Aubrey v. D Magazine Partners, L.P.
| Decision Date | 29 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-0056-B |
| Parties | STEVEN B. AUBREY and BRIAN E. VODICKA, Plaintiffs, v. D MAGAZINE PARTNERS, L.P.; ALLISON MEDIA, INC.; JAMIE L. THOMPSON; ROBERT L. ERMATINGER, JR. SCOTT ROBERT SAYERS; ERIC VAUGHN MOYE; CITY OF DALLAS; DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; and DOES 1-20, all whose true names are unknown, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary and Permanent Injunction (Doc, 17, the "Motion") against Defendant, the City of Dallas (the "City"). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED without prejudice to refile.
Plaintiffs in this case bring a variety of federal- and state-law claims against various defendants based on events surrounding the death of Ira E. Tobolowsky. This Motion seeks to enjoin the City from complying with a state-court order to turn over Dallas Police Department's homicide file on Ira Tobolowsky's death to a private citizen, namely Tobolowsky's son. Doc. 17, Mot., 2, 10; Doc. 45, Pls.' Reply, 4. Plaintiffs were at one point suspects in that case, and during the investigation the City allegedly compiled personal information on Plaintiffs, including records of their medical, cell phone, email, and credit card history, as well as photographs and videotapes of a strip search that was performed. Doc. 17, Mot., 4. Plaintiffs assert that all of the information in that file was improperly obtained, is private, and should not be publicized to anyone, much less Tobolowsky's son. Doc. 45, Pls.' Reply, 3-4.
Plaintiffs were never parties to the state-court suit that issued the order for the City to disclose the homicide file, although a different state-court judge previously quashed a subpoena Tobolowsky's son issued for some of Plaintiffs' confidential information. Id. Ex. A. Plaintiffs state that they first learned of this state-court order on or about February 28, 2019. Id. Ex. D, ¶ 4 (Aubrey Declaration); Id. Ex. E, ¶ 4 (Vodicka Declaration).
In their Motion, Plaintiffs raise several merits arguments as to why the state-court order was improperly issued: (1) that Tobolowsky's son violated the notice requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.2(f) in failing to give interested persons like Plaintiffs notice of his attempts to obtain the homicide file; (2) the law enforcement privilege should have barred Tobolowsky's son's request; and (3) the order would violate Plaintiffs' right to privacy. Doc. 17, Mot. 3-7; Doc. 45, Pls.' Reply, 3.
The City itself opposes the state-court order, albeit on the grounds of law-enforcement privilege and undue burden, not on the Plaintiffs' privacy rights. See Doc. 41, Def.'s Resp., 2; Doc. 45, Pls.' Reply, Ex. C (City's response in opposition to Tobolowsky's son's Rule 202 petition). The City has appealed the state-court order, and litigation is ongoing in the Fifth Court of Appeals,Dallas, Texas. Doc. 41, Def.'s Resp., 2. Until the appeal is resolved, the order is suspended. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 6.002(b); Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(h).
In short, Plaintiffs argue that this Court should enjoin the City from complying with the state-court order. The City responds: (1) Plaintiffs fail to establish jurisdiction; (2) the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction; (3) Plaintiffs lack standing; and (4) Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to show injunctive relief is warranted. See generally, Doc. 41, Def.'s Resp. As all briefing has been received, the Court considers the Motion.
There are four prerequisites for the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction. A court may grant such relief only when the movant establishes that:
(1) there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury [to the movant] outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987); Canal Auth. of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). The party seeking such relief must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985); Clark, 812 F.2d at 993. Otherwise stated, if a party fails to meet any of the four requirements, the court cannot grant the preliminary injunction.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a movant first must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. He must also demonstrate a substantial likelihood that abstention principles will not preclude relief. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1997) (). If abstention is not warranted, the Court need only consider whether a movant has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of one of his claims. See Ramada Franchise Sys. Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., 2001 WL 540213, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2001). Thus, the Court first addresses its jurisdiction and whether abstention is proper before proceeding to address the four preliminary-injunction elements.
The Court first rejects the City's argument that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, bars Plaintiffs' claims, many of which are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. 41, Def.'s Resp., 3-4. Both the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit have recognized that Section 1983 is an express exception to the Congressional policy that federal courts shall not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court. Duke v. State of Tex., 477 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)). While the Court has not yet ruled on the City's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' 1983 claims, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are sufficiently well-plead such that the Court may exercise jurisdiction here, despite the Anti-Injunction Act. However, there are potential abstentionissues that the Court addresses below.
The City argues that even if jurisdiction exists, the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' application for injunctive relief. Doc. 41, Def.'s Resp., 4 (citing Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242-43; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). Under Younger—the abstention doctrine most applicable here and the doctrine relied on by the City—a federal court is required "to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that seek to interfere with or interrupt ongoing state proceedings." SKS & Assocs. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2010). But, as the City concedes, because Plaintiffs were not parties to the state court action, Younger does not absolutely bar Plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 678 () (emphasis added); Doc. 41, Def.'s Resp., 4.
However, courts have applied Younger's abstention principles when a case "implicates the same principles of equity, comity, and federalism." SKS, 619 F.3d at 677. For example, one of the considerations that drove the Seventh Circuit to apply Younger abstention principles and to refuse to enjoin state action in SKS was the principle that "when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceeding, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary." Id. at 680 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)). The court noted that "[w]hen a section 1983 suit seeks a federal order compelling a state court to do something in an ongoing action, it calls upon the federal courts to cause friction with principles of comity and federalism." Id. at 682. The court cited three avenues for the plaintiff to present its claims in the state-court litigation it wasalready a part of—and conclude that abstention was proper. Id. at 680.
Here, although there are some similarities to the SKS case, SKS is only persuasive authority, and ultimately distinguishable. For example, unlike the plaintiff in SKS, Plaintiffs are not parties to the on-going state suit—and Plaintiffs state that they have no right to intervene in the ongoing appeal to bring their constitutional claims. In general, this is true: "While the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not impose a deadline for intervention, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 60, the general rule is that a party may not intervene after final judgment unless the judgment is set aside." State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011), aff'd, 466 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. 2015).
The only exception this Court is aware of is the virtual-representation doctrine, which the Texas Supreme Court has held is an equitable doctrine that requires a case-by-case analysis. See, e.g., In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tex. 2006) (). But "[i]n order to claim virtual representation, an appellant must show that (1) it is bound by the judgment, (2) its privity of estate, title, or interest appears from the record, and (3) there is an identity of interest between the appellant and a named party to the judgment." Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at 439. And of these three factors, "the most...
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