Attorney Grievance v. Saridakis

Decision Date07 December 2007
Docket NumberMisc. AG No. 25, September Term, 2006.
PartiesATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION of Maryland v. Anthony A. SARIDAKIS.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Fletcher P. Thompson, Asst. Bar Counsel (Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland), for petitioner.

Albert D. Brault (Brault Graham, LLC), Rockville, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER,* CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE and ALAN M. WILNER (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

HARRELL, J.

The Attorney Grievance Commission ("Petitioner"), acting through Bar Counsel, filed with this Court on 27 July 2006 a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the "Petition") against Anthony Alex Saridakis ("Respondent") alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") in connection with his preparation of a will on behalf of an unrelated, long-time client, Wylette Speed, in which he was named the beneficiary of a substantial bequest (in excess of $400,000.00). Respondent was charged accordingly with violations of MRPC 1.8(c) (Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients)1 and 8.4(d) (Misconduct).2

I. Procedural History

Respondent answered the Petition, admitting most of the factual allegations therein, but denying those averments concluding that his actions constituted violations of the MRPC. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a),3 we referred the matter to the Honorable Joseph A. Dugan, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law according to Maryland Rule 16-757(c).4 Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Dugan filed on 1 February 2007 his written findings of fact and conclusions of law, which stated his determination that Respondent did not commit the ethical violations alleged. Petitioner filed timely with this Court its Exceptions to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Were Petitioner's Exceptions well-taken, it recommended a sanction of indefinite suspension. Respondent filed a Response to those exceptions and urged dismissal of the Petition.

II. The Hearing Judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Respondent was admitted by the Court of Appeals and to the District of Columbia Bar in 1974. Respondent, since then, remains a member in good standing in both jurisdictions. After being employed for several years with the United States Department of State, and later engaged in private practice, Respondent became associated in 1983 with the law firm of DeOrsey & Thompson ("the Firm"). Since 1991, he has been the only lawyer practicing under the Firm name.5 His practice focuses mainly on estate planning, probate and trust administration, and taxation.

When Respondent joined DeOrsey & Thompson in 1983, the Firm had a pre-existing business client named Speed & Briscoe, which operated truck stops along the Interstate 95 corridor. Mr. Speed and Mr. Briscoe, the partners of the business, were close friends. Mr. Lee Speed and his wife, Wylette, the testatrix, did not have any children. Mr. and Mrs. Briscoe had one child, Lee Speed Briscoe. Lee and Wylette were the godparents of the Briscoes' child. Mr. Speed passed away in 1975, leaving a trust estate in favor of his wife. American Security and Trust Company was designated as the trustee. Because Wylette's husband had relied on DeOrsey & Thompson for his legal services, Wylette entrusted Respondent, as an associate of the Firm, to represent her legal interests.

Wylette had no immediate family in close proximity to her residential condominium unit in Bethesda, Maryland. Her only relatives consisted of a sister in ill health residing in Baltimore and a niece who lived in Ohio. Her primary social contacts thus were with her trust officers, Marny McCain and her husband, Robert McCain; her godson, Lee Speed Briscoe; and Respondent. Respondent visited with Wylette on a regular basis throughout his legal representation of her. Although Mrs. Speed was a quiet person, and generally kept to herself, she demonstrated a strong will and keen ability to participate in the decision-making process concerning recommendations made to her by the trust officers and Respondent.

In the late 1980s, Respondent drafted several wills for Wylette, at her request. She also executed a general power of attorney in favor of Respondent and named him as her health care agent. As a result, Respondent exercised control over all of her financial and real estate matters. The hearing judge in the present case determined that Wylette was satisfied with Respondent's work and reposed a great deal of trust in him as her attorney.

In 1992, Wylette suffered a debilitating stroke. Respondent came to visit Wylette at least once during her stay at Suburban Hospital to bring her clothes, and on one other occasion to facilitate her transfer to a nursing home. Respondent visited Wylette frequently at the first nursing home and undertook to research a more suitable place for her after she complained of her accommodations. As a result of Respondent's efforts, Mrs. Speed was transferred to a facility that paid closer attention to her wants and needs. While in these quarters, Respondent visited Wylette several times a month and continued to manage her trust, estate, and tax matters, in addition to serving as the "family member" at all meetings with the nursing home staff, where her medical care and therapy were discussed and evaluated.

After several months in the new nursing home, Wylette repeated her request, made once previously while in the first nursing home, that Respondent draft for her a new will that, for the first time, would include Respondent as a beneficiary of her residuary estate. Respondent reviewed the bequests with her and advised her that he did not feel comfortable composing a will in which he was a beneficiary. Wylette, however, was adamant about her wishes, so Respondent told her that she should consult with another attorney because of his concerns about preparing such a will. Mrs. Speed responded that she did not know any other attorneys because of her long-standing reliance on the Firm and Respondent. She asked Respondent to locate another attorney in order to carry out her desired disposition. In the meantime, Wylette informed her godson, Lee Speed Briscoe, of her proposed bequest to Respondent. Her godson reacted to this news as a natural and reasonable decision, given his awareness of the close relationship she had with her attorney.

Respondent prepared the will according to Wylette's instructions and consulted with an experienced estates and trusts attorney, Richard Lawlor, who shared office space with Respondent, for the purpose of reviewing the will with Wylette and gauging her competence. Lawlor and Respondent came to know one another initially while representing independent clients in an estate matter in 1988. Several years later, DeOrsey & Thompson relocated its offices into an office suite in Silver Spring, Maryland, shared by the firm for which Lawlor was working. From 1990 until 1995, the firms maintained separate leases for the office suite, but shared a receptionist and a conference room. The firms did not, however, share clients and maintained distinct law practices.

Lawlor agreed to meet with Wylette Speed. On the appointed day of 13 May 1994, Lawlor and Respondent traveled separately to Wylette's nursing home. Respondent introduced Lawlor to Wylette and explained the terms of the will he drafted at her request. He then explained to Wylette that Lawlor was going to serve as her attorney for the day in order to discuss and, if necessary, modify the will. Respondent then left the room for Wylette and Lawlor to consult privately. Lawlor, according to the available evidence, conversed generally with Mrs. Speed, which allowed him to form the opinion that she was of sound mind and competent to execute a will. Next, Lawlor reviewed all of the items contained in the will drafted by Respondent and verified Wylette's donative intent as to each item, including the bequest to Respondent. Because Mrs. Speed was unable to sign her own name— a disability stemming from her stroke— she executed the will by marking an "X" on the signature line. This mark was accompanied by a jurat6 prepared by Lawlor, intended to verify that he witnessed Wylette Speed execute the will.

The hearing judge concluded that Lawlor "acted as independent counsel to Wylette." As principal support for this conclusion, Judge Dugan relied on a three-page, typed memorandum, prepared by Lawlor immediately following the meeting, relating to his consultation with Wylette at the nursing home on 13 May 1994. This memorandum was the source of Lawlor's recount of what transpired between he and Mrs. Speed. Lawlor also opened a client file for Wylette, noted the nature of his representation as "estate planning consultation," and prepared a bill for his services. Lawlor addressed the bill to Wylette, which ultimately was forwarded to Respondent so that it could be paid from Mrs. Speed's trust assets. Wylette was apprised of this arrangement and consented.

Wylette Speed died on 6 April 2000. Respondent, in his capacity as personal representative for Mrs. Speed, made the appropriate filings to administer her estate. Among the documents submitted for probate was a "First and Final Account," which listed all bequests, including the residuary bequest in favor of Respondent in the amount of $413,281.00, out of a gross estate of $3,548,410.00. The account was approved by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as the Orphan's Court.

The hearing judge in the present case accepted as an expert witness in the field of legal ethics, Professor Abraham Dash of the faculty of the University of Maryland School of Law. The judge's findings stated that "Professor Dash's opinion, which was accepted in full by this Court, is that Respondent did not violate Rule 1.8(c) of the...

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