Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District Court, Montrose County, 89SA423

• Decision Date: 09 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89SA423,89SA423
• Citation: 794 P.2d 253
• Parties: ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, Exxon Corporation, and Shell Western E & P, Inc., Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT, MONTROSE COUNTY, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Richard Jay Brown, Acting District Judge, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 253

794 P.2d 253

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, Exxon Corporation, and Shell Western E & P, Inc., Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT, MONTROSE COUNTY, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Richard Jay Brown, Acting District Judge, Respondents.

No. 89SA423.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

July 9, 1990.

Holland & Hart, Perry L. Glantz, Robert M. Pomeroy, Jr., Denver, for Atlantic Richfield Co. and Exxon Corp.

Jones, Meiklejohn, Kehl & Lyons, Edward T. Lyons, Jr., Denver, for Shell Western E & P, Inc.

John R. McNeill, James H. Delman, Montrose, for respondents.

Jack P. Wolfe, Longmont, for Twelve Member Cooperatives.

Carol A. Curran, Montrose, for Southeast Colorado Power Ass'n.

Chief Justice ROVIRA delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the Atlantic Richfield Company, Exxon Corporation, and Shell Western E & P, Inc. (oil companies), petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus either ordering the trial court to take further action on the issue of refunds or ordering the trial court to remand the case to the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for determination of the refund issue arising out of our decision in Colorado-Ute Electric Association, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 760 P.2d 627 (Colo.1988), appeal dismissed, 489 U.S. 1061, 109 S.Ct. 1333, 103 L.Ed.2d 804 (1989). The oil companies also requested this court to vacate the trial court's contingent summary judgment in favor of thirteen member cooperatives who intervened in the case. We issued a rule to show cause why the trial court should not conduct further proceedings on the issue of restitution, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the PUC for determination of the refund issue. We now make the rule absolute, and order the trial court to remand the case to the PUC for determination of whether the oil companies are entitled to refunds, and, if so, the amounts that may be due and the method of payment. We also order the trial court to vacate the summary judgment in favor of the thirteen member cooperatives.

I

A brief review of the history of this case is necessary to understand the current controversy. Colorado-Ute generates and transmits electrical power on a wholesale basis to fourteen member cooperatives, who in turn market the electrical power on a retail basis to electrical consumers. In December 1981, Colorado-Ute requested an increase in rates from the PUC. The PUC initiated Case No. 6076 for the purpose of investigating the reasonableness of the tariffs filed by Colorado-Ute. A number of parties intervened and participated in the proceeding, including the member cooperatives, and certain customers of the cooperatives, including the oil companies. After presentation of evidence by Colorado-Ute and the member cooperatives, the PUC approved the revenue increase. However, it disapproved Colorado-Ute's use of a "flat rate" and ordered Colorado-Ute to file a "seasonally differentiated demand energy rate." The PUC also allocated over $24 million of generation fixed costs (demand costs) to the energy component of the demand-energy rate.

Colorado-Ute and the member cooperatives sought judicial review of the PUC's decisions in the Montrose County District Court. The oil companies sought judicial review of that portion of the PUC's decisions which allegedly had misclassified certain demand costs as energy costs.

Colorado-Ute and the member cooperatives moved the trial court for a stay or suspension of the PUC's decisions on the ground that they would suffer irreparable injury if the decisions were implemented. The trial court suspended the PUC decisions, finding that failure to stay the decisions would "result in serious financial uncertainties and impact" to the member cooperatives. The court ordered Colorado-Ute to file a suspending bond of $500,000 pursuant to section 40-6-116, 17 C.R.S. (1984).

The trial court then reviewed the merits of the PUC decisions. The court set aside that part of the PUC's determination which required Colorado-Ute to file rates based on a seasonally differentiated demand-energy rate design. Further, the trial court set aside the PUC's allocation of $24 million of demand costs to energy costs, and held that if the supreme court were to find lawful the PUC's imposition of the seasonally differentiated demand-energy rate, the commission would be directed to allocate demand-energy costs in accord with a study contained in one of the exhibits.

On appeal to this court, the PUC urged reversal of the district court's order in its entirety. Colorado-Ute and the member cooperatives requested that we dismiss the appeal on the ground of mootness, or, in the alternative, affirm the district court's order. The oil companies requested that the district court's order setting aside the seasonally differentiated demand-energy rate be reversed, but that the district court's order concerning the allocation of charges be affirmed. The oil companies also requested an order from this court directing the payment of refunds to customers who might have overpaid under the flat rate scheme during the time that the PUC's order requiring a demand-energy rate was under suspension pursuant to the trial court order.

In Colorado-Ute Electric Association, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 760 P.2d 627 (Colo.1988), appeal dismissed, 489 U.S. 1061, 109 S.Ct. 1333, 103 L.Ed.2d 804 (1989), we held that (1) the appeals were not moot; (2) the district court's rejection of the PUC's findings on rate design constituted an impermissible intrusion into the PUC's ratemaking process; and (3) the district court's order setting aside that portion of the PUC's order which classified over $24 million of demand costs as energy costs should be affirmed. Concerning the issue of refunds, we declined to decide whether the oil companies were entitled to such reimbursement, but held that their claim was sufficient to avoid an allegation of mootness. At the close of our opinion, we remanded the case "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

After remand, the PUC complied with the district court's order in which the PUC was directed to allocate demand-energy costs in accordance with the study contained in one of the exhibits. On August 22, 1988, the oil companies moved the trial court for an order dissolving its suspension of the PUC decisions and requested a hearing to determine the damages or refunds to which they were entitled as a result of the suspension. Thirteen of the member cooperatives also submitted a motion for summary judgment in which the trial court was requested to rule that the cooperatives had no liability for damages.

By order dated August 24, 1989, the trial court held that it was without jurisdiction to determine liability and damages as requested, and indicated that the PUC was the appropriate body to perform this function. The court also declined to exercise any equitable jurisdiction that it may have had. Further, the court held that there was no evidence of any illegal actions by Colorado-Ute, thus no liability could be imposed for damages under section 40-7-102, 17 C.R.S. (1984). Finally, the court held that in the event it was reversed on the jurisdictional issue, the summary judgment motion of the thirteen member cooperatives would be granted because there was no basis upon which the court could find liability to the oil companies by any of the cooperative members. The oil companies filed motions to alter or amend, requesting that the trial court determine the issue of refunds itself or, in the alternative, remand the case to the PUC for determination of the refund issue. Subsequently, the trial court issued an amended order which denied the oil companies' motion for damages on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to act in that matter. The court's order further stated that if its determination that it was without jurisdiction were reversed, then the case would be remanded to the PUC for further proceedings.

The oil companies then petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus to enforce compliance with our mandate. On March 29, 1990, we issued an order finding that the district court was "vested with jurisdiction to determine the issue of refunds or to remand the case to the Public Utilities Commission for determination of this issue." The cause was remanded to the district court with directions to order the PUC to conduct a hearing, including the taking of evidence if necessary, on the issue of whether the oil companies were entitled to refunds, and, if so, the amounts that may be due and the method of payment. ¹

In compliance with our order, the district court remanded the case to the PUC for a hearing on the refund issue. Shortly thereafter, the member cooperatives informed the PUC of their belief that they were no longer parties to the refund proceeding because the district court's contingent summary judgment came into existence when this court found that the trial court was vested with jurisdiction. The oil companies then filed a Joint Motion for Clarification or Amendment of Order Making Rule to Show Cause Absolute, requesting this court to clarify whether the summary judgment in favor of the member cooperatives was vacated and whether they remain as parties to the refund proceedings. The issue has been fully briefed by both the oil companies and the member cooperatives. We now withdraw and vacate our order of March 29, 1990, and issue this opinion in its stead. ²

II

The oil companies contend that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the issue of refunds. We agree.

The district court first held that it was without jurisdiction to determine the refund issue because its authority to review PUC decisions was limited by section 40-6-115, 17 C.R.S. (1984). Because that section prohibits the district court from taking new or additional evidence, and because the statute provides that "review shall not extend further than to determine whether the...