defects in the statements of matters of inducement and in some of the specific acts of negligence do not render the declaration subject to demurrer.
Defects in matters of form or in the manner of stating a cause of action that do not make the declaration insufficient in substance may be reached by appropriate motion under the statute.
In an action against a common carrier for negligence, while a determination of whether there was negligence does not depend solely upon a compliance with the requirements of statutes ordinances, or other lawful governmental regulations, for circumstances may require additional precautions and care yet the prescribing of particular facilities that may be regarded as essential or useful in preventing injuries from trains at railroad crossings in municipalities or elsewhere is a function that is legislative or administrative in its nature.
Charges to the jury should be predicated upon the pleadings and the evidence adduced in the cause, and where there is no evidence to support a charge it is error to give it.
If an injury to the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of a railroad company in running its train, and subsequently such injury was increased or added to solely by the act or omission of the plaintiff, she cannot recover damages from the defendant for such added injury; but if the negligence of the defendant in running its train caused an initial injury to the plaintiff, and such negligence through the initial injury contributed proximately to an added injury to the plaintiff, she may recover damages therefor from the defendant; but the damages will be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's fault in causing the added injury.
Where it appears that an erroneous charge could reasonably have misled or confused the jury to the injury of the party complaining of it, a new trial will be granted.
John L. Doggett and J. B. Johnson, for plaintiff in error.
J. N. Stripling and F. L. Rees, for defendant in error.
This writ of error is to a judgment against the railroad company for personal injuries to Mary Wallace in being struck by an engine of a train while she was crossing the railroad track on a street in the town of Live Oak; her feet being partially crushed.
The negligence alleged is that 'the defendant then and there by its servants so carelessly and improperly drove and managed the said locomotive engine that, by and through the negligence and improper conduct of the defendant by its said servants in that behalf, the said locomotive engine then and there struck with great force and violence against the plaintiff,' injuring her as stated. The amendment to the declaration alleges 'that the injury which the plaintiff received, as aforesaid, was due to the negligence of the defendant in failing to maintain gates and a sufficient number of watchment at said crossing to warn and protect pedestrians and the plaintiff against approaching trains and engines, and to the negligence of the defendant, through its servants, in driving said locomotive at said crossing at the time of said injury at a greater rate of speed, to wit, at the rate of about 20 miles an hour, than allowed by law and the ordinance of the town of Live Oak, an incorporated city, which is four miles an hour, and in failing to ring any bell or sound any whistle on said engine or give any other notice or warning to indicate to the plaintiff the approach thereof on said occasion.'
The effect of the amendment is to limit the plaintiff to a recovery for the negligent acts specifically alleged. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones, 45 Fla. 407, 34 So. 246.
The second count of the declaration was apparently abandoned at the trial. A demurrer to the first count questions the sufficiency of the allegations as to matters of inducement, as to certain of the specific acts of negligence, and as to the alleged negligence being the proximate cause of the injury.
The declaration is not subject to the demurrer interposed to it, even though matters of inducement or some of the specific acts of negligence charged be defectively stated. It is sufficiently alleged that negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury complained of. Negligence of the plaintiff is a matter of defense.
Defects in matters of form or in the manner of stating a cause of action that do not make the declaration insufficient in substance may be reached by appropriate motion under the statute. See King v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 6 Idaho, 306, 55 P. 665, 59 L. R. A. 209, and notes.
The province of the jury is to determine whether under the facts and circumstances in evidence the defendant was negligent as alleged, and, if there was such negligence, whether it was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.
While a determination of whether there was negligence does not depend solely upon a compliance with the requirements of statutes ordinances, or other lawful governmental regulations, for circumstances may require additional precautions and care, yet the prescribing of particular facilities that may be regarded as essential or useful in preventing injuries from trains at railroad crossings in municipalities or elsewhere is a function that is legislative or administrative in its nature. Ordinarily it is not for a trial jury to determine whether particular methods or facilities should have been used to prevent an injury alleged, when such methods or facilities are not prescribed by competent authority or necessarily required by implication of law. But the jury should determine from all the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Loftin v. Crowley's Inc.
... ... the case of Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Ivey, Fla., 5 ... So.2d 244, 139 A.L.R. 973, to sustain ... Moseley, 60 Fla. 186, 53 So. 718; Atlantic C. L. R ... Co. v. Wallace, 61 Fla. 93, 54 So. 893; Warfield v ... Hepburn, 62 Fla. 409, 57 So ... ...
-
J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co. v. Carter
... ... passenger and freight trains on main line railroads, and each ... of a specially diffusive character, being ... Co., 61 Fla. 293, ... 54 So. 959; A. C. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 61 Fla. 93, ... 54 So. 893; also see Schultz v. Pacific Insurance ... ...
-
Liboy ex rel. Liboy v. Rogero ex rel. Rogero, 6:04-CV-30-ORL-31JGG.
...Buchman, 358 So.2d at 839. Buchman, in this regard, distinguished the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 61 Fla. 93, 54 So. 893, 895 (1911), which held that it is a legislative or administrative function, not a question for a jury, to determine the f......
-
Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co.
... ... the general issue. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v ... Crosby, 53 Fla. 400, 43 So. 318, and Seaboard ... Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Wallace, 61 Fla ... 93, 54 So. 893 ... We held ... that, 'Where an ... ...