Auguste v. MacEachern

• Decision Date: 30 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–12395–LTS.
• Citation: 94 F.Supp.3d 59
• Parties: Mac HUDSON and Evans Auguste, Plaintiffs, v. Duane MacEACHERN, Scott Anderson, Keith Nano, Timothy Bariamis, and Christine Brockelman, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

94 F.Supp.3d 59

Mac HUDSON and Evans Auguste, Plaintiffs

v.Duane MacEACHERN, Scott Anderson, Keith Nano, Timothy Bariamis, and Christine Brockelman, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–12395–LTS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed March 30, 2015.

Filed March 31, 2015.

Mac Hudson, Concord, MA, pro se.

Evans Auguste, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Richard C. McFarland, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

SOROKIN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Mac Hudson and Evans Auguste,¹ both in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, bring this pro se action against several officials of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Shirley (“MCI–Shirley”). Plaintiffs claim that they were targeted for retaliation by Defendants for their activities grieving certain actions taken by Defendants as well as for assisting other prisoners in grieving those actions. Plaintiffs have brought several constitutional claims as well as other federal and state law claims. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that it fails to state a claim and, as to two Defendants, that proper service has not been effected. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTS

The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and accepted as true for the purpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs were involved with a program called “Bridging the Gap.” Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1721. Auguste, among others, had petitioned prison administrators to seek approval for the program, which, it is alleged, was granted. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. After Hudson was transferred to MCI–Shirley in August 2010, he became active in the group as “chairman” of the program. Id. ¶¶ 2021. In that role, Hudson submitted an informal grievance and otherwise complained to the administration, including Defendant MacEachern, about the delay in approving certain proposals submitted by the group. Id. ¶¶ 21–23. Sometime after those complaints, Bridging the Gap was discontinued as a program by Defendant Anderson. Id. ¶ 26. In response to the administration's actions, Hudson advised members of the group who were upset by the actions that they should submit individual grievances to the administration to seek redress. Id. ¶ 28. Auguste assisted group members who were unfamiliar with the grievance process in submitting grievances regarding the discontinuance of Bridging the Gap. Id. ¶ 29.

The administration, in the person of Defendant Bariamis, the Institutional Grievance Officer, received a large number of grievances related to the discontinuance of the Bridging the Gap program. Id. ¶ 30. Defendant Bariamis notified Defendant Anderson of the volume of grievances he had received, and Anderson ordered an investigation into the grievance activity. Id. Thereafter, corrections officers, including Defendant Nano, interviewed several of the inmates who had submitted grievances. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. Hudson and Auguste eventually were identified for the assistance they provided to prisoners in filing grievances. Id. ¶¶ 32, 36. Both Hudson and Auguste were placed in the Special Management Unit within MCI–Shirley while the investigation continued. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.

The investigation resulted in disciplinary reports for both Hudson and Auguste, alleging that they had pressured other inmates to file grievances. Id. ¶ 38. Hudson and Auguste allege that the reports of pressuring other inmates were fabricated by Defendant Nano. Id. They claim that the investigation into the allegations in the disciplinary reports was either inadequate or nonexistent, and that the disciplinary reports were intended to alter Plaintiffs' classification such that they would be subject to more restrictive conditions of confinement.Id. ¶¶ 39–40. Both Plaintiffs were found guilty of disciplinary offenses and their appeals were denied. Id. ¶¶ 39, 41. Internal grievances they submitted relating to the investigation and disciplinary reports were also denied. Id. ¶ 41.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants, by threats and intimidation, conspired to deny the group members of the benefit of the Bridging the Gap program and further conspired to prevent Plaintiffs from filing their own grievances as well as assisting other inmates in submitting grievances. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution for filing grievances and assisting others in submitting grievances, and that Plaintiffs were denied due process by the investigation and disciplinary procedures that followed the grievance activity. Id. ¶¶ 43, 45.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The Court “must take the allegations in the complaint as true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[ ].” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). “[F]actual allegations” must be separated from “conclusory statements in order to analyze whether the former, if taken as true, set forth a plausible, not merely a conceivable, case for relief.” Juarez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 708 F.3d 269, 276 (1st Cir.2013) (internal quotations omitted). This highly deferential standard of review “does not mean, however, that a court must (or should) accept every allegation made by the complainant, no matter how conclusory or generalized.” United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir.1992). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the pleadings fail to set forth “factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1997) ).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that Hudson is barred from bringing the claims contained in the Complaint under the doctrine of res judicata due to his previous litigation of related issues in Massachusetts state court. Defendants also argue that the Complaint independently fails to state a claim and that Plaintiffs failed to serve two Defendants.

A. Res Judicata

Defendants argue that Hudson is precluded from raising the claims presented in the Complaint due to the doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, arising from his prior litigation of related issues in state court. Although res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be plead and proved by Defendants, SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town Of Westminster, 547 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir.2008), in certain circumstances the Court may address res judicata in resolving a motion to dismiss. For res judicata to be ripe at this stage, two requirements must be satisfied. First, “the facts that establish the defense must be definitively ascertainable from the allegations of the complaint, the documents (if any) incorporated therein, matters of public record, and other matters of which the court may take judicial notice.”In re Colonial Mortgage Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.2003). Second, “the facts so gleaned must conclusively establish the affirmative defense.” Id.; see also Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir.2004).

Here, the facts implicating res judicata are not contained within the Complaint, rather they are contained within state court documents brought to the Court's attention by Defendants. Defendants attached to their Motion to Dismiss a complaint filed in Middlesex County Superior Court by Hudson, as well as a memorandum and order dismissing that case on the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. Nos. 21–1, 21–2. Documents from prior state court adjudications are matters of public record and, as such, are appropriate for consideration on a motion to dismiss. See Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir.2008) ; In re Colonial Mortgage Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d at 19.

Turning to the merits of the res judicata issue, “[w]hen a federal court considers the preclusive effect of an earlier state court judgment, it must apply that state's preclusion principles.” Goldstein v. Galvin,

719 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir.2013) ; see Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). Thus, Massachusetts supplies the substantive law to resolve this question. Under Massachusetts law, “[t]hree elements are essential for invocation of claim preclusion: (1) the identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits.” DaLuz v. Dep't of Correction, 434 Mass. 40, 746 N.E.2d 501, 505 (2001).

Looking first to the identity of the parties, the state court complaint filed by Hudson named Scott Anderson and Gregory Bedard as defendants. Doc. No. 21–1 at 3. Anderson is a defendant in this action; Bedard, alleged to be a Disciplinary Hearing Officer at MCI–Shirley, is not. The present suit, in addition to Anderson, names MacEachern, Nano, Bariamis, and Brockelman as defendants. The different roster of defendants in this action, however, does not make res judicata inapplicable. “A non-party to the first action may use a judgment in that action defensively against a party who was a plaintiff in the first action on the issues which the judgment decided so long as the parties have a sufficiently close relationship.” Langadinos v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Mass., CIV. A. No. 12–11159–GAO, 2013 WL 5507042, at *7 (D.Mass. Sept. 30, 2013) (adopting report and recommendation of Boal,...