Augusta & S.R. Co. v. City Council of Augusta
| Decision Date | 29 March 1897 |
| Citation | 28 S.E. 126,100 Ga. 701 |
| Parties | AUGUSTA & S. R. CO. v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA et al. SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. SAME. SOUTH CAROLINA & G. R. CO. v. SAME. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where a railroad company was incorporated by an act of the general assembly of March 20, 1866, "for the full term of thirty years," the act being silent as to any renewal or extension of the charter thereby granted, and it being declared therein that the company was incorporated for the purpose of building and using, with the consent of the city council of a named city, a horse railroad from a designated point within the corporate limits to a point or points outside of the same, a grant by the city council to the company, "their successors and assigns, for and during the term of their charter," of a right of way through and over the streets of the city, expired on the date upon which the period of 30 years specified in the charter ended and was thereafter no longer effective.
2. The above is true although such grant was made by ordinances and by a written contract, all of which were subsequently ratified and confirmed by an act of the general assembly which also declared that these ordinances and this contract were "not liable to be repealed by the city council," and although in the contract the city council stipulated that it would "forever" keep in force the second section of one of these ordinances which, while entitled generally "An ordinance authorizing the construction of street railways" in the city in question, related exclusively to this particular company; the second section referred to, among other things, providing that "the cars and carriages of said company running on said railways, turnouts, and switches, and sidings shall be entitled to the right of way over their said tracks," and prohibiting teams and vehicles from obstructing the free passage of the company's cars.
3. Where such a railroad company, in pursuance of an ordinance authorizing it to obtain from another railroad company "a lease for thirty years" of a track which had already been laid in certain streets, entered into a contract with the latter company, by the terms of which the company first referred to was to have the use of that track "for the term of their charter," this contract likewise expired by limitation on the day when the period of 30 years mentioned in the charter of the lessee company was completed.
4. The time for the expiration of the original charter being the 20th day of March, 1896, and the general assembly having, on the 13th day of November, 1889, passed an act to continue this charter in force upon certain conditions, and with certain restrictions in the act set forth, the company's acceptance of this act made the same the company's charter, and thereafter its corporate powers, rights, and privileges were to be measured and limited by the provisions of this latter act.
5. Although this act, among other things, declared that the company to which it referred might, "at any time, by a majority vote of the stockholders, surrender their present charter before the expiration thereof, and accept this new charter, with all its privileges and liabilities," this was not the exclusive manner in which the company could accept the new charter. The same result could be, and in the present case was, accomplished by its applying to and obtaining from the city council, under and by virtue of this very act, valuable privileges and franchises, which it actually used and enjoyed, and subsequently sold to another corporation.
6. Having accepted the provisions of the act of 1889, which renewed and extended the charter life of the company for a period of 50 additional years, there was no authority of law for the company subsequently to apply to and obtain from the secretary of state an independent renewal of its charter under the act of December 20, 1893, that act having no application save to corporations whose charters had expired, or were presently about to expire.
7. Inasmuch as the act of 1889 expressly declared that it should not "have the effect or be construed to extend or continue in force" the several amendments to the original charter of the company, which had been previously enacted, or the ordinances and contract above referred to; and also that the right to use the streets of the city in question should be "subject to the consent of, and on such conditions as might be prescribed by, the city council,"--it was certainly after March 20, 1896, essential that the company should again obtain such consent before being entitled to continue its use of the streets of the city for the purposes specified in its original charter.
8. The rule being that legislative grants of authority to municipal corporations must, where the rights of the public are concerned, be strictly construed, and that in such cases no power passes which is not clearly comprehended within the words of the statute, or derived therefrom by necessary implication, an act authorizing a city council "to permit the connection by common depots, tracks, or otherwise of all railroads in said city, or any of them, upon such terms and conditions as may be fixed and agreed on between the city council and them," did not give to the municipal authorities the power to confer upon any railroad company using steam motors the right to construct and operate a railway or railways longitudinally along and over the public streets of the city.
(a) The municipality could not, under the grant embraced in the words above quoted, confer upon a railway corporation any higher or greater privileges than it would have been entitled to if these words, or words of like import, had been contained in a direct grant from the general assembly to the corporation itself.
Error from superior court, Richmond county; E. H. Callaway, Judge.
Separate actions by the Augusta & Summerville Railroad Company, the Southern Railway Company, and the South Carolina & Georgia Railroad Company against the city council of Augusta and others. There were judgments for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.
Frank H. Miller, Boykin Wright, W. K. Miller, and Jos. B. Cumming, for plaintiffs in error.
M. P. Carroll, J. R. Lamar, J. S. & W. T. Davidson, J. Ganahl, and Black & Verdery, for defendants in error.
The Augusta & Summerville Railroad Company was incorporated by an act of the general assembly approved March 20, 1866 "for the full term of thirty years." The charter declared that the company was incorporated for the purpose of building and using, with the consent of the city council of Augusta, a horse railroad from a designated point within the limits of the city to a point or points outside of the same. The city council, both by ordinances and by a special contract, in writing, granted to the company, "their successors and assigns, for and during the term of their charter," a right of way through and over the streets of the city. There is nothing in the charter with reference to any renewal or extension of the same beyond the period of 30 years. The ordinances and contract above referred to were subsequently ratified and confirmed by another act of the general assembly (Acts 1889, p. 700), which, among other things, declared that they were "not liable to be repealed by the city council" of Augusta. One of these ordinances purported generally to authorize the construction of street railways in Augusta, but an inspection of it shows that it was intended to relate exclusively to this particular company. The second section of this ordinance provided that "the cars and carriages of this company running on said railways, turnouts, and switches and sidings [viz. those the company had been authorized to construct] shall be entitled to the right of way over their said tracks," and prohibited teams and vehicles from obstructing the free passage of the company's cars. In the special contract between the city and the company it was stipulated that the city would "forever" keep this section in force. Prior to the year 1868, the South Carolina Railroad Company was in possession of and using a railway track which had been laid longitudinally in Washington street, in the city of Augusta, claiming the rights to do so under ordinances adopted by, and contracts made with, the city council. This track affords the only existing means by which a connection between some of the railroads running into Augusta can be made with other railroads entering the city, so as to facilitate the transaction of through business. On March 13, 1868, the city council adopted an ordinance authorizing the Augusta & Summerville Railroad Company to obtain from the South Carolina Railroad Company "a lease for thirty years" of the track above mentioned, and in pursuance of this ordinance a contract was entered into between these two companies, by the terms of which the Augusta & Summerville Railroad Company was to have the use of that track "for the term of their charter." In 1869, the Columbia & Augusta Railroad Company, when nearing the completion of its road, petitioned the city council for leave to enter the city. An ordinance was adopted on April 27th of that year reciting that, if the street-railroad tracks were sufficient, "then the said Columbia & Augusta Railroad must arrange with said street-railroad company [meaning the Augusta & Summerville Railroad Company] for this purpose." This gave rise to a controversy between the South Carolina Railroad Company on the one side and the city council and the Columbia & Augusta Railroad Company on the other, which was adjusted and settled by a tripartite agreement, by the terms of which the city council guarantied to the two railroad companies ...
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